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ABSTRACT
The use of outsourcing in higher education has grown over the past decade as 
colleges and universities have sought management mechanisms to reduce operating costs 
and increase revenues. Current higher education management practice and related 
literature stress the financial benefits possible from outsourcing, provide case studies 
suggesting how financial benefits can be realized, and offer analytical matrices to assist 
decision makers arrive at an outsource decision. In addition, several published surveys 
list the numbers and types o f enterprises outsourced by higher education institutions. 
Curiously absent in higher education management literature is discussion o f non- 
flnancial considerations that may affect a decision to outsource. The presence of non- 
flnancial considerations may suggest that the economic, financially-oriented model is an 
incomplete explanation of outsource decisions and a more complete explanation is useful 
and appropriate for theoretical and practical purposes. This study identifies non-financial 
considerations affecting outsource decisions in higher education by focusing on how and 
why higher education institutions outsource and proposes a more complete decision 
model.
Five outsourcing case studies were conducted at four public institutions of higher 
education in Oklahoma. The cases yielded data on nine outsource decisions. Drawing 
on three theory-based models that can explain outsourcing — economic-based, 
management-based, and decision-process dynamics-based -  analysis suggests that the
vl
institutions outsource (the “why”) for two reasons. First, economic-financial benefits are 
derived as an in-house enterprise is exposed to the market’s competitive forces, and 
contracts are awarded that reduce costs and increase revenues. Second, management 
benefits are derived from a contractor’s ability to increase productivity, increase 
efficiencies, and provide economies of scale, and from divesting non-core activities. 
Analysis also suggests that the institutions decide to outsource (the “how”) as a result o f 
the institution’s decision process dynamics: the bureaucratic, the collegial, the political 
process dynamics. A more complete decision model thus accommodates an institution’s 
desire to gain both economic-financial and management-related benefits, and includes all 
three decision process dynamics, sequentially or simultaneously, in the decision process. 
Finally, the study concludes that analysis of reengineering or restructuring is and should 
be an integral part of outsource decisions.
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OUTSOURCING IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN OKLAHOMA
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem
Outsourcing, a business technique used by private enterprise and the public sector 
to reduce costs, increase productivity, and increase revenues, appears to be increasingly 
popular among public institutions of higher education (Green, 1992; Abramson, 
1993,1994, 1995; Wertz, 1996). Known as “privatizing” in the public sector, outsourcing 
stems from the theoretical concept that as an institution’s internal enterprises are exposed 
to competition, their products or services can be obtained at the lowest possible cost. As 
these internal enterprise are competitively bid and outsourced, the institution can thereby 
shed unprofitable or too-costly functions, divest non-core functions that detract from its 
primary purpose, and reduce overhead costs while increasing productivity and revenues 
(Thompson & Strictland, 1995). Current higher education management practice and 
related literature stress the financial benefits possible from outsourcing (Morrell, 1994), 
provide “case studies” suggesting how financial benefits can be realized (The 
Association, 1994; Green, 1992), and offer analytical matrices to assist decision makers 
arrive at a financially sound decision (Goldstein, 1993). In addition, several surveys
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have been published listing the numbers and types of functions and enterprises higher 
education institutions outsource and conclude it is a useful mechanism to reduce costs 
(Abramson, 1993,1994, 1995; Wertz, 1996). In sum, outsourcing is advocated and 
practiced among institutions o f higher education with the assumption that decisions to 
outsource are and should be economic-based and financially-driven.
Outsourcing as an economic, financial outcome therefore appears to provide 
sound justification for achieving cost savings and increased revenues. Curiously absent 
in higher education literature, however, is discussion of non-financial considerations and 
influences that may affect a decision to outsource. Although a highly-regarded higher 
education outsourcing “guide” tantalizes by suggesting institutional culture and ethical 
considerations must accommodated, its model is still a financially-based cost-benefit 
analysis (Goldstein, 1993). More to the point, the presence o f non-financial influences 
and considerations in a decision to outsource may suggest that the economic, financially- 
based model is an incomplete explanation o f outsource decisions, and a broader, more 
complete explanation is necessary and appropriate. Indeed, the decision process 
dynamics at work on a typical college or university campus themselves suggest the need 
to consider an alternative model.
Purpose
Postulating that an economic-based, financially-driven decision model may be an 
incomplete explanation of outsource decisions, this study identifies non-financial 
influences and considerations that affect the decision by focusing on how and why higher
education institutions outsource, and proposes a more complete decision model. 
Conducting a series o f case studies, two major questions are addressed: (I) what non- 
financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role in outsourcing decisions, 
and (2) how does their presence affect the decision?
Significance
This study has theoretical and practical dimensions. It contributes, first, to 
conceptual and theoretical understandings o f outsourcing as a process or as an outcome. 
Management literature reveals little, if anything, in the way of outsourcing theory. At 
best it allows one to draw a few conceptual distinctions that may contribute to an 
emerging “grounded theory” if they can be generalized (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). The 
study helps clarify these distinctions and contribute to this limited body of knowledge. 
Specifically, it identifies as yet unclear variables in the outsourcing process upon which 
subsequent studies, qualitative or quantitative, might be based. Second, the study 
contributes to a practical understanding of outsourcing as both a process and an outcome. 
The literature (Ginsburg, 1989) and practical experience suggest that outsourcing a 
traditional higher education function can cause campus-wide disruptions in service, 
morale, and personnel dislocations. Moreover, it may result in a degree of the 
outsourced function’s control loss that may ultimately be unacceptable to the institution. 
For these reasons, a more complete understanding of these practical dimensions of 
outsource decisions contributes to their avoidance and, ultimately, to outsourcing’s more 
successful use.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The strands o f three theories converge to influence outsourcing decisions in 
higher education; economic theory, management theory, and decision making theory. 
Economic theory addresses the role of competition and its financial benefits. 
Management theory addresses operational effectiveness and the benefits of divestiture. 
Decision making theory provides an explanation of how decisions are made. Taken 
together, these theories can provide a more complete explanation of the outsource 
phenomenon.
Economic Literature 
Economic theory explains that in a free market, where prices are free to change, 
the profit motive and competition result in the best good or service at the lowest cost 
(Boyes & Melvin, 1991). Where a good or service is needed to benefit all members of 
society (a public good) but the full cost to produce it is too high for all direct consumers
to pay, like education, then government steps in with taxes and subsidies to provide it at 
below-market prices. Taken out o f the free market, however, public goods are no longer 
subject to the regulating influences of profit and competition to ensure the best service at 
the lowest price. Thus, overhead costs increase, productivity decreases, and efficient 
service declines. Only by exposing public goods and services once more to the forces of 
competition will public enterprises reduce overhead costs, increase productivity, and 
provide efficient services.
Introducing competition into the public sector is a central theme of Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992). Citing continuing and intractable problems in public education, health 
care, the justice system, and prison overcrowding, among many public issues, the authors 
state that the public's confidence in government has fallen to a record low. The tax revolt 
that began in 1978 continues, with the public growing impatient with elected officials 
unable to deliver on promises to do more with less, and dismayed at the bottom-line 
choice o f fewer services or higher taxes. Their thesis: the highly centralized, rule and 
regulation-driven, hierarchically-structured bureaucracies created during the growth of 
the industrialized era are no longer responsive to society's needs.
In this context, the authors see the emergence of a new form of governance they 
identify as "entrepreneurial" government. Taking cues from the revolutionary changes in 
American business and society that decentralize authority, flatten hierarchies, emphasize 
quality, and respond to customers' demands, entrepreneurial governments are becoming 
creative in efforts to make government more responsive. They are promoting 
competition between service providers, empowering citizens in community-based
programs, focusing on outcomes, being driven by missions rather than rules, redefining 
clients as customers, working to prevent problems instead of relying only on cures, 
developing alternate revenue sources, decentralizing authority, relying on market 
incentives and mechanisms, and trying to stimulate not only the public sector, but also 
the private and voluntary sectors, into solving community problems. The authors' 
purposes are twofold: to identify the common threads in this new movement, and to 
provide a roadmap to governments at the federal, state, and local levels who want to 
change.
At the heart o f the movement is recognition that governments must "steer," not 
"row." They must move more toward governance, or "steering," and except where 
governments have already freed their service organizations from centralized, rule-bound 
control, away from "rowing," or trying to provide the services themselves. Constrained 
by restrictive rules and procedures, protected by civil service regulations, and managed 
by cumbersome bureaucracies built over the past 100 years, public employees seldom 
have the incentive or the means to be creative and responsive. When freed from those 
constraints, and when pushed by competition, o f particular importance to this study, 
public employees respond to the challenge o f increased efficiency, lower costs, and 
better service. Governments' new challenge: be creative in finding ways to provide 
public services that are lower cost, more effective, responsive, and efficient by 
reintroducing competition.
Addressing the "rowing" process, the authors outline several approaches typical 
of this movement, two of which are relevant to this study: restructuring
("reengineering”) traditional public service organizations to allow flexibility, creativity 
and responsiveness; and contracting out, or outsourcing, traditional service functions to 
the private sector. Both work, the authors state, and can be used together. They 
conclude that restructuring "in-house," or traditional govemmental-run service functions, 
although essential and often effective, is frequently the most difficult because o f strong 
public employee constituencies and long-held perceptions that governments should 
perform public services. Nevertheless, when accomplishing the mission is substituted for 
following rules and procedures, and public employees are allowed flexibility in 
determining how to provide services, they have proven remarkably responsive, 
particularly when prodded by competition from other potential service providers.
Osborne and Gaebler conclude that contracting out public functions to private enterprise 
through competitive bidding is probably the easiest, most effective and most often used 
mechanism to get out o f "rowing." When structured well and monitored carefully, they 
argue, contracting out can be a highly effective way to provide almost all public services, 
from police and fire protection to community services.
In their "steering" functions, the authors maintain, government can be more 
"entrepreneurial" by reengineering itself. The movement has found a number of 
approaches particularly effective. First, governments should fund outcomes, not inputs. 
That is, they should do away with funding carefully controlled line-item budgets, the 
inputs, and move instead to funding levels of service, the outputs. Essential to this 
process is developing performance measurements by which the success or failure of 
activities can be evaluated. Thus, training vendors can be paid by the number people
they place in jobs — the outputs — rather than the number o f trainees they enroll — the 
inputs. By extension, any process can be measured and benchmarks developed to 
establish performance standards that can subsequently be used in funding. Second, they 
argue, customer-driven governments are more successful than bureaucracy-driven forms. 
Changing the focus is a challenge because public agencies don't get their funding directly 
from the customer; governments thus have few incentives to focus on service. Total 
Quality Management, with customer surveys and emphasis on quality service, however, 
is becoming increasingly popular in governmental circles to change the focus to the 
customer. Introducing competition into service provision, for example giving customers 
vouchers they can use with several providers, is another way to sharpen an organization's 
interest in customer service. Third, the authors suggest, governments can be 
"enterprising," Just like businesses. They note that in the face of the tax revolt, state and 
local governments have moved increasingly toward developing alternate revenue 
sources, to include implementing user fees, leasing government-owned facilities and 
space to vendors (a form o f  outsourcing), and designing activities to create profits.
From the perspective o f higher education administration, many of the concepts 
explored by the authors apply; public higher education is experiencing reduced revenues, 
and it suffers from many o f the rule- and procedure-driven perceptions and processes that 
limit governments. Likewise, many of the authors' remedies can apply to providing 
administrative services in higher education; decentralization, customer orientation, 
managing by results, entrepreneurialship, and competition through outsourcing. The last, 
competition through outsourcing, is most directly related to this inquiry.
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The authors conclude that outsourcing, or privatizing, is useful, but with 
limitations. For example, if a public activity like garbage collection is contracted out, 
the contract could merely privatize a former governmental monopoly rather than reduce 
costs or increase efficiencies. If privatizing is achieved by competitive bidding, 
however, then the result is more likely to be lower costs and increased efficiencies. The 
authors also caution that privatizing merely shifts the function from the public to the 
private sector; it does not shift the responsibility. The responsibility must remain with 
the public. Another limitation stems from the natures o f public and private enterprises; 
where both can operate in the same arena with equal costs and service, like health care or 
utilities, public services can be less costly without the need for a profit margin. In these 
cases, the issue is not public vs. private enterprise, but more efficient management. As a 
general rule, however, the authors maintain that outsourcing or privatizing will result in 
lower costs and better services.
Competition is the fundamental principle that best reinvents government.
Whether between public entities, between public and private, or between private entities, 
competition best leads to reduced cost, increased efficiencies, and better services. 
Although outsourcing a function provides an organization the opportunity to shed high 
overhead costs and inefficient operations, for example, it is the process o f competitive 
bidding that is more likely to bring about the desired efficiencies and savings. But, they 
caution, if the contract does not have clear standards by which performance can be 
measured and evaluated, and if contract performance is not followed carefully, then 
outsourcing may add to rather than solve an organization's problems. In sum, the
literature supports the concept that the benefits of outsourcing stem from the economic 
principle o f competition. When public functions are exposed to the market’s competitive 
forces, the financial benefits o f  lower costs, increased efficiencies, better service, and 
increased revenues, will result. Outsourcing in higher education is therefore economic- 
based and financially-driven.
Management Literature 
Management theory argues that if a good or service required by an enterprise 
cannot be produced internally at lower cost and better quality than an external provider, 
then it should be purchased from an external provider (Thompson & Strictland, 1995). If 
the good or service produced by the external provider is its primary product, then 
economies of scale, worker productivity, and management experience are likely to result 
in higher quality and lower price. Hence, outsourcing the good or service is a logical and 
traditional tenet by which private enterprise operates. A related corollary argues that if  a 
business operation is not essential to an enterprise's primary mission or product, then it 
should be divested so the enterprise can focus its resources on its core mission, a process 
enterprises are likely to accelerate in a recession when resources are scarce (McHugh, 
Merle & Wheeler, 1995; Thompson & Strictland, 1995).
Outsourcing as a management theme is the focus o f the Reason Foundation, a 
non-profit, non-partisan, public policy research and educational organization advocating 
free-market, private-sector alternatives to traditional public-sector programs. It seeks to 
act as an informational clearinghouse for governmental, media, and business enterprises
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interested in governmental streamlining. The foundation claims to be a major 
information source for Vice President Gore's National Performance Review,
"Reinventing Government." The results of the foundation's research are a series o f 
monographs presenting case studies of privatization, and "how-to" guides for public 
enterprises seeking to privatize all or parts o f  their functions. It also publishes a monthly 
newsletter reporting current privatization developments and "alternative service delivery" 
efforts across the public sector and an annual report siunmarizing world-wide 
privatization efforts, successes, and failures.
In the Reason Foundation’s 1994 annual report (O’Leary, 1994), its eighth, the 
editor states in his preface, "The intellectual debate on privatization is over. The model 
of government as monopolistic service provider has yielded to the productive power of 
competitive markets" (p.I). To support this thesis, the report’s authors cite national and 
international trends toward privatization of public services, joint and private 
development o f national infrastructure, and divestiture of governmental assets and 
enterprises. "Reshaping” societies and economies o f both western and eastern Europe, 
the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand, and Asia, 
privatization in 1993 saw over $60 billion in state-owned and operated enterprises shift 
to the private sector. This brings the worldwide total to more than $388 billion over the 
past eight years (p. 4).
In a summary article, the editor identifies three forces that are accelerating this 
world-wide trend: a world-wide recession that depleted national treasuries and put 
severe restrictions on the ability of governments to fulfill their promises, including state
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governments in the United States who are cutting higher education funding; the fall of 
communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and its worldwide discredit; 
and sharply-increasing global competition forcing greater attention to efficiency, 
productivity, and quality. As these forces tend to be regionalized, he explains, so are the 
responses. Joint and private development of infrastructure and divestiture of 
government-owned enterprises has grown most rapidly in former communist and 
developing countries. Divestiture in the developed countries of Western Europe, Latin 
America, and industrialized Asia continues in banking, telecommunications, energy and 
power utilities. Divestiture trends are low in the United States, however, since 
government-owned enterprises are relatively few. Private development of 
highways/tollways is emerging as a leading worldwide trend, followed by private 
development o f airports, air traffic control systems, ports, rail systems, power utilities, 
and waste management.
The report’s authors’ data indicate the move toward privatizing traditional 
government services, though global, is strongest in the United States where orientation 
toward competition and free enterprise are more traditional. Eroding tax bases in 
municipalities, decreased state and federal revenues, undiminished demands for services, 
and a wave of managerial reform have all focused attention on the private sector as a 
lower-cost, more effective and efficient alternative. That is, the private sector is proving 
to be able to provide many traditional “public” functions at lower cost and with better 
services, a key management theory tenet. Contracting out is the leading form of 
privatization in the US, accounting for almost 80% of the total. Grants, vouchers,
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volunteerism, public/private partnerships, private donations, franchises, service- 
shedding, asset sales, and deregulation are the other major forms of privatization used by 
federal, state and local governments in the US. The most popular services for 
privatization are, in rank order, mental health, administrative services, social services, 
health, transportation, corrections, and, relevant to this study, education. Privatization in 
higher education merits only brief mention in the study, however, as the author limits 
consideration to universities contracting for food service and bookstore ownership and/or 
operation. It is unclear whether the author's short treatment o f privatization in higher 
education results from scarce research or from less frequent use o f the process.
Outsourcing as a management principle in public higher education remains 
implicit; higher education continues to emphasize the economic, financial benefits 
(Wertz, 1996; Mercer, 1995). Nevertheless, Just as there are public services that 
municipal governments can provide at less cost and with equal or better quality by 
outsourcing to private vendors -  like golf courses, swimming pools, trash removal, street 
repair, and other services — the same principle can apply to public colleges and 
universities. Is it necessary for colleges and universities to provide dormitory housing, 
food services, bookstores, publishing services, computer servicing, and physical plant 
maintenance when these services can be purchased from private vendors, often Just off 
campus? The central questions thus become, can these kinds o f services be provided 
more efficiently and at lower cost by contract? Are they essential to the core mission
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and responsibility of higher education, or are they peripheral and therefore candidates to 
be divested by outsourcing?
Serious discussion about contracting-out university support functions from a 
management perspective has been tentative, and appears to have begun in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s when colleges and universities began experiencing discontinuities in 
earnest between higher education programs and resources. Writing in the early 1980s, 
for example, Keller (1983) predicted that higher education would find itself faced with 
declining enrollments, overly-ambitious academic programs, excess faculty, surplus and 
over-age facilities, and increasing costs. To meet these challenges, Keller concluded, 
colleges and universities should adopt an "entrepreneurial," or business approach to 
administration and management. Although he advocates more use o f business-like 
planning and asset management, his broad management emphasis on efficient use of 
existing resources and more creative approaches to their acquisition reinforces the idea of 
divestiture. Two additional sources from the early 1980s indicate a growing interest in 
contracting-out during the period. In a short article, Heger (1982) identifies the practice 
of outsourcing as a "revolution," and suggests small and medium-sized colleges and 
universities will likely turn increasingly to academic franchising and contracting as cost- 
saving and revenue enhancing measures, and implies divestiture can be beneficial. 
Educational Facilities Labs, Inc. (1982) published a "how-to" manual addressing campus 
physical plant operations and management that includes a section on contracting-out as 
an option to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
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O f significant interest, little more about outsourcing from a management 
perspective appears in higher education administration literature until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as the world-wide recession began to affect colleges and universities. 
Ginsburg (1988) presents a summary o f the pros and cons o f contract services in one of 
the first articles to move beyond identifying the practice. Among the advantages o f 
contracting-out, he lists greater quality and depth of management; professional staff 
training; savings in staffing, overtime, supplies and equipment; more modem and 
efficient equipment; increased ability to motivate and reward staff; and the fact that the 
contractor assumes the business risk. Although the author does not identify them as 
such, these are all management-based justifications for outsourcing. As disadvant%es, 
he lists the potential for decreased service and increased costs stemming from the 
contractor's inclination to minimize costs and maximize profits; the institution's over- 
dependency on the contractor once it forfeits the ability to perform the contracted 
function; and the negative impact on the institution's employee morale.
Fuchs berg (1989a, 1989b) presents a more perceptive and persuasive pair o f 
articles addressing the advantages and disadvantages of contracting-out. Writing about 
the increasing number of colleges and universities that are contracting-out bookstores, he 
summarizes the arguments of proponents and opponents, and profiles one individual's 
"crusade" to reverse the trend. Proponents argue the practice allows contractors to 
achieve economies of scale unavailable to a university that can result in lower prices and 
higher quality merchandise. In addition, contracting can provide substantial financial 
benefits: a large one-time payment from the sale of the institution’s existing inventory, a
steady stream of income, avoiding investment costs to update equipment, and greatly 
reduced administrative costs. Proponents reflect the popular view that colleges and 
universities should devote energies and resources to academic and other educational 
functions and leave non-educational support functions, even if traditionally provided on 
campus, to professionals, the classic management-based divestiture argument. Critics 
argue that a well-managed in-house operation will always provide services at a lower 
cost since contractors must make a profit. More important, the institution may lose 
control of the function, a major problem if the contractor does not perform to contract 
standards. The author identifies a growing movement to provide consultant services to 
in-house managers preparing counterproposals when faced with the prospect of 
outsourcing.
One of a very few scholarly presentation of outsourcing in higher education as a 
management practice is provided by Ferris (1991). In an analysis that addresses 
contracting in its broadest context, he identifies three forms found in higher education: 
performance contracts between state agencies and higher education institutions, inter- 
institutional contracting, and contracting with private entities to provide services. He 
discusses each in turn, and lists the sources o f potential efficiencies and cost savings. 
Scale economies, increased managerial incentives, managerial flexibility, and 
competitive market conditions are advantages he observes can accrue under a well- 
developed contract. On the other hand, he argues, the contracting institution retains 
several "transaction" costs often overlooked that must be addressed when deciding to 
contract: oversight costs of determining the quantity and quality o f the outsourced
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service, and the potential to become too dependent upon a single supplier. Indeed, the 
costs o f going back to an in-house operation once it is outsourced may be almost 
prohibitive, potentially making the institution captive to a contractor's pricing and service 
standards.
Abramson (1993, 1994, 1995) has been surveying higher education outsourcing 
since 1993. He reports a steady increase in its use and that less than 6% of responding 
institutions do not outsource. The most frequently contracted services are food services 
(68%), vending (64%), bookstores (33%), computer services (31%), academic building 
custodial services (23%), academic building security (22%), and HVAC servicing (17%). 
About one-third of the responding institutions indicate they plan to increase use o f 
contracting-out, whereas about one-half say no. And, although the total number o f 
outsourced functions remain steady, they are enterprises at least tacitly acknowledged as 
peripheral to higher education's primary missions.
As a footnote. Lively (1993) reports an innovative approach proposed by the 
Governor o f Florida. The Governor asked Florida's 10-campus system how it would 
operate if its budget remained at the same level, but half the employees were taken off 
the payroll. Billed as an approach to "reinventing government," the divestiture proposal 
was intended to provide incentives to increase operating efficiencies by contracting for 
non-teaching services, and using the savings to upgrade educational programs.
Finally, Goldstein (1993) edits a "how to" publication that offers a framework to 
assist higher education institutions decide whether to contract-out campus support 
functions. Sponsored by the Council of Higher Education Management Associations, it
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identifies six core decision factors that institutions must address and reconcile: (I) the 
financial impact, (2) human resources implications, (3) mission and culture concerns, (4) 
management control and efficiency considerations, (5) service quality, and (6) the legal 
and ethical considerations. The publication then outlines a 10-step sequence to guide the 
institution through the process: identify key participants; develop an analytical 
framework; assess the current environment; identify customer requirements; develop 
operating designs; identify operating alternatives; review legal, ethical, and community 
considerations; compare and contrast proposed alternatives; select the preferred 
alternative; and establish a continuous assessment and improvement process. It also asks 
a relevant question: "Is privatization good for higher education?" The authors observe 
this issue is "emotionally charged" with fervent supporters and critics, but they do not 
attempt to answer the question. In sum, from a management perspective the literature 
implicitly portrays outsourcing as a management-driven decision as institutions of higher 
education examine non-core functions that can be divested to provide services externally 
at lower cost and with equal or better quality. The primary emphasis, however, 
continues to be economic and financially-based.
Summary of Definitions from Economic and Management Literature 
The literature addressing outsourcing from the economic and management 
perspectives reveals no developing theory about the practice of outsourcing itself, other 
than reaffirming that outsourcing can offer financial and management benefits. Several 
conceptual distinctions nonetheless emerge that may be useful to this study in summary.
18
"Privatization" is a generic term often used interchangeably with "contracting out," 
"outsourcing," and "restructuring," but in strict definition it is limited to transferring the 
operation, control, and/or ownership o f public services and enterprises to private 
enterprise. The process appears to follow two major forms. The first is a private 
"monopoly" in which a private enterprise competitively substitutes for a government 
monopoly, with tax revenues going directly to the enterprise for its services (Examples: 
contract schools and educational programs, street maintenance, trash collection, utility 
service). The second form is a private sector, competitive service for which customer- 
tax payers pay the enterprise directly in competition with other service providers 
(Examples: vouchers for social services and schools; privately-developed and operated 
municipal parking garages, and ambulance services). In both forms, consistent with 
economic theory, competition plays the regulating role.
"Contracting out," and its synonym "outsourcing," refer to the process o f 
externally procuring a service or product an enterprise cannot produce itself more 
economically or o f sufficient quality. A fundamental business tenet, the terms apply to 
both private and public sector practices. Here again, competition is the regulating 
process, both implicitly and explicitly. Competition is implicit if an enterprise concludes 
the service can be provided more economically internally; competition is explicit when 
an enterprise awards a contract externally for services through competitive bidding. The 
same distinctions are being refined in the public sector, to include public higher 
education. "Competitive restructuring" is the implicit process public agencies, including 
public higher education institutions, are using to lower the cost and increase the
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efficiencies of their services by comparing themselves ("benchmarking") to private 
enterprise and “reengineering” or restructuring their internal operations. At least one 
university has established a formal “make-buy” policy by which the institution routinely 
compares its in-house costs for services directly against contractor costs for the same 
services. If in-house is lower or can be restructured to become lower, then the service 
remains in-house. Conversely, if reengineering cannot reduce costs, then the service is 
outsourced through competitive bid (see p. 156 in appendix). Reengineering or 
restructuring thus becomes an important, implicitly competitive process. "Competitive 
contracting" is the explicit process by which public entities request proposals from and 
award contracts to private enterprise to perform public services. In higher education, the 
terms "contracting out" and "outsourcing" are appropriate to both public and private 
institutions. In public higher education institutions, however, the terms are often used 
synonymously with "privatizing.”
A word is in order about the term “reengineering.” Coined and popularized by 
Hammer and Champy in their popular book. Reengineering the Corporation (1993), the 
term describes the process by which American corporations must reinvent themselves in 
order to remain competitive in the global economy. It is no longer sufficient, they 
explain, to employ the organizing and operating principles advocated by Adam Smith 
over 200 years ago that work should be broken down into its simplest and most basic 
tasks. Although his concepts facilitated the world’s industrialization, they result in 
specialization, compartmentalization, and fragmentation, principles that work contrary to 
the requirements of the post-industrial era. To succeed in the post-industrial, highly
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competitive global environment, enterprises must reunify those tasks into coherent 
business processes and procedures through “business reengineering,” eliminating any that 
do not lead directly to high quality products and services at fair and reasonable prices. 
That is, reengineering should eliminate all tasks that do not lead directly to customer 
satisfaction.
With the restructuring and downsizing typical o f American business in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, however, reengineering came to be associated with job losses, 
unemployment, and under-employment among white collar workers, consequences that 
have overshadowed reengineering’s salutary intent. Nevertheless, the term is now widely 
accepted in management, to include higher education administration, to describe any 
process by which an organization restructures its organization and operations to increase 
efficiencies, reduce costs, and increase revenues. It is in this context that the term 
“reengineering” is used in this study.
Decision Making Literature 
Decision making theory is a relatively new branch of organizational theory which 
is, itself a branch of sociology (Selznick, 1948). Based on theories of how organizations 
function, it focuses on how decisions are made within the organization. A seminal work is 
Allison's Essence o f  Decision (1971), an analysis o f presidential and executive-level 
national security decision making during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison identifies 
and isolates three decision making models at work in the process: the rational actor at the 
top and center o f a rational decision process; organizational processes, or the routines,
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scenarios, and standard operating procedures that limit rationality and lead to decisions; 
and bureaucratic politics, the interaction o f key participants in decision making as they 
build coalitions, bargain, and compromise. This last model, bureaucratic politics, is 
Allison's distinctive contribution to decision making theory as he identifies and analyzes 
power relationships among individuals and political processes within complex 
organizations (George, 1972). It is the power relationships and processes, Allison 
explains, that best describe how decisions are made within organizations. Jefferies 
(1977, 1989) argues further that it is all three decision models, acting together, that best 
explain the decision process.
Bimbaum (1988) does for higher education what Allison and others do for the 
national security establishment; he describes several models of higher education 
organization, governance, and decision making. Each can serve as a “conceptual lens” to 
help one understand and “make sense” of higher education’s organizational functioning 
(p. 83). He outlines five models: the collegial, the bureaucratic, the political, the 
anarchical, and the cybernetic.
The collegial model is the traditional view of higher education governance and 
decision making. It is based on consensus, shared power, common commitments and 
aspirations, consultative leadership, and collective responsibilities. The author refers to 
a 1986 study by Bowen and Schuster that identifies three additional characteristics: the 
right to participate in institutional affairs; membership in congenial and sympathetic 
company; and equal value of all disciplines (p. 87). Processes are egalitarian and 
democratic, and decisions are made by consensus. By “consensus” Bimbaum doesn’t
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mean “unanimity.” Consensus occurs when participants believe they have had a chance to 
influence the outcome, have had a fair hearing, and can be comfortable with supporting 
the decision. Particularly important to the collegial model is the frequent, continuing, 
face-to-face interaction of the decision makers, a requirement implying a comparatively 
small group.
Bimbaum acknowledges the collegial model alone does not completely describe an 
institution’s governance and decision making. It ignores differences in legal authority 
between participants, it overlooks standard or legal procedural requirements, and it 
assumes general agreement on values when they may in fact be disputed. Moreover, it 
provides limited accountability; if things do not go well, governance begins to fall apart. 
Finally, maintenance of interpersonal rewards and group self-protection, often a 
consequence o f strong, cohesive groups, may not adequately describe how decision 
making in the best interest of the institution may nonetheless result.
His bureaucratic model emphasizes a rational organizational structure and decision 
process with characteristics able to accommodate the collegial model’s weaknesses. 
Bimbaum defines bureaucracy as the type of organization designed to accomplish 
administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals within 
structures designed to relate organizational programs to the institution’s goals. At the 
heart o f the bureaucratic system, he explains, is the organizational chart, the formal 
depiction o f positions and responsibilities, lines of authority, and lines of communication. 
Also inherent in a bureaucracy are codified rules, regulations, and procedures that provide 
the scenarios and repertoires by which organizations operate.
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Division of labor, rights, regularized routines and procedures, and responsibilities 
allow the system to work and leads to development of and dependence on high levels of 
expertise in defined areas. Technical competence and performance are accepted as the 
basis for promotions and position, and the higher one is in the hierarchy, the greater is 
assumed his or her competence and expertise. Effectiveness and efficiency, he 
continues, equate to complying with established and accepted rules, procedures, and 
routines as articulated in standard operating procedures, repertories, and programs. 
Decision making is approached as a rational process linking means to ends and resources 
to objectives, and the hierarchical structure suggests this process will occur at the senior 
levels. As a bureaucracy, Bimbaum concludes, the institution functions predictably, 
impartially, reliably, and effectively to achieve its mission.
The collegial and bureaucratic models alone, he cautions, still do not account for 
all the influences and factors that determine how the institution works. For example, 
status differences created by hierarchy may limit the exchange and flow of information.
In addition, while responsibility may be delegated, sometimes full authority is withheld. 
Moreover, although power may be embodied in the legitimacy of a position, not all 
orders are obeyed; a subordinate’s expertise and relationships may allow him or her to 
accept or reject an order. To provide a more complete explanation of organizational 
functioning and decision making, Bimbaum turns to his Political model.
In its simplest terms, the Political model of organizational functioning is based on 
individuals and groups interacting by forming coalitions, bargaining, compromising, and 
exerting influence to reach agreements they believe will further their individual and
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collective interests. Thus, power comes not from norms, rules, procedures, or positions, 
but by negotiation or other means individuals and groups use to impose their aims. 
Institutions are more accurately described, he explains, as a collection o f groups vying for 
and exerting influence rather than a hierarchical structure o f individuals. Decision making 
is thus diffused and decentralized. In order to obtain a desired outcome, groups must join 
with other groups to bargain and compromise. Organizational politics thereby becomes 
the process of groups and individuals acquiring, developing, and using power to obtain 
desired outcomes.
Constant instability and turmoil are avoided, he continues, first, because groups 
tend to develop quasi-stable coalitions; second, because individuals most often belong to 
more than one group, providing an element o f checks and balances; and third, because of 
indifference. That is, most groups are not concerned about most issues most o f the time. 
Established rules and procedures, and informal understandings, however, provide stability, 
regularity and some degree of predictability. Collegiality, bureaucracy and politics can 
thereby co-exist.
Bimbaum’s two remaining models sometimes integrate elements o f the other three 
models, and sometimes provide alternative explanations of organizational phenomena. His 
Anarchical model assumes an institution is not driven by comprehensive rationality, “but 
by the autonomous actions of many individuals and organizational subgroups responding 
to their own perceived interests ..." (p. 166). Each participant, individual or group, can 
perceive and pay attention to only a limited set o f elements or circumstances o f the 
organization’s environment, and thus respond only to those in which they perceive an
25
interest at stake. This process of individuals and groups pursuing their interests is 
“organized anarchy,” “organized” because the process occurs in an accepted structure, 
and “anarchy” because individuals and groups pursue only their interests. Characteristic 
of the anarchical system are vague and subjective goals, unclear processes by which 
individuals and groups convert inputs to outputs (i.e., decision making), and fluid 
participation. Thus, problems arise that are looking for solutions, solutions exist that are 
looking for problems, and decision makers are looking for decision opportunities. The 
organization nonetheless functions adequately, Bimbaum explains, because o f “garbage- 
can decision making” (p. 162). As streams of problems, solutions, and participants flow 
through the environment, large receptacles, or “garbage-cans” exist in which specific 
problems, participants and solutions coalesce, and decisions are thus made.
Bimbaum asserts that all four models are helpful to “make sense” o f organizational 
processes, but each is incomplete. Much of what happens is a consequence o f standard 
operating procedures, programs, and repertories (the bureaucratic model). Groups of 
people meet regularly with colleagues as members o f departments, committees, or colleges 
and come to consensus (the collegial model). Politics can explain why and how 
individuals and groups make conscious choices (the political model). Goals are often 
vague and subjective with fluid group participation in organizational processes and 
decision making (the anarchical model). More likely, he explains, a fifth model is at work 
that integrates the other models; the cybernetic nature of academic institutions.
Governance and decision making occur through "cybernetic controls," or "self-correcting 
mechanisms that monitor organizational functions and provide attention cues, or negative
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feedback, to participants when things are not going well” (179). Activities are regulated 
by explicit and implicit control systems operating within the institution’s culture. The 
explicit systems are the institution’s organizational rules, regulations, procedures, and 
structures; the implicit systems are controls developed through the interaction of 
individuals in groups that leads to shared values and concern for cohesion. The explicit 
and implicit control systems are “organizational feedback loops” that accomplish two 
ends: they make minor adjustments in organizational processes to keep them functioning 
within acceptable limits, and they initiate action to alter the organizational processes 
themselves. These “negative feedback loops” provide information that something is 
wrong or when an important variable is outside its acceptable limit and attempts to correct 
it. Adaptive behavior thus creates a reasonably stable environment.
Bimbaum’s collegial, bureaucratic, and political models closely parallel Allison’s, 
George’s and others’ explanations of organizational functioning and decision making. His 
anarchical and cybernetic models, however, are complex, arcane explanations difficult to 
understand and follow. While they may be useful to provide additional explanations of 
how higher education institutions function, they are much less useful as discrete models to 
assist analytical study. This study will draw on Bimbaum’s collegial, bureaucratic, and 
political models, and Allison’s and other’s explanations. Together they provide theoretical 
frameworks within which outsourcing decisions might be explained and understood, that 
is, by explaining and understanding an organization's decision processes. Decision models 
appear to provide a more complete explanation o f how outsource decisions are made at 
institutions o f higher education.
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Summary o f the Literature and Relevant Hypotheses 
A review of the literature related to outsourcing suggests there are two well- 
established hypotheses or propositions that can explain why decisions are made in public 
higher education to outsource traditional campus functions. First, decisions to outsource 
are based on outsourcing’s use as an economic, financial mechanism that introduces 
competition into the public sector and thereby reduces the cost of services. Employed in 
public higher education, savings are thereby generated that can be reallocated to other 
functions. Second, decisions to outsource are based on its use as a management 
mechanism to achieve efficiencies and to divest an institution of non-core functions. 
Unburdened by non-educational functions, the institution can thereby concentrate its 
resources on direct education.
If the economic-based and the management-based decision models providing 
explanations of why higher education institutions outsource are incomplete, what else 
does the literature suggest? A third proposition is suggested by analyses o f how 
institutions make decisions. Decisions are determined by the decision processes and 
organizational dynamics typical o f public higher education institutions. Analyzing 
outsourcing in these contexts may thus lead to a more complete understanding by 
addressing how higher education institutions decide to outsource. Together with 
explanations of why institutions outsource, explanations of how will contribute to the 
development of a greater body o f knowledge explaining outsourcing’s use in higher 
education, and to a practical understanding of outsourcing as a decision outcome.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY
Conceptual Framework 
This study poses two questions designed to elicit an understanding of how and 
why an institution of higher education concludes it will or will not outsource a traditional 
higher education function. What non-financial considerations play a significant role in 
outsourcing decisions? How does their presence affect the decision? The study is 
exploratory in nature and suggests a qualitative, phenomenological approach using case 
studies (Ary, D., Jacobs, L, & Razavieh, A., 1990). While not excluding a quantitative, 
survey-based study, the questions are designed to identify as yet unclear variables 
affecting outsource decisions. A qualitative study is thus easier to design and conduct 
given the current tentative state o f outsourcing hypotheses. More important, identifying 
possible variables through a qualitative study may simplify the design of follow-on 
survey-based studies.
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As the study focuses on decision makers and the decision processes, or how and 
why decision makers choose to outsource, a phenomenological approach is appropriate. 
Decision making is largely a subjective process reflecting a person’s “socially- 
constructed” reality (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992. p. 34), even when a decision maker relies 
heavily on “objective” data or analysis. Interpreting the data, analyzing it rationally or 
intuitively, and making a decision, require judgments by the decision maker that will 
reflect his/her perceptions. Phenomenology seeks to understand the individual’s 
perceptions and maintains that a person’s perceptions cannot be separated from the 
environment (Langenbach, Vaughn & Aagaard, 1994). Studying an individual’s 
perceptions and the environment from which they grow, therefore, will offer some 
understanding of the phenomenon. The phenomenon in this study is outsourcing.
Building on these concepts, Yin (1994) affirms the utility of a qualitative 
approach to investigate contemporary phenomena when the phenomena and context may 
not be clear, and when there are many possible variables of interest deriving from 
multiple sources of evidence. He asserts that questions asking “who,” “what,” “where,” 
“how many,” and “how much,” are likely to favor predictively-designed quantitative 
surveys. Indeed, the limited research into higher education outsourcing thus far is 
survey-based and is just now beginning to answer these types of questions (Abramson, 
1993, 1994, 1995; Wertz, 1996). Questions asking “how” and “why,” however, are more 
likely to favor exploratory or explanatory methods such as qualitatively-designed case 
studies (Yin, 1994, pp. 5-6). As this study’s questions are designed to elicit information
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about how and why higher education institutions outsource, Yin’s case study approach is 
appropriate.
Yin explains a case study should follow a logical sequence connecting empirical 
data to the research questions and, finally, to its conclusions. Such a design will have 
five components; the study’s questions; its propositions (“theory”), if any; the units o f 
analysis; the logic linking data to the propositions; and the criteria for interpreting the 
findings (pp. 20-26). He suggests the case study investigator should not resist the 
development o f propositions, but should make the effort at least to develop a conceptual 
framework. This effort will not only pay off in constructing an appropriate research 
design, but will also provide a vehicle to generalize the study’s results.
He explains further that case study design should meet four tests: construct 
validity, or establishing operational measures; internal validity, or establishing causal 
relationships; external validity, or establishing the domain to which a study’s findings 
can be generalized; and reliability, or demonstrating that the data collection procedures 
can be repeated with the same results (p. 33). To ensure construct validity, use multiple 
sources of evidence to triangulate. To ensure internal validity, use pattern-matching, that 
is, compare an empirically-based pattern with a predicted pattern. External validity can 
be enhanced by replication logic using multiple cases in which similar results are 
obtained in several cases. Reliability will be increased by developing a study protocol 
that establishes and outlines the steps the researcher will follow. If planning a multiple- 
case study, Yin suggests using a pilot case study to test the questions and gather data that 
might provide conceptual clarification. Finally, he lists six sources of data that will help
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triangulation: documents, archivai records, interviews, direct observations, participant 
observation, and physical artifacts. While observing no single source has an advantage 
over the others, Yin suggests all can be highly complementary and as many as possible 
should be used.
Using Yin’s case study research methodology, five case studies were conducted. 
Each case examined the decision processes in which outsourcing an in-house enterprise 
at a public four-year higher education institution in the state of Oklahoma was at issue. 
Studies were conducted at four separate campuses and yielded information on nine 
outsource decisions. To strengthen construct validity, three sources o f evidence were 
used to triangulate: contemporary correspondence, archival records, and interviews. 
Participant observation was relied upon in one case. To strengthen internal validity, 
patterns were matched within and between cases. To strengthen external validity, 
multiple cases were studied and yielded similar data. To strengthen reliability, a 
protocol o f steps and procedures was followed.
The study’s two questions are designed to elicit an understanding of how and why 
decisions are made to outsource at public four-year institutions of higher education. What 
non-financial considerations play a significant role in outsourcing decisions? How does 
their presence affect the decision? From the questions and from possible theoretical 
constructs (economic theory, management theory, decision theory), several testable 
propositions suggest themselves. First, outsource decisions are driven by the financial 
objectives to lower the costs of providing academic support services or to increase 
revenues by introducing competition into selecting a service provider. Second, outsource
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decisions are driven by the management objectives to increase productivity, reduce costs 
through economies of scale, and to divest the institution of non-core functions that do not 
lead directly to education outcomes. The institution is thus able to focus its resources on 
direct education. Third, outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics 
that affect decision making in organizations in general and higher educational institutions 
in particular.
As the study focused on decision processes, using Yin’s methodology, the units o f 
analysis are individual decision makers and decision-making groups such as committees 
and boards. The logic linking data to the propositions is the degree to which the data 
support each proposition. Finally, the principle criterion used to interpret the findings is 
the relative influence each proposition has on the decision. Analyzing the relative 
influence o f each proposition thus yields the information to begin answering the 
questions.
Assumptions
The study assumes, first, that economic-based, financially-driven explanations o f 
outsource decisions at public four-year institutions of higher education in Oklahoma are 
incomplete, and that additional explanations are required to understand the phenomenon.
It assumes, second, that additional explanations can be determined by case study analysis 
following a qualitative, phenomenological, case study methodology as described by Yin.
It assumes, third, that reviewing archival data, contemporary correspondence, and 
interviewing the primary decision makers in outsource decisions will yield sufficient
33
information to build a more complete explanation. The study assumes, finally, that some 
degree of generalization to other cases will be valid and useful.
Limitations
This is not a quantitative study. Cases were not selected randomly, nor are they 
necessarily representative samples o f a larger population. An effort was nevertheless 
made to select cases from different campuses. The study is limited to four year public 
institutions o f higher education in Oklahoma. This limitation acknowledges there may 
be differences in outsourcing between public and private institutions. The limitation also 
recognizes the possible distinctive character of public institutions o f higher education in 
Oklahoma. For example, of the 26 public colleges and universities in Oklahoma, at least 
a quarter are led by former Oklahoma public officials. It also acknowledges a distinction 
between four and two-year institutions, particularly in procurement policies and 
procedures. Generalizations must therefore be made cautiously.
As a phenomenological study, the conclusions are limited by the perceptions of 
the participants. Although determining environmental perceptions is an aim of the study 
and essential to explanation building, perceptual differences may further limit 
generalizations. Nevertheless, the number o f decisions studied, nine, yielded useful and 
broadly consistent perceptual patterns. Moreover, triangulation, data from 
correspondence, archival records, and financial statements, was used to offset some of 
the bias inherent in individual perceptions as revealed in interviews.
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Research Questions and Propositions 
Document research and loosely-structured interviews were conducted to elicit 
information that would help answer the two research questions: (1) what non-financial, 
non-economic considerations play a significant role in outsourcing decisions, and (2) 
how does their presence affect the decision? Two corollary questions are implied: (a) are 
costs the major criterion upon which the decision to outsource was made; if not, then (b) 
what decision model is more appropriate or complete? A review of the literature 
suggests three hypotheses or propositions and their associated models. First, outsource 
decisions are economic-based and financially-driven. Second, outsource decisions are 
management-based, driven by possible efficiencies and the benefits of divestiture. Third, 
outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics inherent in higher 
education: bureaucratic decision dynamics, collegial decision dynamics, or political 
decision dynamics.
Population and Sample 
The decision was made to limit research to four-year public institutions in 
Oklahoma, acknowledging there may be significant differences between four and two- 
year schools, between public and private institutions, and between Oklahoma and non- 
Oklahoma schools. In addition, an effort was made to select outsource cases from 
different four-year campuses in Oklahoma. In the end, five cases were selected from 
four campuses. Although two cases were from the same campus, they were separated by 
a significant time lapse and different sets of decision makers. The five cases, in turn,
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yielded information on nine outsource decisions. While the validity of qualitative studies 
is not dependent upon random selection or sample size, selecting cases was influenced by 
a desire to achieve some degree of cross-sectional representation. Thus, one campus is a 
professionally-oriented health sciences university, one is a major state flagship 
university, one is a rural university, and the other is a small liberal arts university. The 
nine outsource decisions equate to a series o f nine multiple cases as defined by Yin 
(1994) and fall within the six-to-ten he suggest will provide compelling support for initial 
propositions (p. 46).
Data Collection Procedures 
The first case study, the decision to outsource printing services, is a pilot study 
conducted to test the study protocol and conceptual propositions. It was largely an 
archival search to determine the events leading up to the outsource decision and to 
provide context. In addition, contemporary correspondence related to the decision was 
reviewed, together with pre- and post-decision financial data. Finally, interviews were 
conducted with key remaining participants to elicit their perceptions and descriptions of 
the decision processes. The case confirmed the protocol utility and the presence of all 
three study propositions. In addition, the study identified a number of additional 
outsource characteristics or variables that add to understanding the phenomenon. These 
were looked for in subsequent studies.
Data collection for the second case, the decision not to outsource the campus 
motor pool, relied upon a review of contemporary correspondence, meeting minutes,
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personal observations o f participants and procedures, and interviews with key 
participants. The case reconfirmed the study protocol and the influence of the three 
study propositions. It also confirmed the additional outsourcing variables identified in 
the pilot study.
The third case, the decision to outsource a campus lighting retrofit, grew out of 
the unique opportunity to participate directly in the decision process. Data collection 
therefore comes largely from personal observation. The data was triangulated with 
subsequent participant interviews, archival research, and reviews of contemporary 
correspondence. The data confirmed again the influence of the three study propositions.
Data collection procedures for the fourth and fifth cases, the rural university, and 
the small liberal arts university, followed the protocol established and used in the first 
tfiree cases. In the rural university case archival research was relied upon heavily since 
the initial decisions were made almost twenty years ago. Records included meeting 
minutes, financial statements, and transcripts o f interviews conducted soon after the 
events. Interviews conducted with three key participants still accessible were 
particularly valuable. Outsourcing at the small liberal arts university is recent, so data 
collection relied heavily upon participant interviews, triangulated with financial 
statements and contract reviews.
Research was terminated after five cases. The last two cases confirmed again the 
study’s tfiree propositions established in the previous three cases. Moreover, patterns and 
characteristics consistent with previous cases were found to be present in the last two 
cases. Finally, no additional variables affecting outsourcing appeared in the final cases.
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
Current higher education management practice and related literature stress the 
financial benefits possible from outsourcing (Morrell, 1994), provide “case studies” 
suggesting how financial benefits can be realized (The Association, 1994; Green, 1992), 
and offer analytical matrices to assist decision makers arrive at a financially sound 
decision (Goldstein, 1993). In addition, several surveys have been published listing the 
numbers and types o f functions and enterprises higher education institutions outsource 
and conclude it is a useful mechanism to reduce costs (Abramson, 1993,1994, 1995; 
Wertz, 1996). In sum, outsourcing is advocated and practiced among institutions of 
higher education with the assumptions that decisions to outsource are and should be 
economic-based and financially-driven.
Outsourcing as an economic, financial outcome therefore appears to provide 
sound justification for achieving cost savings and increased revenues. Curiously absent 
in higher education literature, however, is discussion of non-financial considerations and
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influences that may affect a decision to outsource. The presence of non-financial 
influences and considerations in a decision to outsource may thus suggest that the 
economic, financial model is an incomplete explanation of outsource decisions, and a 
broader, more complete explanation is necessary and appropriate.
Postulating that an economic-based, financially-driven decision model may be an 
incomplete explanation of outsoiuce decisions, this study was conducted to identify non- 
financial influences and considerations that affect the decision by focusing on how and 
why higher education institutions outsource. A series o f case studies was conducted 
asking two major questions: (I) what non-financial, non-economic considerations play a 
significant role in outsourcing decisions, and (2) how does their presence affect the 
decision? From the questions and from possible theoretical constructs (economic theory, 
management theory, decision theory), several testable propositions suggested themselves. 
First, outsource decisions are driven by the financial objectives to lower the costs of 
providing academic support services or to increase revenues by introducing competition 
into selecting a service provider. Second, outsource decisions are driven by the 
management objectives to increase productivity and efficiency, and to divest the 
institution of non-core functions that do not lead directly to education outcomes. 
Divestiture enables the institution to focus its resources on direct education. Third, 
outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics that affect decision 
making in organizations in general and higher educational institutions in particular.
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Case One
The Decision to Outsource Printing Services 
At a Major Medical School
Case synopsis. Printing Services had operated for over 20 years at the medical 
school, providing offset printing and, when it became technically feasible, high-speed 
copying to support its printing and copying needs. With low employee turnover, yearly 
wage and salary increases gradually increased the shop’s overhead costs. By 1990, 
office copiers and off-campus copying services had cut into printing services’ business, 
and revenues were running less than 70% of several years earlier. Old equipment and 
technology and employee attitudes limited the ability to increase productivity, and a 
series of not-well-thought-out organizational changes and realignments greatly reduced 
morale. By 1991, what appeared to be intractable personnel problems, low productivity, 
high costs, and reduced business combined to contribute to large operating losses. In an 
effort to correct the problem, the administration commissioned a series o f studies to 
determine how to fix printing services. Among the alternatives, two stood out: (1) 
restructure the operation, modernize the equipment, hire new management and keep the 
function in-house, or (2) outsource the operation to an off-campus contractor to provide 
on-campus printing and copying. After protracted analysis, the vice president for 
administrative affairs’ staff o f directors decided to outsource printing services.
Question One: What non-financial, non-economic considerations play a 
significant role in outsourcing decisions?
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The case identified two primary non-economic, non-financial considerations in 
the decision to outsource printing services. O f great importance was the directors’ desire 
to rid themselves of what they perceived to be an intractable personnel problem 
stemming from deep dissatisfaction with printing services performance and weariness 
over trying to work with recalcitrant employees. As the director of purchasing stated, 
“we were just tired of the continuing problems in printing services dating back at least 
three years. Contracting out the entire operation seemed the easiest, cleanest way to get 
rid o f the problem.” Of somewhat less importance in the decision was the university’s 
board o f regents’ stated policy of encouraging the university’s administration to 
outsource non-essential enterprises and activities. The policy provided easy justification 
to proceed with outsourcing.
Question Two: How does their presence affect the decision?
By concluding that they could rid themselves o f an intractable management and 
personnel problem by outsourcing printing services, the directors’ moved the decision 
away from the economic-based, financial-driven model commonly accepted as 
justification for outsourcing, to the management-based model that includes divestiture. 
Although cost and service were marginal criteria, this does not suggest that cost and 
service were unimportant. If either of the two alternatives offered significant cost 
savings over the other, restructuring and keeping printing services in-house or 
outsourcing the operation, then it would have been difficult for the directors to justify not
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pursuing the clearly lower cost option. As it was, restructuring and outsourcing both 
offered options that satisfied the economic and financial criteria.
The regents’ role provided an unexpected and interesting perspective in this 
study. Like outsourcing to solve a personnel problem, outsourcing because of emphasis 
by the regents further moved the decision from economic, financial considerations. 
Although the role o f the regents was not decisive, it was influential, and reflects their 
perceptions that outsourcing enables an institution to divest non-core functions in order 
to focus resources on core activities, a management-related proposition. Also important, 
influence by the regents, a non-campus-based group, may suggest that political 
considerations play a role in outsource decisions.
Other significant findings:
The case helps answer the corollary question, what decision model is more 
appropriate or complete, by providing a more complete explanation. The predominance 
of non-financial considerations suggests the inadequacy of the economic-based, 
financially-driven model in the outsource decision. In this case, the decision was made 
by a group of seven directors working for the vice president for administrative affairs: the 
directors of financial affairs, budgeting and purchasing, educational services, grants and 
contracts, computing services, and operations. The group exhibited many characteristics 
of the collegial model: shared influence, decisions by consensus, common values and 
commitments, collective responsibility, mutual trust and respect, frequent face-to-face 
interaction, and mutual congeniality. All but one had worked together successfully for 
several years, and the new director of operations appeared to fit in well. Together they
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shared the dismay caused by printing services’ problems, having struggled together for 
several years for an acceptable solution. The staffs of each director used printing 
services, with its products being crucial to their respective operations, and they reflected 
the broader campus community’s deep dissatisfaction with printing services status. 
Financial considerations appeared important only to the director o f financial affairs; the 
others wanted an end to the problem by whatever means. All, however, shared the 
perception that the problem lay with the recalcitrant employees of printing services. The 
collegial model of decision making thus appears to be an appropriate explanation of how 
the decision was made to outsource printing services. Few elements of the bureaucratic 
or the political models appeared to be significant, although the regents’ emphasis on 
outsourcing, a political element, did have an influence.
Restructuring printing services, or reengineering, offered a second, clear 
alternative to the problems the directors were experiencing. Restructuring worked; costs 
were coming down and revenues were increasing with improved management. Given 
time, restructuring the in-house operation may have proven as efficacious as outsourcing 
to solve the problems, an alternative higher education literature says little about. A 
question deserving additional research, then, is whether an existing campus enterprise 
can be restructured or reengineered to provide improved services at the same or better 
levels than available through outsourcing to a contractor. The pilot study thus suggests 
reengineering may be an additional line o f research into decisions to outsource.
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Case Two:
The Motor Pool:
Outsource or Reengineer?
Case synopsis: The university’s board of regents directed the administration to 
make efforts to “get out of the business o f business” and focus on the university’s 
missions o f education, research, and public service. Since a university is a public 
institution, they argued, it is unlikely to be able to provide services as efficiently or at as 
low a cost as private enterprise. Translated, that meant to outsource in-house services 
private vendors might be able to provide. With a number of university functions 
successfully outsourced, they thought more aggressive efforts were required and 
suggested the administration consider the motor pool as an outsource candidate. In 
response, the vice president for administrative affairs constituted a steering committee of 
staff and faculty to oversee the process. The committee hired a consultant to assist its 
analysis of the motor pool’s finances and management. It soon became clear that a few 
internal restructuring steps would enable the motor pool to reduce its costs significantly 
and increase its services. As the changes were made, improvements resulted and the 
committee recommended that instead o f outsourcing, the regents accept the reengineered 
motor pool. The regents insisted it be outsourced, however, so purchasing prepared a 
request for proposals to outsource the motor pool. Subsequent events delayed the release 
of the RPF, including the announced retirement of the president, the announced
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retirement o f the board’s chairman, and a six-month tenure of an interim president.
When the new president took office, he concluded the motor pool should not be 
outsourced.
Question One: What non-financial, non-economic considerations play a 
significant role in outsourcing decisions?
The presence o f political dynamics was predominate in the decision process. The 
regents believed that outsourcing by its nature is preferable to in-house operations o f 
non-education support functions. In contrast, the steering committee members believed 
that in-house operations are preferable to outsourced if the in-house enterprise can be 
restructured or reengineered to make its operations less costly, more efficient, and more 
responsive to customers. Two decision-making groups, each with a different perception 
of the problem and its solution, were in conflict. If the outcome were dependent only 
upon which of the two groups had greater influence, then the motor pool would likely 
have been outsourced. In the end, it was not.
Also significant in the case was the Regent’s articulated view that non-core 
enterprises should be divested to allow the institution to focus more directly on its 
missions. With many o f the members being successful business persons, the view 
reflects their perceptions of management, particularly the chairman’s. Under their 
direction, several university functions had been outsourced successfully, and outsourcing 
the motor pool seemed a logical extension of the process. Political dynamics appear to 
be the only reason the RFP for outsourcing the motor pool was not released.
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Question Two: How does their presence affect the decision?
Like the first case, this case suggests that financial considerations were not the 
decisive criteria in the outsource decision processes. While they appeared to drive the 
steering committee’s evaluation and decision to reengineer rather than outsource, in the 
end they provided only the baseline around which other dynamics swirled. Other events 
and perceptions played more important roles, in particular, the regents’ view that 
outsourcing would allow the institution to focus on its primary missions, a fundamental 
tenet of management theory. More important were the political dynamics. The regents 
have more authority than the steering committee. Despite the regents’ greater authority, 
the motor pool was not outsourced. With the retirement o f the president and the 
appointment of an interim president, the vice president and the committee never 
submitted the question formally to the regents for a decision, a highly-effective political 
tactic. As a member o f the committee expressed, “if you can’t win, wait until another 
day when circumstances are more favorable.” Moreover, with the announced retirement 
of the regents’ chairman soon after the president’s annoimced retirement, other matters 
no doubt became more pressing to the regents. They likely became indifferent to the 
motor pool. Finally, the arrival o f the new president six months later resulted in a 
shifting of policy priorities. Although he emphasized the need to continue to cut 
administrative costs, the new president was also highly sensitive to the need to rebuild a 
sense o f community within the university and did not want to risk further alienation 
among the administrative staff that outsourcing the motor pool was likely to cause.
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O ther significant findings:
The first case identified reengineering as a significant consideration in the 
decision to outsource. While in the first case reengineering incidentiy provided an 
alternative to outsourcing, reengineering became a central issue in this case. Can 
business process reengineering, the term coined in current management-related literature, 
be a valid alternative to outsourcing, given outsourcing’s potential to disrupt tradition 
and personnel? Little in higher education management literature suggests an answer, but 
this case provides interesting and useful insights into the relationship between 
outsourcing and reengineering. Like the first case, it confirms that reengineering can be 
an effective alternative to outsourcing. Reengineering worked. The motor pool reduced 
its costs and increased its productivity, and significant personnel disruptions were 
avoided. In addition, reengineering resulted in “benchmarking” cost and productivity 
measures that would be useful if the enterprise were outsourced. Perhaps most 
important, reengineering allowed the in-house enterprise to become more competitive 
with potential off-campus contract operations, thereby satisfying the economic-based, 
financially-driven criteria.
Furthermore, the case helps clarify the corollary question, what decision model is 
more appropriate or complete? There are indications that all three of the decision 
process dynamics models were at work in the decision process. The steering 
committee’s deliberations appeared to reflect the collegial approach, and the respective 
bureaucratic responses by the committee, the vice president, the president, and the 
regents, reflect the bureaucratic model. The political decision dynamics model, however,
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is most clearly illustrated. The RFP was not released as a result of the struggle for 
influence between the regents and the steering committee. The committee “won” as a 
result of the political dynamics.
Finally, the heightened visibility o f outsourcing in this case, in contrast to the first 
case, may suggest an important dynamic. What made the motor pool case more visible 
than the printing services case? The major difference appears to be in the political 
significance of the motor pool in contrast to printing services. The motor pool contract 
would affect a greater number of individuals, and a much higher contract dollar amount 
increased the potential risk of the outsource contract Although tentative after only two 
cases, the size and dollar amount of a potential outsource contract seem to be important, 
emerging considerations.
Case Three:
The Lighting Retrofit Project
Case synopsis: The medical school’s physical plant staff has traditionally looked 
for energy efficient measures to reduce the university’s cost o f utilities. Over the years 
the staff has successfully implemented a number of measures that have resulted in 
significant utility cost reductions. Over the past several years, a number of technological 
advances in lighting have made possible significant reductions in the consumption of 
electricity if older-technology florescent light tubes and ballasts were replaced with the 
new, more energy-efficient tubes and ballasts. To evaluate potential savings, the
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physical plant staff retrofitted one of the campuses’ twelve buildings as a test. The test 
proved successful, reducing electrical consumption by an estimated 35% and saving the 
university about $100,000 per year. Based on the test, the staff prepared and released a 
request for proposals to retrofit the remaining eleven buildings, a project that would 
potentially save the university a further $265,000 per year. Only one proposal was 
received in response, an offer to retrofit the remaining buildings at a cost o f $1,054,000 
submitted by the winner o f the test-project contract the previous year. Fearing that 
receiving only one bid might bring into question the validity of the bid process, 
purchasing made a number o f unilateral decisions that collectively brought into question 
not only the bid response, but the validity of the project itself. As a result, the project 
decision process escalated well beyond an easily-controllable level, to include the 
president’s office located on the main campus, the university’s regents, and the state 
bond oversight commission, a player outside the university. After a year of re- 
evaluations and political maneuvers, contract signing is still in question.
Question One: What non-financial, non-economic considerations play a 
significant role in outsourcing decisions?
Right from the beginning, each of the three decision process dynamics models 
was clearly illustrated. The bureaucratic and collegial decision dynamics process models 
accurately explain the decision process leading to the test project, evaluation of the test, 
and the decision to proceed with the campus-wide project. The participating members of 
this group included the director o f campus operations and three of his four assistants, one 
of whom was an engineer. Each was acting in their organizational and bureaucratic
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capacity. In addition, they enjoy a collegial relationship with the group making decisions 
after eliciting and accommodating the views and concerns of each member. Expanding 
the group to include the vice president, the final decision-level authority, was an easy 
evolution as he is a primary participant in physical plant decisions.
When the follow-on decision process to retrofit the remaining 11 buildings 
expanded beyond this group to include representatives from purchasing, architecture and 
engineering, legal counsel, and finance, the bureaucratic model continued to 
predominate. The chief buyer’s response reflected the department o f purchasing’s 
routines and procedures. “An RFP should have more than one bid to maintain the 
integrity of the bid process and to be in the best interest of the HSC,” she states. “In 
addition,” she continues, “because the contract potentially creates a debt by the state, it 
should be referred to the State of Oklahoma bond oversight commission.” An unusual 
move because the project did not involve bond financing, the bond oversight 
commissions’ staff, in turn, reflected its own routines and procedures by reviewing and 
commenting upon the contract even though its jurisdiction over the university and this 
type of project was unclear. Finally, A&E responded that before the project could 
proceed an electrical engineer should review the scope of the project and prepare detailed 
contract specifications. Even though this step was not required in the previous retrofit, it 
was most typically bureaucratic. A&E’s purpose as an organization is to prepare 
drawings and specifications for renovation and construction projects in campus buildings, 
and to oversee contract completion and compliance. Their response that detailed
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specifications were required was therefore predictable, even though the retrofit was a 
maintenance-related project in which they do not become involved.
The decision process dynamics, finally, reflected the political model. Defined as 
a diffused process in which individuals and groups vie for influence, it describes 
purchasing, the campus architect, and the operations director arguing and maneuvering 
for their respective positions. In particular, the architect’s insistence on three occasions 
before the contract signing that his concerns be accommodated, although they had 
marginal influence on the contract itself, is classic political dynamics. In addition, the 
bond oversight’s staff was quick to claim jurisdiction, even though it is still questionable, 
in an effort to exercise their prerogative. “Does the project involve financing by anyone 
involved at any level? If so, then you damn well better bring it to us” was the response 
by a senior member o f the staff when bond oversight’s Jurisdiction was questioned. The 
contractor also entered the political arena when he appealed to a member of the board of 
regents. The regent, in turn, vied to influence the process by going to the president’s 
office on the main campus. The president’s office illustrated both the bureaucratic and 
political models; it “won” by exerting its influence in making the decision to award the 
contract, but its influence stems from its organizational position and prerogatives. The 
vice president’s eager acquiescence to the president’s office, even though this was 
clearly a local medical school project, reaffirms the political dynamics model.
Question Two: How does their presence affect the decision?
The pervasiveness of the decision process dynamics models in this case moved 
the decision far from economic, financial considerations. Although marginal, financial
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considerations nevertheless remained significant. At each major step the decision to 
outsource the project rather than complete it in-house was reaffirmed by cost-benefit 
analysis. The one-building test project came close to a solely economic-based, 
financially-driven decision, confirming that financial considerations are important and 
play a major role as a base-line as other variables come into play. During the ensuing 
decision process dynamics, however, the question of financial benefit was not at issue 
even though at times the viability of the project itself came into question.
Other significant findings:
The case seems to clarify a pattern suggested by the contrast between the printing 
services case and the motor pool case that may be significant. A major factor in this 
case’s decision process escalation was the project’s cost. The test project’s cost was 
$254,000, and although significant, it appeared to entail minimal risk. It was funded 
from the utility budget where the savings likewise accrued. At this stage, the decision 
process was limited to the physical plant staff and the vice president. Cost of the 
campus-wide project, however, increased by four times to just over $1 million. At that 
level, the project’s visibility and risk seemed to become more significant. Hence, the 
chief buyer was uncomfortable with only one bid in response to the RFP even though 
receiving one response to an RFP is not unusual. When the campus architect was asked 
why A&E took an interest in the project when it grew to include all campus buildings, 
even though they had little interest in the test project, he replied that “with over $ 1 
million at stake in the project, we dare not overlook anything that might potentially 
increase the risk to the university.” In addition, concern over potential risk was
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illustrated by questions being raised several times over a methodology to calculate and 
verify energy savings. “How do we really know, the test project notwithstanding, that 
we really do have savings?” asked the vice president, by nature reluctant to make 
decisions. Even though the contract spelled out a calculation methodology all primary 
participants acknowledged was valid, the potential risk of no savings after such a 
sizeable investment seemed to sit heavily on the vice president’s mind. It thus appears 
that the higher the potential cost in an outsource decision, the greater the visibility and 
the further the decision moves from solely economic and financial considerations, and 
the greater the number o f decision participants. This is a pattern looked for in 
subsequent cases.
This case also reaffirms a pattern suggested by the first two cases. Restructuring 
or reengineering an in-house enterprise appears to be a significant consideration in the 
decisions to outsource. Reengineering in this case refers to the more traditional 
definition o f recalculating technical specifications and, with the project thus being re­
defined, to completing it in-house to reduce the project’s cost. In addition, its intent 
parallels the concept o f “process reengineering” illustrated in the first two cases; let’s 
restructure the organization and its processes to become more efficient and competitive 
and thereby keep the enterprise in-house. More explicitly, reengineering was addressed 
in both the test building and the campus-wide project by estimating the costs of 
completing the projects in-house, to include hiring additional staff if necessary. This 
study thus appears to reaffirm the efficacy of reengineering as an alternative to 
outsourcing, even though in the end outsourcing was the more cost-effective approach.
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Case Four:
Outsourcing at a Rural University:
Setting the Standard
Case synopsis: With an on-campus student population of about 2500, 
the university is located in a rural area north of Oklahoma City. For a number of reasons 
during the mid-1970s, the university underwent severe financial difficulties to the point 
of technical bankruptcy. In a rural area with limited access to qualified and trained staff, 
extraordinary measures were required to regain solvency. Among the steps taken, 
unusual among institutions of higher education in Oklahoma at the time, was a program 
to outsource three important campus enterprises: food services, the bookstore, and 
somewhat later, physical plant operations and maintenance in two phases. Food services 
and the bookstore, both unable to become solvent after efforts to reorganize, were 
outsourced, respectively first and second, and soon began to show profits. Physical plant 
operations, with new leadership, were successfully restructured and soon began to 
provide adequate services. Five years later, it too was outsourced with good results. The 
three enterprises remain outsourced today, almost 20 years later.
Question One: What non-financial, non-economic considerations play a 
significant role in outsourcing decisions?
Outsourcing the food services and the bookstore followed closely the economic- 
based, financial-driven decision model. The extreme financial exigencies required quick 
and decisive action to bring solvency to these enterprises. Financial and cost-benefit
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analysis indicated outsourcing offered a clearly better alternative to continued internal 
efforts to restructure. Indeed, it may have been the only viable alternative. Beyond the 
financial model, organizational-bureaucratic considerations played an important role.
The ability of the vice president for fiscal affairs to move quickly and decisively to 
outsource food services and the bookstore operations stems from his role and 
responsibilities in the organization. The decision to outsource the physical plant, made 
several years after the successful outsourcing of food services and the bookstore, appears 
to be management based. The vice president and the president concluded outsourcing 
would offer economies o f scale purchasing, increased productivity, and allow them both 
to spend less time managing physical plant operations. As the president stated, “by now 
it was clear that not managing and worrying about how food services and the bookstore 
were operating left me time to devote to more important matters. The prospect of doing 
the same with physical plant was persuasive.” The decision process in the physical plant 
decision also reflects the collegial decision dynamics model as the president deliberately 
expanded the decision process to include his vice presidents and key staff members.
Question Two: How does their presence affect the decision?
While the economically-based, financially-driven decision model is evident, the 
vice president’s ability to move quickly and largely unilaterally to outsource both 
functions, albeit with the president’s approval, stems from his role and responsibilities as 
the university’s chief financial officer. That is, his actions are more satisfactorily 
explained when considered in the context of the bureaucratic decision dynamics model. 
Financial considerations were important, and impelled action, but the response was
55
largely a result o f the vice president’s organizational position and prerogatives. Thus the 
university’s first two outsource decisions also are illustrations of the bureaucratic 
decision process dynamics model.
The decisions to outsource the physical plant, however, went beyond both the 
economic-based, financially-driven and the bureaucratic process dynamics decision and 
provide useful contrasts. Financial considerations continued to remain important. More 
important, however, the vice president was concerned that despite its improvements and 
satisfactory current operations, the plant needed improvements current capabilities were 
unlikely to allow, and outsourcing, with its economies o f scale, higher productivity, and 
increased efficiencies, provided a means to achieve them. Concurrently with the vice 
president’s initiative, the president realized that outsourcing provided him relief fi-om 
managing non-educational activities. Together these two concerns moved the decision 
into a management model: outsource for greater efficiency; outsource non-core activities 
to allow greater focus on core activities.
Going beyond outsourcing food services and the bookstore, both decision 
makers realized that the decision to outsource the plant represented an important 
evolution in outsourcing’s use at the university. Financial imperatives were not as 
significant, and outsourcing appeared more discretionary. Moreover, the value and 
magnitude of a contract to operate the physical plant meant that more members of the 
campus community would be affected, directly and indirectly. In particular, a larger 
number of more highly-paid, highly-skilled, and likely more vocal employees would be 
affected in contrast to the employees affected by the food services and the bookstore
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contracts. Consequently, the president adopted a collegial approach to decision making 
by ensuring that representatives from all campus communities were involved in the 
decision process. Interviews with the vice presidents for fiscal affairs, academic affairs, 
student affairs, members o f the faculty, and managers of the physical plant determined 
they all believed they had significant input into the decision to outsource the physical 
plant and agreed with the assessment that the process was collegial.
Although the decisions primarily followed the collegial model, political dynamics 
played an important, though lesser role. The decision to outsource the plant in two 
phases based on trade skills was an effort to minimize potential opposition from a likely 
vocal group while the concept was tried, proven and accepted. So likewise was a 
decision to include in the contract the requirement to hire in-house plant employees for at 
least six months at comparable wage and benefit rates. Unusual for the time, these 
contract provisions successfully limited opposition from the affected employees, satisfied 
the regents’ concerns, and provided satisfactory answers to two state legislators who 
inquired on behalf of their constituents.
Other significant findings:
The case provides additional Insights into outsourcing in higher education. First, 
the physical plant decision appears to confirm that the higher the value and magnitude of 
a potential contract, the greater its visibility becomes, and the more significant non­
economic and non-financial considerations become. This phenomenon was identified in 
the two previous cases, and implicit in the first case. Food services and the bookstore
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were failing enterprises, but their operating costs were individually about one-third the 
operating costs o f the physical plant. Fewer resources were thus at risk.
Second, restructuring or reengineering, though not a major, continuing effort, 
nonetheless occurred at some level. The vice president tried restructuring food services 
and the bookstore before concluding outsourcing in each case offered a better alternative. 
At about the same time, he reorganized the physical plant and hired a professional 
director. Significant improvements resulted over several years in physical plant 
operations and maintenance. The vice president's subsequent conclusions that the 
university was unlikely to be able to make the improvements he viewed elsewhere, 
within the plant’s current capabilities and resources, was implicit reengineering; he made 
a Judgement that additional restructuring would not bring additional improvements
Finally, the case confirmed many outsourcing benefits often cited in higher 
education management literature. Outsourcing brings up-front capital funding at no or 
little cost to the institution. Outsourcing brings increased productivity and lower costs 
through economies of scale buying and more responsive, quicker purchasing.
Outsourcing brings increased productivity by reducing employee absenteeism and 
providing access to a larger pool o f qualified employees on which to draw when non­
routine problems arise. Outsourcing can increase revenues from auxiliary enterprises. 
Outsourcing, through its efficiencies, can reduce the cost of providing services and 
provide savings that either can be reallocated to other activities, or retained in the 
outsourced activity to improve services further.
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Case Five:
A Small Liberal Arts University:
A Work in Progress
Case synopsis: The university is a small liberal arts state-supported university of 
about 1700 campus students located southwest o f Oklahoma City. It enjoys a strong 
reputation for academic distinction. Outsourcing is a recent phenomenon at the 
university, with its first contract awarded in 1994. The president became interested in 
the concept when he grew weary of working with the bookstore that had long struggled 
with profitability. Discussions with colleagues who had successfully outsourced one or 
more enterprises on their campuses convinced him that outsourcing might be o f benefit 
to his bookstore operations. Soon after awarding a contract for its operation, the 
bookstore began generating surpluses rather than losses. Encouraged by the bookstore’s 
success, he next outsourced food services when its long-term manager retired. Early 
success was mixed with food services, but he had confidence in the concept. A year 
later, recognizing that outsourcing might also benefit the physical plant, the president and 
his staff awarded a contract for physical plant operations and maintenance. The food 
services and physical plant contracts have not been as successful as hoped for a number 
of reasons, but with contractors willing to work things out the president and his staff are 
yet hopeful the contracts will be as successful as the bookstore contract. Nevertheless, 
returning physical plant operations and maintenance as in-house operations remains an 
option.
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Question One: What non-financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role 
in outsourcing decisions?
The management model is reflected in all three decisions; outsourcing provided 
efficiencies and economies unlikely to be achieved in-house. Operation of the decision 
process dynamics models also was significant and contributes to a more satisfactory 
explanation of outsourcing at the university.
Question Two: How does their presence affect the decision?
Economic-based, financially-driven considerations were significant only in the 
decision to outsource the bookstore; the initial concern was to help it become 
consistently profitable. Financial considerations were of marginal concern in the 
decisions to outsource food services and physical plant operations. That is, the contracts 
had to be financially sound, but financial considerations did not drive the decisions.
Food services had been a highly successful enterprise, and the decision to outsource was 
influenced by the bookstore’s successful contract. The president’s concern that he would 
be unable to find a qualified manager to replace food services’ retiring manager was a 
management-based issue. He chose instead to rely upon the contractor’s access to a 
broad management pool to provide a qualified manager. The physical plant was 
operating adequately. The decision to outsource reflected the desire to improve 
operations and the expectations that outsourcing would offer management-based benefits 
deriving from economies of scale purchasing and greater productivity not available in- 
house.
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The decision processes dynamics were also important. Participation in the 
decisions to outsource the bookstore and food services was limited to the president and 
the vice president for fiscal affairs. It appears that the president’s determination to 
outsource, and both enterprises’ limited impact on the campus community, explain the 
narrow decision processes. The actions and decisions o f the president and vice president 
fall within their organizational and bureaucratic roles and reflect the bureaucratic 
decision dynamics model.
When the decision was made to proceed with outsourcing the physical plant, the 
decision processes were expanded to include a broader decision group, reflecting 
recognition o f the wider impact outsourcing physical plant operations would have on the 
campus community. The greater cost of the physical plant contract and the greater 
number o f higher skilled and higher paid long-term physical plant employees ensured it 
would be. Consequently, the decision process dynamics expanded to the collegial 
decision model. Political dynamics did not appear to play a significant role in the 
decision process but were nonetheless important. Concern for the welfare o f physical 
plant employees and the need for their support led directly to a decision to allow 
employees to chose to go with the contractor or remain with the University. The 
consequences o f that decision, however, are now causing contract and operating 
difficulties.
Other signiflcant findings:
The university’s experience appears to confirm the pattern identified in the earlier 
cases: the higher the value and magnitude of a potential outsource contract, the more
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significant non-economic and non-financial considerations become. The bookstore's 
gross sales are now about $500,000 per year and food services’ sales are about $350,000 
per year. The physical plant budget, however, is about $1.2 million, and represents about 
20% of the university’s total annual budget. Accordingly, tlie decision process to 
outsource physical plant operations and maintenance expanded from the narrow 
bureaucratic decision process dynamics to broader collegial decision dynamics, with 
political dynamics an important concern.
In addition, together with the rural university’s experience, the university’s 
experience seems to suggest another pattern; on small campuses, bureaucratic and 
collegial decision models are more likely, and political dynamics are less important than 
on larger campuses. Finally, although the university is experiencing difficulties with two 
of its three contracts, it nonetheless reaffirms many benefits associated with outsourcing. 
In particular, outsourcing can increase revenues and decrease costs. It can bring up-front 
resources either unavailable to, or difficult to obtain by, in-house operations. Also, it can 
increase productivity and reduce costs through economies of scale and with access to a 
larger labor pool.
Somewhat surprising, the university’s experience with outsourcing did not appear 
to include explicit or implicit reengineering efforts. With the bookstore, reengineering 
did not appear to be considered at all. With food services, the enterprise was already 
successful and reengineering seemed unnecessary. With the physical plant, 
reengineering was considered unlikely to result in any improvements given the limited 
skill pool and long-tenures of in-house employees. Likewise a surprise, management-
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based divestiture was little in evidence. The president and vice president for fiscal 
affairs continue to be actively engage in managing food services and the physical plant.
Summary o f Findings
During the course o f the research and analysis, and beyond the research questions 
themselves, a useful organizing concept emerged from the broad purpose of the study: to 
determine how and why higher education institutions in Oklahoma outsource. Each of 
the variables, economic-financial considerations, management based considerations, and 
decision dynamics-based considerations, fit into either “why” or “how” categories. 
Economic-financial and management-based considerations explain why institutions 
outsource. Decision process dynamics explain how. Categorizing the variables in terms 
of “how” and “why” institutions outsource thus allows the construction of a summary 
matrix.
The matrix lists the variables across the top: economic-financial (Finance), 
management-economies and efficiencies (Mgt/E), management-divestiture (Mgt/D), 
bureaucratic decision dynamics (Bureau), collegial decision dynamics (College), and 
political decision dynamics (Political). In the “other” category are reengineering or 
restructuring (Reengin), and revenue or budget expenditures listed in thousands of dollars 
(add 000 to the listed values). On the left axis are the cases: printing services (Print), the 
motor pool (Motor), lighting retrofit (Light), rural food services (R/Food), rural 
bookstore (R/Book), rural physical plant (R/Plant), small university bookstore (S/Book),
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small university food services (S/Food), and small university physical plant (S/Plant). 
Analysis follows the matrix.
(Why) (Why) (Why) (How) (How) (How) (Other) (Other)
Finance Mgt/E Mgt/D Bureau College Political Reeng Size
Print M M P M P S Yes 750
Motor M M P M M P Yes 1,700
Light M M S P P P Yes 1,100
R/Food P M S P M M Yes 375
R/Book P M S P M M Yes 550
R/Plant M P P S P S Yes 1,700
S/Book S M P P M M No 500
S/Food M S M P M M No 350
S/Plant M P S M P S Yes 1,200
P: primary importance. S: secondary importance. M: marginal importance 
Matrix analysis. The case studies suggest that economic-based, financial-driven 
considerations explaining why the institutions outsourced were of marginal importance in 
six of the nine cases. They were of primary importance only in the rural's food services 
and bookstore decisions, and secondary in the small’s bookstore decision. Likewise, 
management based economies of scale and productivity efficiencies were of marginal 
importance in six of the nine cases. They were o f primary importance only in the rural’s 
and the small’s decisions to outsource their physical plant operations and maintenance, 
and of secondary importance in the small’s food services decision. Management based
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divestitures, however, were o f either primary or secondary importance in seven of the 
cases, and in only two, the small’s bookstore and food services, they were of marginal 
importance.
In terms of how the institutions outsourced, bureaucratic decision process 
dynamics were either of primary or secondary importance in six o f the cases, and o f 
marginal importance in only the printing services, the motor pool, and the small’s physical 
plant decisions. The collegial decision dynamics were o f marginal importance in five o f 
the cases, but in the other four, they were o f primary importance. Political decision 
dynamics were o f primary or secondary importance in five o f the cases, but of marginal 
importance in the other four. Finally, reengineering or restructuring was significant in 
seven o f the nine cases, with only the small’s bookstore and food services indicating 
marginal importance.
It appears a relationship between the size of the outsource contract and its relation 
to non-financial considerations may be significant. Initial indications suggested that the 
higher the value of the contract, the more visible the process and the more likely the 
decision would move from economic-financial concerns. In three out o f  the four lowest- 
value contracts, financial considerations were o f primary or secondary importance whereas 
in the five highest-value contracts, the political process dynamics model was of primary or 
secondary concern. A relationship may also be implied between the bureaucratic decision 
dynamics model and the four lowest-value contracts. In all four, bureaucratic process 
dynamics were of primary concern. Conversely, in the four lowest-value contracts 
political decision dynamics was uniformly of marginal importance.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The broad purpose of this study was to determine how and why public institutions 
of higher education in Oklahoma outsource in-house enterprises. Postulating that an 
economic-based, financially-driven decision model may be an incomplete explanation of 
outsource decisions, the study was designed to identify non-fmancial influences and 
considerations that affect a decision and to propose a more complete decision model.
The study examines two major questions: (I) what non-fmancial, non-economic 
considerations play a significant role in outsourcing decisions, and (2) how does their 
presence affect the decision?
Current higher education management practice and related literature stress the 
financial benefits possible from outsourcing (Morrell, 1994), provide “case studies” 
suggesting how financial benefits can be realized (The Association, 1994; Green, 1992), 
and offer analytical matrices to assist decision makers arrive at a financially sound 
decision (Goldstein, 1993). In addition, several surveys have been published listing the
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numbers and types of functions and enterprises higher education institutions outsource 
and conclude it is a useful mechanism to reduce costs (Abramson, 1993,1994; Wertz, 
1996). In sum, outsourcing is advocated and practiced among institutions o f higher 
education with the assumptions that decisions to outsource are and should be 
economically-based and financially-driven.
Outsourcing as an economic, financial outcome, therefore, appears to provide 
sound justification for achieving cost savings, increased efficiencies, and increased 
revenues. Curiously absent in higher education literature, however, is discussion of non- 
financial considerations and influences that may affect a decision to outsource. More to 
the point, the presence of non-financial influences and considerations in a decision to 
outsource may suggest that the economic, financially-based model is an incomplete 
explanation of outsource decisions, and a broader, more complete explanation is 
necessary and appropriate.
Although higher education management literature emphasizes the economic- 
financial benefits, a review of the broader literature related to outsourcing suggests there 
are two well-established hypotheses or propositions that may be used to explain why 
decisions are made in public higher education to outsource traditional campus functions. 
First, decisions to outsource are based on outsourcing’s use as an economic, financial 
mechanism that introduces competition into the public sector and thereby reduces the 
cost of services or increases its revenues. Employed in public higher education, savings 
or revenues are thereby generated that can be reallocated to other functions. Second, 
decisions to outsource are based on its use as a management mechanism to achieve
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efficiencies and/or divest an institution of non-core functions. Unburdened by non- 
educational functions, the institution can thereby concentrate its resources on direct 
education.
The economic-based, financially-driven decision model and the management- 
based decision model provide explanations o f why higher education institutions 
outsource, but does the literature also provide explanations of how? A third proposition 
suggests that decisions are determined by the decision process dynamics typical o f public 
higher education institutions. Analyzing outsourcing in this contexts thus adds to a more 
complete understanding of how higher education institutions decide to outsource. 
Together with explanations o f why institutions outsource, explanations o f how they make 
the decisions contribute, in turn, to the emerging body of knowledge explaining 
outsourcing’s use in higher education, and to a practical understanding of outsourcing as 
a decision outcome.
Conclusions
This study was conducted in an effort to provide a more complete and satisfactory 
explanation of how and why public institutions of higher education in Oklahoma 
outsource traditional in-house enterprises. It is concluded from the case studies that the 
institutions outsource (the “why”) for two primary reasons: economic-financial benefits 
and management-related benefits. Economic-financial benefits are realized as an in- 
house enterprise is exposed to the market’s competitive forces and contracts are awarded
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that reduce costs and increase revenues. Second, management benefits are realized 
through a contractor’s ability to increase productivity, increase efficiencies, and provide 
economies of scale, and when a contract allows the institution to divest non-core 
enterprises to allow more attention to mission-related activities.
The data also leads to the conclusion that the outsource decision process (the 
“how”) follows three decision process dynamics models. First, decisions result from 
organizational, bureaucratic processes and procedures as officials act in their respective 
organizational roles. Second, decisions result from a collegial dynamics process in 
which responsibility is shared by key decision makers as they reach consensus. Third, 
decisions are a result o f the political dynamics process in which individuals and groups 
bargain, compromise, build coalitions, and seek to influence the decision in their favor.
In each of the outsource decisions examined, elements of all variables were found 
to be present in varying degrees of importance, suggesting that a more complete 
explanation of why and how public institutions of higher education in Oklahoma 
outsource must include consideration of each. The findings suggest an institution may 
desire both economic-financial benefits and the management benefits associated with 
outsourcing. They also suggest that on a campus all three decision process dynamics 
may be at work, sequentially or simultaneously, and that each may have an influence on 
the decision. A complete outsource decision model thus states that public higher 
education institutions in Oklahoma outsource for economic-financial and management 
related benefits as the outsource decision evolves through bureaucratic, collegial and 
political decision process dynamics.
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The findings also suggests that restructuring or reengineering is implicitly and 
explicitly related to outsource decisions, particularly as institutions seek the economic- 
financial benefits competition can make possible through outsourcing, in all five cases, 
and in seven of the nine outsource decisions, reengineering was either an implicit or 
explicit process. It was implicit as decision makers subjectively Judged in-house 
restructuring would not bring the same benefits as outsourcing, and explicit as decision 
makers made cost-benefit analyses o f the relative benefits of restructuring and 
outsourcing. Competitive restructuring appears efficacious in higher education.
Although not as immediately apparent as others, an additional conclusion related 
to reengineering might be drawn. In the motor pool case, the threat of outsourcing 
motivated a majority of the steering committee members and motor pool employees to 
undertake reengineering vigorously. The possibility that many Jobs might be lost 
appeared to stimulate employee cooperation in reducing the motor pool’s operating costs, 
and extended to eliminating four employee positions. This experience is in direct 
contrast to the printing services case; nevertheless, it is also suggested in the lighting 
retrofit and the initial rural university decisions. It deserves additional study.
Further, the data suggest there may be a relationship between the size or dollar 
amount of a potential outsource contract and the likelihood that non-fmancial concerns 
drive the decision. The decision process dynamics in large dollar-amount contracts will 
more likely reflect either the collegial or political decision process dynamics. Smaller 
contract dollar amounts are more likely to follow the routine organizational-bureaucratic 
decision process dynamics model. This issue has significant practical application.
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Finally, the study confirms a number o f benefits frequently associated with 
outsourcing in higher education. Broadly, six o f the eight outsource contracts resulted in 
significant benefits to the respective institutions, with the outcome o f the two yet in 
question. The problems with the two seem to derive from incomplete or inadequate 
contract provisions not present in the other seven. These problems suggest that a 
carefully structured contract explicit enough to cover institutional requirements and to 
include easily measured performance standards can provide significant benefits to the 
outsourcing institution. More specifically, a number of contractors made significant 
required capital improvements in equipment and facilities at either no or low cost to the 
institution. The institutions were thus able to use their capital funds for other purposes. 
In addition, economies of scale purchasing and personnel resources, reduced operating 
costs, increased auxiliary enterprise revenues, fewer management diversions from core 
activities, fewer personnel problems, and increased productivity, were all demonstrated 
in the contracts studied. The study, in sum, demonstrates that outsourcing is a useful 
mechanism for public higher education in Oklahoma.
Implications
From a theoretical perspective, the study confirms outsourcing can be understood 
adequately and explained in terms of existing economic, management, and decision 
making theory. The cases do not identify any variables that appear to be acting outside 
these theoretical boundaries. The study does nevertheless contribute to conceptual and 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon o f outsourcing in public higher education
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and adds to its body of knowledge. It also clarifies variables upon which subsequent 
studies, either quantitatively, survey-oriented or qualitatively, phenomenologically- 
oriented, can be based. Perhaps more important to higher education administration and 
management, the study has practical significance and implications.
First, reengineering or restructuring is an integral part of the outsource decision 
process, either implicitly or explicitly. Many of the benefits ascribed to outsourcing can 
also accrue to the institution through reengineering in-house enterprises. Perhaps more 
important to the institution, these benefits can accrue without the personnel dislocations, 
loss of continuity, and reduced morale often associated with outsourcing. If outsourcing 
is the better alternative, then better contracts and greater contract benefits are more likely 
if a reengineering analysis is included as an explicit part of the decision process.
Second, the study demonstrates that outsourcing can be a complex, difficult, and 
time-consuming process requiring a significant commitment of resources. Better 
understanding the process can reduce the time and resources necessary to arrive at a 
decision beneficial to the institution. For example, if a large contract with a high dollar 
amount is under consideration, as in the lighting retrofit case, anticipating the decision 
process dynamics might simplify and shorten the process. Conversely, smaller outsource 
contracts are more likely to be approved and awarded more quickly.
Recommendations
As a qualitative, phenomenological study of nine outsource decisions at four 
public institutions o f higher education in Oklahoma, generalizing the study’s results to a
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larger population must be done cautiously. The study has identified a number of 
variables affecting outsourcing at four institutions, and a follow-on survey-based 
quantitative study may be useful to understanding outsourcing in general higher 
education. Survey questions addressing the relative importance of economic-financial 
considerations, management-related considerations of economies and divestiture, and 
decision process dynamics, would elicit data that could be analyzed using statistical 
processes. With appropriate sampling, the data would be useful to understanding the 
process in the broader population.
The study suggests a number o f possible correlations and relationships that a 
quantitative study may clarify. Is there a significant correlation between the size and 
dollar amount of a potential contract and a decision process dynamics model; between 
the size of the university and a particular outsource decision process dynamics model; 
between the size o f a university and outsourcing frequency; between the size o f a 
university and the enterprises it outsources? Does the location of a campus, urban, 
suburban, or rural, correlate to outsourcing frequency? When outsourcing is under 
consideration, what is the ratio o f successful reengineering to successful outsourcing? Is 
there a relationship between the threat o f outsourcing and cooperation in reengineering? 
Is there a correlation between a type of outsourced enterprise and a level o f savings? 
What percentage of outsourced enterprises have been brought back in-house? While 
further analysis o f this study may elicit additional questions, as will follow-on studies, 
the limited body o f knowledge addressing outsourcing in higher education suggests that 
further quantitative or qualitative studies will contribute significantly.
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STUDY ONE
THE DECISION TO OUTSOURCE PRINTING SERVICES 
AT A MAJOR UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER
THE CASE
With publishing being a natural outcome o f  higher education's mission, university 
presses and printing services have long been an integral part o f any campus. While some 
have grown to rival the major publishing houses, most provide convenient, quick, and 
low-cost services to assist the faculty, research staff, and students. In the case of the 
health sciences center, printing services included the additional, unique capability to 
create medical illustrations, indispensable to its teaching and publishing. Before 
inexpensive office copiers and desk-top publishing systems became common, and before
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high-speed copiers allowed the development o f low-cost off-campus copying enterprises, 
the center’s faculty and staff had few options other than printing services.
For over 20 years, operating as the department o f graphics and media, the shop 
was a $I million per year enterprise supporting the center's needs using offset presses 
and, when it became technically and financially feasible, a high-speed copier. It 
established a walk-in, over-the-counter quick-copy service, and offered pick-up and 
delivery of larger jobs for which offset presses were more appropriate and less expensive. 
Employee turn-over was low; advances in printing technology had reduced the demand 
for experienced, skilled printers, and the university provided a wage scale and benefit 
package that surpassed those prevailing in the community. Though office copiers and 
off-campus copying services began to cut into printing services business, the shop 
nonetheless sustained a large, loyal clientele built over many years. In addition, it 
continued to offer hand-drawn medical illustrations not readily found elsewhere.
By 1990, increased competition from off-campus quick-copy services and office 
copiers began to have a significant impact. Gross revenues fell to the $750,000 per year 
range. The shop's ability to cut costs was limited by fixed overhead operating costs tied 
to the university's rigid personnel and service unit accounting policies and procedures, 
and was thus unable to reduce overhead. In an effort to shed some of its personnel costs, 
the shop in 1990 was restructured and assigned to the office of public affairs, under the 
provost, responsible for the center’s publications. Medical illustrations, typesetting, and 
reception were separated and relocated from printing services to the public affairs office.
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together with their overhead costs. Two print shop employees were laid off with the 
hope that combining administrative support o f two offices would result in economies.
Though well intentioned, the move appeared not to have been well thought out. 
Expected administrative economies did not materialize. Separating typesetting, 
illustrations, and reception from production slowed down the printing process. Printing 
priorities, now established by public affairs, tended to favor the slower, less profitable 
publishing projects like books rather than quicker and more profitable printing and 
copying jobs. Slower and less responsive service eroded the shop's clientele even 
further. Moreover, print shop employee morale, seldom a problem when the shop 
operated as an independent enterprise, plummeted under public affairs. Animosities 
grew between print shop and public affairs employees. Indeed, print shop employees 
viewed the downsizing and subordination to public affairs as management retaliation for 
going public with a long dispute over environmental working conditions in the print 
shop. Tardiness and absenteeism became problems. Losses, heretofore only occasional, 
began to be chronic, ranging as high as $200,000 per year.
The administration, in an effort to untie what had become a Gordian knot, 
commissioned the first of three print shop studies by outside consultants. The study 
identified four practical options: close the print shop and allow the center’s users to go 
directly to any off-campus source for printing; contract with an off-campus printing firm 
as the exclusive center printing source; contract with an outside firm to establish an on- 
campus operation; reorganize, re-equip and restaff printing services to provide quick, 
low-cost and convenient printing services. It recommended the fourth option:
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reorganizing, re-equipping and restaffing. Acknowledging a large on-campus clientele, 
the study suggested modernizing printing equipment, cross-training personnel to reduce 
personnel needs, reducing the number of supervisory and management personnel (out of 
12 employees, four were supervisors who no longer contributed to production), and 
computerizing and streamlining the work flow.
Before deciding which option to pursue, however, administration attempted to 
overcome the open hostility between printing services and the office of public affairs that 
brought printing practically to a standstill. In 1991, it moved printing services from 
public affairs to the director of operations and consolidated once again its former 
functions. Operations is responsible for several other campus-wide support functions, 
including central mail, records management, physical plant, motor pool, and public 
safety. More importantly, the director o f operations reports to the vice president of 
administrative affairs, the administrative unit under which the print shop had previously 
been assigned. Although the move somewhat improved morale and productivity, the 
director of printing services retired out of exasperation and frustration. Despite the 
change, for which he argued forcefully, he believed too many uncertainties remained 
about printing services' future.
The director's resignation further complicated the issue and stimulated the second 
study: Should administration hire another director/manager? Are the first study's 
recommendations valid? If so, which option should be pursued? This time, the 
administration turned to the main campus and commissioned the director of student 
publications to conduct a study. He confirmed the first study's conclusion: strong
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demand for on-campus printing services remained, and printing services should be 
reorganized, re-equipped and restaffed. In particular, he concluded hiring a new manager 
from outside the center, and investing in new equipment, would significantly improve 
printing operations. It could once again become a profitable enterprise.
The director of operations, however, did not implement the recommendations. 
Despite two studies' findings that the equipment needed to be modernized, he elected not 
to invest in new equipment. Though he admitted knowing nothing about printing, he 
nonetheless believed better management and reorganization would do the trick. But then 
he, too, retired. This left the print shop without management or administrative oversight, 
with marginally adequate presses, obsolete typesetting equipment, and antiquated collating 
and binding machinery. Not surprisingly, the print shop drifted. Project backlog 
increased, employees showed little interest in improvement, tardiness and absenteeism 
increased even more, and most of the shop's clients went elsewhere. Clearly, something 
had do be done with printing services.
The vice president of administrative affairs, growing weary o f what appeared to  be 
an intractable problem, asked his directors staff to come up with a plan. Should the shop 
be salvaged, or should it be outsourced? After extended deliberation, the staff formulated 
a plan it seemed only a committee could have come up with. A request for proposals was 
prepared soliciting proposals for a 90-day management contract to improve printing 
operations, with an option for the bidder to purchase the entire operation if administration 
concluded it was in center's best interest. The idea was to hire an expert management 
consultant to try to turn the print shop around by making improvements and, if
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successful, hire a permanent manager to continue printing services as a center enterprise. 
Alternatively, if shop operations could not be made profitable once more, then the 
manager-consultant would be offered the print shop to purchase and provide the center's 
printing needs. To keep the contractor "honest," that is, to dissuade him/her from trying 
to convince the administration to sell the shop by showing only marginal improvement, 
the administration would assign its own interim business manager to the shop as an 
assistant to keep an eye on things. Four management-purchase offers were received, 
with the lowest management fee/highest purchase price offer being accepted. The 90- 
day trial period began July I, 1992.
Coincidental with the end of the 90-day period, and after a seven month delay, 
administration hired a new director of operations. His first assignment was to evaluate 
the print shop test and recommend a course o f action. Should the shop be continued as a 
center enterprise, or should it be contracted out? He called for reports by the consultant- 
contractor, as stipulated by the contract, and by the administration's interim manager.
Both reported significant improvement. Employee absenteeism and tardiness 
were well down. Work flow improved with a new tracking system, and a new, lower, 
competitive price list was established. Turn-around times were shortened. The billing 
system was computerized and collections were up. Gross revenues increased to an 
annual rate of $800,000. Most importantly, the shop began to show revenue surpluses 
consistently, although small. Old equipment still remained a problem, however, and 
needed to be replaced. In addition, overhead costs remained high; the university's wage 
and benefit structure and the print shop staff seniority allowed little room to cut.
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Moreover, employee attitudes, while improved, were still defensive. Customers 
continued to sense the attitude "you need us" rather than "we need you." Nonetheless, 
administration's interim business manager identified the trial a success; good 
management had made a difference, and transformation was underway.
It was time for a decision. Which option should the director recommend? From 
the reports and financial statements he concluded printing services could be profitable, 
and given an experienced manager, time, and investment in new equipment, could 
recapture its clientele. Ultimately, the print shop could provide quality, low cost printing 
for the center, and, without the need for a profit margin, perhaps even at lower prices 
than off-campus competitors. Equally important, keeping the operation in-house would 
ensure its availability and flexibility; administration would maintain control.
There remained, however, substantive problems with keeping the print shop in- 
house. Could the shop decrease its operating costs enough to become truly competitive? 
Since high wages and benefits limited the ability to cut overhead costs, reducing 
operating costs would rest on greatly-increased productivity that would, in turn, require 
new equipment and highly motivated employees. Estimates for new equipment 
approached $410,000, a cost that would require more than five years to recapture; 
enthusiastic, motivated employees seemed unlikely given the events of the past several 
years. Selling the print plant to a contractor, on the other hand, would avoid capital 
costs, difficult personnel issues, and, with the terms and conditions offered by the 
consultant, provide responsive, reasonably-priced, on-campus printing for center users.
In summary, there was no clear-cut indication that one alternative was better than the
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other. Indeed, the director concluded, either alternative could provide campus users with 
convenient printing services. He leaned toward recommending it stay in-house.
Armed with his analysis and conclusions, the director consulted with the other 
committee members to formulate a recommendation. He was surprised, however, by 
their cool responses; they seemed to have little interest in continuing to operate the shop 
as a center enterprise. The problems of the past two years had taken their toll. The staff 
had little confidence that employee attitudes would improve, were weary with dealing 
with the issue, and intuitively believed that contracting out the print shop made more 
sense. In addition, the vice president observed that the university’s board o f regents were 
very interested in outsourcing as a means to reduce costs and were actively encouraging 
its use. Both campuses were under pressure to demonstrate they supported the idea. A 
recommendation to continue operating the print shop thus would have likely been 
received with little enthusiasm.
Upon further reflection, the director recommend printing services be sold to the 
manager-consultant. The existing space would be leased to him for continued on-campus 
operations, his offer to buy the equipment would be accepted, he would be allowed to use 
campus mail to receive orders and return completed jobs, and he would offer continued 
employment to all print shop employees for at least 90 days. Arguing that since 
administration's objective was to provide quality, timely, low-cost printing services to 
campus users, the director suggested outsourcing the print plant would achieve that end 
and avoid the time and resource-consuming process required to re-establish a quality in- 
house operation. The staff and vice president concurred. The director prepared a
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reduction in force plan and the decision was enthusiastically approved by the board of 
regents. The manager-consultant took over operations in February 1993.
Printing services’ first year’s operations suggested the decision to outsource was 
sound. The vendor was providing responsive service, although he had not regained the 
customer base enjoyed by printing services in previous years. Important to the directors 
staff, complaints from campus users about printing services had stopped. The center 
recovered $57,500 in the sale o f the printing equipment to the vendor and in reallocating 
printing services cash and reserves to other projects, and avoided the $400,000 cost 
required for new equipment. The center also began receiving about $30,000 per year in 
lease revenues from the vendor. Perhaps most important, it appears the center’s costs for 
printing had been reduced by about $225,000 per year based upon the vendor’s new 
pricing schedule. Although outsourcing did not settle the question of whether 
it was a better option than restructuring, re-equipping, and continuing to operate printing 
services in-house, it was nonetheless considered successful.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study postulates that an economically-based, financially-driven decision 
model, when used to outsource higher education in-house functions, may an incomplete 
explanation of the process. Focusing on how and why higher education institutions 
outsource, it seeks a more complete decision model by asking two questions: (1) what 
non-financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role in outsourcing 
decisions, and (2) how does their presence affect the decision? Two corollary questions
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are implied: (a) are costs the major criterion upon which the decision to outsource was 
made; if not, then (b) what decision model is more appropriate or complete? A review of 
the literature suggests three hypotheses and associated models. First, outsource decisions 
are economic-based and financially-driven. Second, outsource decisions are 
management-based, and driven by possible efficiencies and the benefits o f divestiture. 
Third, outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics inherent in higher 
education: bureaucratic decision processes, collegial decision processes, or political 
dynamics decision processes.
This first case study is an effort to begin answering the questions by determining 
if economically-based, financial considerations were the major criterion in the decision 
to outsource the center’s printing services and, from an exploratory perspective, to 
identify other criteria considered important in the decision. It appears cost and service, 
financial considerations, were not the primary criteria in the decision to outsource 
printing services at the center. The new director o f operations clearly believed a 
restructured and re-equipped print plant could provide quality printing at a reasonable, 
competitive price to campus users, a conclusion confirmed by three separate studies. He 
likewise concluded outsourcing the operation by selling it to the manager-consultant 
would provide competitively priced, quality printing if the contract were structured as 
required by the request for proposals. While financial considerations, cost and service, 
thus provided a baseline against which to measure alternatives, a wish to get rid of what 
had become a difficult personnel and management problem seems to have been the 
driving motivation, reinforced by the regents’ advocacy of the practice.
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Cost and service were important, however. If either alternative offered 
significant savings over the other, then it would have been difficult to justify not 
pursuing the clearly lower cost option. As it was, restructuring the print shop offered an 
option that also satisfied the cost and service criteria. Perhaps of greater significance to 
the study is that in-house restructuring may have proven as efficacious as outsourcing to 
reduce costs and increase quality, an alternative higher education literature says little 
about. A question deserving additional research, then, is whether an existing campus 
enterprise can be restructured, or reengineered, to provide a product or service at the 
same or better levels than available by contract from private vendors on- or off-campus.
The predominance of non-financial considerations suggests the inadequacy of the 
economic-based, financially-driven model in the outsource decision. In this case, the 
decision was made by a group of seven directors working for the vice president for 
administrative affairs; the directors o f financial affairs, budgeting and purchasing, 
educational services, grants and contracts, computing services, and operations. The 
group exhibited many characteristics o f  the collegial model: shared influence, decisions 
by consensus, common values and commitments, collective responsibility, mutual trust 
and respect, frequent face-to-face interaction, and mutual congeniality. All but one had 
worked together successfully for several years, and the new director of operations 
appeared to fit in well. Together they shared the dismay over printing services’ 
problems, having struggled together for several years for an acceptable solution. The 
staffs o f each director used printing services, with its products being crucial to their 
respective operations, and they reflected the broader campus community’s deep
88
dissatisfaction with printing services status. Financial considerations appeared important 
only to the director of financial affairs; the others wanted an end to the problem by 
whatever means, suggesting a desire to divest the operation, a management 
consideration. All, however, shared the perception that the problem lay with the 
recalcitrant employees of printing services. The collegial model o f decision making thus 
appears to be an appropriate explanation of how the decision was made to outsource 
printing services. Few elements o f the bureaucratic or the political models appeared to 
be significant, although the regents’ emphasis on outsourcing, a political element, did 
have an influence.
The decision makers use o f contracting-out to rid themselves of what had become 
a difficult personnel and management problem suggests the presence also of the 
management model, and helps answer why the outsource decision was made. What to do 
with recalcitrant public service employees has long been the bane o f public management, 
protected as they are by procedural hurdles designed to minimize arbitrary management 
personnel decisions. In this case, the attitudes and morale of print shop employees were 
crucial. Whereas private enterprise can lay off personnel or reduce their wages to reduce 
overhead costs, neither option is available in a public enterprise like the center without 
protracted, cumbersome procedures. The only other practical option to reduce high 
overhead personnel costs was to increase individual employee productivity by their 
working harder and more efficiently. Employees seemed unwilling to cooperate, even 
when it became clear their jobs may be in Jeopardy. The decision to outsource the 
printing operation thus suggests a divestiture that freed management from dealing with
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the difficult problem. Are there other cases in which outsourcing has been used to rid a 
campus enterprise of an intractable personnel or other management problem? Additional 
research may help clarify the issue and its role in outsourcing decisions.
The role of the regents provided an unexpected and interesting perspective. Like 
contracting-out to solve a personnel problem, outsourcing because of emphasis by the 
regents further moved the decision away from financial considerations. In this case, the 
regents' role was influential, but not decisive. Their interest in the process reflects the 
prevailing perception that outsourcing avoids costs and saves resources that can be 
reallocated. If the financial analysis had tilted toward keeping the printing services in- 
house, however, would the regents' emphasis have influenced administration's decision to 
outsource anyway? If so, then an external political consideration would likely have 
become important in the decision. This suggests an additional line of research into 
decisions to outsource; do political considerations play a role?
In summary, this study clarifies why and how a higher education institution 
outsources and suggests patterns to look for in follow-on studies. First, economic and 
financial considerations were not the decisive criteria. While important, financial 
concerns provided a baseline against which other criteria were considered. The most 
important o f these was, second, the desire to divest a difficult personnel problem, a 
management issue. Third, a decision making model, in this case the collegial model, 
provides an explanation of how the decision was made. Less important, but still
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significant, the Board of Regents' pressure to step up the use of outsourcing influenced 
the decision, suggesting the presence o f political influence. Finally, the option to 
restructure in-house printing as an alternative to outsourcing suggests further studies 
might examine if  restructuring, or reengineering, may be as useful financially as 
outsourcing.
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STUDY TWO
A MAJOR UNIVERSITY’S MOTOR POOL:
TO OUTSOURCE OR REENGINEER?
THE CASE
The university's board o f regents establishes the policies and procedures 
governing university administration and management. Resource management is of 
particular concern to the board; they must approve any university expenditure exceeding 
$75,000. This requirement brings the regents well down into the university's day-to-day 
operations. Although individual members come from a variety o f backgrounds, most are 
successful business-persons and are perceived to reflect a "corporate" perspective. Not 
surprising, then, when the university began to experience declining resources and 
increasing costs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they approached the problems much as 
corporate america has during the recession: focus on the core mission, downsize or 
eliminate unprofitable enterprises, reduce overhead costs, and increase productivity and
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system efficiencies. For the university, they directed, focus on the university's three-fold 
mission of education, research, and public service and make efforts to get out o f the 
business o f "business." Since the university is a public institution, they argued, it is 
unlikely able to provide services as efficiently or at as low a cost as private enterprise. 
Translated, that meant to outsource or contract-out in-house services private vendors 
might be able to provide, leaving the university free to concentrate on its core missions. 
The chairman was particularly adamant about outsourcing. And, a number of university 
services and enterprises were successfully outsourced; the bookstore, vending machine 
services, laundry services, an airport control tower, and on one of its other campuses, 
printing services and office copiers. The motor pool, a $1.7 million, highly visible 
operation with many university-marked vehicles on and off campus, fell within the 
regent's interest as an outsourcing candidate. Through the president, the regents 
instructed that it be considered.
Two years earlier, the regents appointed a new vice president for administrative 
affairs with strong administrative and management experience. With a Ph.D. in higher 
education administration, he was well familiar with prevailing management theories and 
practices promising to reduce operating costs and increase efficiencies, like Total Quality 
Management and Business Process Reengineering. Although experienced in outsourcing 
and recognizing its utility, he shares with many administrators the concern that perhaps 
outsourcing is being used indiscriminately in higher education as a "panacea" for 
management problems that might more appropriately be addressed by other means. With 
outsourcing's potential to disrupt careers, adversely affect employee morale, limit
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management flexibility in using resources heretofore available, and the difficulty 
inherent in capturing all tasks to be outsourced, he believes an in-house enterprise ought 
to have the opportunity to restructure its own operations and processes to become more 
efficient and reduce costs before becoming a candidate for outsourcing. He concluded 
reengineering promised to provide the mechanism to reassess, redesign, and restructure 
the motor pool.
Although the regents had clearly articulated their desire to outsource the motor 
pool, he hoped to convince them a reengineered motor pool, with reduced operating costs 
and improved services, was a valid alternative. Moreover, he concluded, reengineering 
the motor pool would accomplish two additional objectives. First, it would provide 
benchmarks against which motor pool performance could be measured. Then, if the 
motor pool was subsequently unable to achieve reduced costs and improved services, the 
benchmarks would be used to write performance specifications in a request for proposals 
to outsource. Second, it would establish a process that could be used to reassess and 
restructure other university enterprises.
To guide the reengineering process, the vice president constituted a steering 
committee of representatives from his staff o f  directors, employee groups, and the 
faculty. To assist the committee, he employed a consulting firm to provide assistance 
with developing analytical data, developing performance standards, identifying the 
processes to be examined and reengineered, and with the examination itself. Over a 
period of six months, the steering committee and smaller working groups, including 
motor pool employees, examined motor pool operations and processes. As the processes
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were examined and a need for improvement was identified, the motor pool incorporated 
the changes in its operations.
As the working group compared motor pool maintenance with off-campus 
garages, it became clear the motor pool rates were higher by about $50,000 per year. 
Analysis indicated the higher rates were direct results of lower mechanic productivity 
and higher administrative overhead costs. Typical of many in-house public university 
functions, the motor pool workloads had changed over the years, in some cases 
decreasing with consolidations and technology improvements, without corresponding 
decreases in personnel. Review o f actual of workload requirements indicated two 
mechanic positions and two administrative overhead positions could be eliminated 
without adversely affecting service response times. The positions were eliminated, 
reducing costs by about $80,000 per year and greatly increasing the productivity of the 
remaining employees. In addition, the working group recommended adopting a 
computerized management and accounting information system to streamline and 
eliminate several clerical functions that would, in turn, allow reducing by one more the 
number o f administrative positions. These changes resulted in reduced costs that showed 
motor pool maintenance a lower-cost alternative to outsourced maintenance by $30,000 
to $50,000 per year.
Additional university-wide savings were generated by a policy change that 
reduced by 17% the rates charged to university departments for vehicle leases. Up to this 
point, vehicles were depreciated and replacement costs assessed over a life of 75,000 
miles, and then the vehicle was retired. This figure was based on the generally accepted
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industry-wide assumption that beyond 75,000 miles maintenance costs began to exceed 
economic levels. Analysis o f actual maintenance, however, indicated 90,000 miles was a 
more practical, realistic level. Adopting the higher mileage level, vehicle lease rates 
were lowered to match the longer depreciation and replacement cost rates. This step 
saves university departments about $28,000 per year. Moreover, the motor pool now 
purchases one vehicle fewer out of five formerly required, thus reducing capital tied up 
in vehicles and allowing it to be put to other uses.
The committee, the consultants, the vice president, and even the university 
president, considered the reengineering effort a success. All but the regents. They still 
seemed convinced that because the university and its motor pool were "public" 
enterprises, un-driven by competition and bottom-line profit, they would not provide 
services as efficiently or at as low a cost as a private vendor. The motor pool 
reengineering effort was commendable, they concluded, but it was faulty because it 
never grappled with the essential element of free enterprise, competition. Would a 
private vendor, given the opportunity to bid, offer a motor pool at a lower cost than even 
a reengineered university motor pool? The only way to determine the answer, the 
regents argued, was to prepare and release a request for proposals to provide a motor 
pool operation. Only then, with vendors required to put their money on the line, could it 
be determined which alternative was better. Their instructions: prepare and release an 
RFP for motor pool operation. The RFP was prepared in mid-spring and awaited release.
In late spring, and over the next six months, several events occurred that, 
although not directly related to the study and resulting RFP, nevertheless had great
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significance. First, the president announced his retirement to return to the faculty in the 
summer. Although he had acknowledged the efficacy of the motor pool reengineering, 
he nonetheless supported the regents in their emphasis on outsourcing. Second, the 
interim president, designated to serve for about six months, deferred as many policy- 
related decisions as possible to the incoming president, including the decision to release 
the motor pool RFP. Third, the new president's much heralded arrival in November 
further delayed the release decision and resulted in a number of policy shifts that would 
affect a final decision. Most important, he vowed to re-establish the familial campus 
atmosphere of his own undergraduate days, and, to win support of the faculty, he 
declared he would reduce administrative staff levels and reallocate savings to faculty pay 
raises. Finally, the chairman of the board of regents, the member most adamant about 
outsourcing, announced he would be stepping down the following spring.
The cumulative effect of all these events and changes was, finally, a decision not 
to release the RFP to outsource the motor pool, but to let the reengineering stand. Absent 
board pressure to outsource, and after declaring a desire to reunify the campus "family," 
yet struggling with a disaffected administrative staff suffering low morale, the new 
president did not want to cause additional alienation and divisions by "laying off' motor 
pool employees. Reengineering thus carried the day.
In contrast to the committee’s conclusions, which appear to be economically- 
based and financially-driven, cost and service were not the regents’ primary criteria in 
deciding that outsourcing was more appropriate. The reengineered motor pool clearly
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achieved lower costs and improved service. Indeed, the motor pool was a profitable 
enterprise before reengineering; increased efficiencies and lower operating costs made it 
more so. Cost and service, financial considerations, were important, if only implicitly.
If the motor pool had not been profitable, and lower costs and improved services had not 
been achieved through reengineering, then outsourcing would have been the clear 
alternative.
More important to the process seemed the regents' and the steering committee's 
differing perceptions o f outsourcing and reengineering. The regents reflected the 
perception that the business o f a university is not "business,” and that outsourcing is less 
costly and more efficient by its nature. These perceptions thus appeared to override the 
reengineered motor pool’s demonstrated financial savings. In addition, the regents 
seemed to have little concern for the mechanics and difficulties o f preparing an RFP to 
outsource so complex an operation as the motor pool. Nor did they share the staffs 
concern that few private vendors were likely to have the ability or experience to provide 
a comprehensive motor pool operation like the university's. Another university in the 
same state had attempted to outsource its motor pool several year earlier without success; 
it could not find a qualified bidder.
From the steering committee's perspective, six o f nine members interviewed were 
aware the regents wanted to outsource the motor pool. Significantly, all believed the 
final decision would turn on issues beyond the financial considerations alone. Perhaps 
more important, all believed in-house operations were preferable to outsourcing unless 
there was convincing evidence outsourcing would reduce costs, increase service
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efficiency and quality, and would produce savings or additional revenues. None, 
however, considered the motor pool a good outsourcing candidate. Based on informal 
criteria developed and used by the university's director of purchasing, a member of the 
committee, they judged the motor pool a profitable, customer oriented enterprise with 
stable, efficient management, high employee loyalty and performance, and not requiring 
any large capital expenditures. Most of these criteria would have had to be absent before 
any of the members would consider the motor pool an appropriate candidate to 
outsource.
On the other hand, all committee members interviewed were eager to try 
reengineering the motor pool. Interesting, only three thought the regents might accept a 
reengineered motor pool operation. The others believed issuing an RFP to outsource 
would be the final outcome. Perhaps more interesting, only two considered 
reengineering a legitimate alternative to outsourcing. Two others viewed it as a useful 
step to determine if outsourcing was appropriate. The remaining two considered 
reengineering a necessary step before outsourcing, but from a unique perspective; it 
would assist the motor pool become more competitive, thereby enabling it to respond 
itself as a bidder against off-campus vendors.
During committee deliberations, some discussion focused on whether the 
reengineering process ought to include "test" RFPs to help determine if performance 
benchmarks were adequate, and if prevailing wage data used in the analysis were 
accurate. That is, limited-scope RFPs could be prepared and released, and the responses 
analyzed to determine adequacy and accuracy of analytical data. Several members
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reflected that if  the committee had done so, and if the results confirmed the committee's 
own analytical data, then perhaps the regents would have been more willing to accept 
reengineering. For practical and ethical reasons, however, none of the committee 
supported test RFPs. They believed soliciting bids intending not to award a contract 
reduces the integrity and credibility o f the bid process. Moreover, they were concerned 
the process would unnecessarily lower the morale o f employees likely to be affected by 
outsourcing. Additionally, preparing a bid in response to an RFP requires considerable 
time and cost; none thought it fair to require this o f vendors deliberately with no prospect 
of awarding a contract.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study postulates that an economically-based, financially-driven decision 
model, when used to outsource higher education in-house functions, may be an 
incomplete explanation of the process. Focusing on how and why higher education 
institutions outsource, it seeks a more complete decision model by asking two questions; 
(1) what non-financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role in 
outsourcing decisions, and (2) how does their presence affect the decision? Two 
corollary questions are implied: (a) are costs the major criterion upon which the decision 
to outsource was made; if not, then (b) what decision model is more appropriate or 
complete? A review of the literature suggests three hypotheses and associated models. 
First, outsource decisions are economic-based and financially-driven. Second, outsource 
decisions are management-based, and driven by possible efficiencies and the benefits o f
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divestiture. Third, outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics 
inherent in higher education: bureaucratic decision processes, collegial decision 
processes, or political dynamics decision processes.
The case study clarifies several issues associated with how and why higher 
education institutions outsource. First, financial considerations did not appear to be the 
decisive criteria, and thus the economic-financial decision model provides an incomplete 
explanation of the decision. While financial considerations did appear to drive the 
steering committee’s evaluation and decision to reengineer rather than outsource, in the 
end they provided only the baseline around which other dynamics swirled. Other events 
and perceptions played more important roles. Second, an important additional perception 
was the regents’ view o f outsourcing that follows a fundamental management theory 
tenet: divest non-core enterprises to allow management to focus on the organization’s 
core activities. An articulated regents’ policy, it reflects many o f members’ perceptions 
of management, particularly those, including the chairman, who are successful business 
persons. The study thus confirms the efficacy of the management model and provides 
additional explanation of why outsourcing was emphasized in this case.
Third, the political dynamics decision model provides the most decisive 
explanation of how the decision was made. The regents believed that outsourcing by its 
nature was preferable to in-house operations in non-education support functions. That 
several university operations were successfully outsourced no doubt reinforced their 
perceptions. In contrast, the steering committee members believed that in-house 
operations are preferable to outsourced if the in-house enterprise can be restructured or
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reengineered to make it less costly, more efficient, and more responsive to customers. 
This did not appear to mean they believed outsourcing is not useful to reduce costs and 
improve service; all interviewed members acknowledged outsourcing is valid and 
appropriate under the right circumstances. Nevertheless, their belief that the motor pool 
was not an appropriate candidate to outsource, while probably right, led directly to the 
committee’s decision the regents found unacceptable. Two decision-making groups, 
each with a different perception of a problem and its solution, and both believing their 
solution provided the best outcome, were in conflict. Which would succeed in exerting 
power and influence?
If  the outcome were dependent only upon which of the two groups had greater 
authority, a bureaucratic model criterion, then the motor pool would likely have been 
outsourced. The regents have more authority than the steering committee. Despite the 
regents’ greater authority, however, the motor pool was not outsourced. With the 
retirement o f the president and the appointment of an acting president, the vice president 
and the committee never submitted the question formally to the regents for a decision, a 
highly effective political tactic; if you can’t win, wait until another day when 
circumstances are more favorable. With the announced retirement of the regents’ 
chairman, other matters no doubt became more pressing to the regents; they became 
indifferent to the motor pool. Indifference is a clear characteristic o f the political model. 
Finally, with the arrival of the new president and his approach to cutting administrative 
costs, his interest in minimizing further disaffection among the administrative staff 
illustrates a political tactic designed to win support and enhance influence.
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This case provided additional information that may prove useful to the study. An 
unexpected insight is use o f five informal criteria the director of purchasing had 
developed over a number of years to determine if an enterprise should be considered for 
outsourcing. Is the enterprise profitable? Are customers satisfied? Is the current 
management effective in accomplishing the enterprise’s mission? Are employees loyal, 
motivated, and productive? Are capital resources adequate, or does the enterprise require 
significant equipment renewal or replacement? In the director’s view, outsourcing would 
be an appropriate alternative if one or more o f the questions could not be answered 
affirmatively.
While outsourcing is increasingly advocated as a means to reduce operating costs 
and reallocate savings to more direct educational functions, the use of business process 
reengineering as an alternative to outsourcing does not appear to be as widely used. Is it 
a useful and valid method to achieve the same end? Little in higher education 
administrative literature suggests an answer. This case provides interesting and perhaps 
useful insights into the possible relationships between outsourcing and reengineering, 
and further clarifies the phenomenon as identified in the first case. It appears to confirm 
that reengineering can be an effective alternative to outsourcing. Reengineering worked. 
The motor pool reduced its costs and increased its productivity, and avoided potential 
disruptions and turmoil inherent in the outsource process. In addition, the case 
highlighted additional reengineering considerations. The process can be used to 
“benchmark” cost and productivity measures that would prove useful to evaluate 
responses if the function were outsourced. Or, reengineering might enable an in-house
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enterprise to become more competitive itself, allowing it to respond as a bidder if the 
decision was made to outsource. Reengineering’s presence as a major criteria in two 
cases suggests an emerging pattern to look for in following studies.
In summary, the motor pool case confirms the inadequacy of the economic-based 
financially-driven explanation o f the decision. Financial considerations were nonetheless 
important as they provided the baseline from which other dynamics operated, and were 
important to both the outsource and reengineering processes. The management-based 
model, in particular the divestiture consideration, also played a significant role as it 
appeared to be the basis for the regents’ articulation of and their emphasis on 
outsourcing. The two models thus provide an explanation o f why outsourcing was 
considered. More important than why outsourcing was at issue is how the decision was 
made. The decision processes clearly illustrate the political dynamics decision model, 
and in this case explains both how and why the outcome occurred. Finally, the case 
confirmed that there may be a relationship between outsourcing and reengineering, a 
consideration identified in the first study.
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STUDY THREE
LIGHTING RETROFIT AT A MAJOR UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER
THE CASE
The health sciences center is an 82-acre urban campus of 15 buildings, part of a 
200-acre complex that comprises the city’s health center near downtown. The center 
consists o f seven medically-related colleges with a faculty and staff of about 2,500, and 
an annual enrollment o f around 3000 students. Its annual expenditures total just over 
$200 million. Its 15-building physical plant equates to about 1.5 million gross square 
feet, with about $4.5 million going to annual maintenance and construction costs. Utility 
costs, for heating, cooling, and lighting, equate to around $3.5 million per year. Of this, 
approximately $1.3 million go to building lighting.
The campus’ buildings, typical of many college campuses, were constructed over 
a period of 70 years. Two buildings are 72 and 67 years old respectively, one is about 40
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years old, seven are around 20 years old, two were built within the last 12 years, and 
three were completed within the last two years. Maintenance and utility costs in general 
are, not surprisingly, higher for the older buildings than the newer. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, electrical costs alone are highest in the buildings constructed in 
the early 1970s. This is attributable to several factors; construction occurred just before 
energy costs began to come under scrutiny; the buildings contain electrical-intense 
laboratories and clinics; and somewhat paradoxically, the oldest buildings by their nature 
required system updates over the years to remain usable and, as a result, contain 
reasonably-modem utility systems. Thus, the average electrical cost-per-square-foot for 
the 12 buildings 10 years of age or more was $1.09 per gross-square-foot, whereas for 
five of the seven buildings about 25 years old the average was $1.33.
The physical plant staff consists of many long-tenured employees who are, 
consequently, intimately familiar with each building and its systems characteristics. In 
addition, the staff included two certified professional engineers: one a civil engineer, and 
the other a utility systems engineer. The combination of longevity and high professional 
staff qualifications resulted in high institutional loyalty and professional concern for the 
physical plant’s well-being and efficiency. As a result, the staff has consistently looked 
for opportunities over the years to reduce operating costs by seeking more energy- 
efficient utility system upgrades and reducing the price it pays for its energy. For 
example, in the late 1980s, the staff contracted for and installed a computer-controlled 
thermostat system in most buildings that automatically adjusts heating and cooling to 
their optimum comfort and efficiency levels. In addition, the staff retro-fitted variable-
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speed heating and air conditioning fan motors to reduce the system operating costs when 
heating and cooling demands were lowest. These two installations resulted in an 
estimated annual energy cost avoidance of $138,000.
To reduce the price it pays for energy, the staff annually negotiates with utility 
companies for energy and emergency generator curtailment rebates, and, together with 
the main campus, negotiates bi-annual natural gas purchases on the spot-market. As a 
result, the center avoids an additional $124,000 in estimated annual utility costs. Cost 
avoidance estimates are based on multi-year average energy and utility costs before the 
changes, compared to subsequent years’ costs.
The staffs continuing interest in reducing energy costs led it to seek additional 
cost-avoidance mechanisms. Aware of advances in high efficiency building lighting 
technology over the past decade, the staff routinely invited proposals and demonstrations 
from lighting-fixture manufacturers and vendors. With a total of almost 19,000 light 
fixtures in the 12 buildings, even a small savings from more energy-efficient florescent 
bulbs and ballasts in each fixture would equate to a significant total. Vendors, however, 
were selling improved reflectors or fixture lenses they claimed would reflect or diffuse 
more light into the room from existing bulbs, but test rooms set up in campus buildings 
using improved reflectors and lenses showed that savings possible from existing light 
bulbs and ballasts were marginal at best. The cost o f replacing 19,000 reflectors and 
lenses would never be recovered from the small savings.
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On October I, 1992, President Bush signed a broad national energy bill that 
required manufacturers to stop making some very popular, low-cost, but notoriously 
inefficient types of bulbs by 1995. Within seven years, or by the year 2000, these bulbs 
would no longer be allowed to be sold. The center’s fixtures used the florescent bulb 
identified in the legislation. This event added urgency to the staffs interest in finding 
and installing more energy-efficient lighting on campus.
Coincidental with the legislation came the marketing of a more energy-efficient 
florescent bulb that met all the legislation’s restrictions and, as claimed by the 
manufacturers, used 28% less energy. Using an electronic ballast already available on 
the market that uses about 50% less energy than the older mechanical ballasts, it would 
now be possible to retrofit existing lighting fixtures with new bulbs and ballasts that 
should reduce energy use for lighting by about 40%. Forty percent o f an annual lighting 
budget o f $1.3 million is $520,000, a highly-significant potential annual savings. 
Technology and the market now appeared to offer an additional mechanism for the 
center’s physical plant staff to continue its quest for lower energy costs.
In late 1994, the staff was contacted by an energy company from Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. One of a very few now-emerging lighting retrofit companies, they were 
interested in replacing the bulbs and ballasts in the 12 campus buildings with the new 
energy-efficient bulbs and electronic ballasts. Not only would they guarantee energy 
savings, but they would also agree to be paid only out o f the savings as they accrued; no 
savings, no payment. Intrigued with both the potential savings and the prospect of 
funding the project out of accumulated savings, the staff concluded a test project would
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be appropriate. They were hesitant to agree to a campus-wide retrofit at this point 
because of a number of uncertainties. Would the savings come close to those claimed? 
Would the proposed substitutions be acceptable in the laboratories where employees 
were used to current light levels and colorations (there are, believe it or not, different 
“colors” of white light)? What if the entire campus was retrofitted, and the building 
occupants were dissatisfied? Did all the existing fixtures require re-lamping, or could 
some be “de-lamped?” Perhaps most important, could the physical plant staff complete a 
retrofit at the same or lower cost?
To test the concepts, the staff selected the biomedical sciences building for a 
retrofit, one of the 25 year old buildings. It was the largest on campus with 205,000 
square feet, and its lighting cost-per-square-foot, compared to the campus-wide average 
of $.95, was the highest at $1.77. Moreover, it had a cross-section of laboratories, 
conference and class rooms, and office space. The test would confirm a level o f savings, 
determine the suitability o f the new bulbs, and indicate whether the in-house staff should 
perform future retrofits a building at a time. A request for proposals was prepared and 
released in the spring of 1995. Eight vendors requested copies. Three proposals were 
submitted, including one by the Tulsa company. Based on the highest total number of 
fixtures they proposed to retrofit, the total bid cost o f $254,000 for the project, and 
projected energy cost savings of $135,000 per year, the Tulsa company submitted the 
best offer.
Up to this point, the action had been largely confined to the physical plant staff. 
Seeking technical solutions, preparing the RFP, evaluating the responses, and
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determining whether in-house or outsourcing was more appropriate, were tasks generally 
left to the physical plant office. With a successful bid, however, two decisions required 
inclusion of the vice president for administrative affairs. First, did the board of regents 
need to approve the project? If the project were completed in-house, it probably did not 
require regents’ approval. If outsourced, then it did. Given the estimated comparative 
in-house versus outsourcing costs, $259,000 in-house versus $261,000 by contract, 
outsourcing was clearly the better alternative since the contractor could complete 
installation within 60 days whereas completing it in-house would likely take 6 months. 
The project therefore required regents’ approval. Second, should the project be financed 
by the center, or should the Tulsa company’s offer to finance it out of energy savings be 
accepted? If the company financed it, did that equate to a debt by the state that required 
the state bond oversight commission approval, a tedious, lengthy process? With a pay­
back of about two years, the center had reserve funds that could finance the project. To 
avoid the question, the director of campus operations and the vice president made the 
decision to finance the project internally. The company’s proposal was approved by the 
regents at the end of June, installation began in July and was completed by the end of 
August.
Initial indications suggested the test was successful. Comparing September 
through November electrical consumption rates with the same period a year before 
showed a savings of from $6,000 to $8,000 per month, or from 30% to 35%. Although 
less than the 40%, or $11,000 per month initially estimated, the savings was nonetheless 
significant and the project was considered successful. Even if the savings approached
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only 30%, the potential savings seemed significant enough to warrant continuing. The 
company volunteered to survey the remaining buildings to determine potential costs and 
energy savings, and the director and vice president made the decision to continue the 
retrofit based on the company’s findings.
How should the center continue? Several questions arose. Should the remaining 
buildings be retrofitted one-at-a-time, or should all be done together? One-at-a-time 
would allow in-house replacement, by now an attractive alternative. Estimated costs for 
sequential in-house replacement came to about $915,500, but using only in-house staff 
would require at least three years to complete. Hiring additional staff just for the project 
would increase the costs to a contractor’s likely cost. In the meantime, the center would 
be foregoing a potential $265,000 cost savings each year. Alternatively, outsourcing the 
project to a qualified vendor would allow completion within 90 to 120 days with savings 
accruing to the center that much sooner. The director and the vice president concluded 
outsourcing the project would be more cost-effective.
Should the RFP require a “shared-savings” payback as the company had offered 
the previous year, or should the center seek an alternative source of financing and pay off 
the contractor upon completion? Under previous year’s proposal for a shared savings 
concept, the vendor would be paid quarterly out o f accrued savings at the ratio of 80% to 
the vendor and 20% to the center. This approach would enable the retrofit to go forward 
with no capital outlay by the center and would allow a payback within four years. 
Moreover, if no savings accrued, then the vendor would receive no payment. By finding 
alternative outside financing and paying the vendor in total at the project’s completion,
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however, the center would probably be able to reduce the overall project cost by about 
15%. This alternative’s downside was that the center would incur interest payments 
equating to about two-thirds the cash-payment savings. Together with the cost o f  the 
financial staffs time to seek and secure outside financing, interest costs would come to 
about the same as the savings from full payment to the contractor upon completion. The 
director and the vice president therefore concluded the shared-savings approach would 
make more sense.
Since no additional costs would accrue to the center with this approach, the 
request for proposal would include the requirement for the project to be financed out of 
shared-savings. Using the same approach and contract format as the previous year, with 
the addition of the provision for a shared-savings contractual payout, the staff prepared 
an RFP and released it for bid. The proposal was sent to 18 potential bidders. By the 
mid-June bid closing date, only one bid had been submitted. The Tulsa company 
proposed to retrofit the remaining 11 buildings for $1,054,000.
Although its was the only bid, the Tulsa company’s proposal was very attractive. 
First, its cost-per-fixture rate was slightly less than the previous project, $65.10 versus 
$65.64, and the previous year’s price of $65.64 was more than $5 per fixture less than the 
next highest bidder. Second, the offer estimated a savings in electrical costs o f $225,000 
per year, or about a 24% reduction. Adding savings from reduced heating and air 
conditioning loads deriving from the cooler-burning lamps, the company estimated a 
total annual energy savings of $270,000. Third, the contractor would replace all lamps 
and ballasts as they failed, and perform all fixture maintenance, during the period o f the
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contract. This operational savings equated to about $62,000 per year to the center, the 
average cost o f physical plant employees and supplies currently required to perform the 
same services.
In total, the company estimated $332,000 per year in energy and operational 
savings to the center. They would accept payment quarterly from accrued savings, as 
verified by an independent auditor, at the ratio o f 80% to the company and 20% to the 
center until the $1,054,000 was paid. At that rate, payment would be complete within 
four years. Fourth, the offer was only $98,000 more than the in-house estimate, an effort 
that would have taken three years. The director, the physical plant staff and the vice 
president agreed the offer was good for the center and an agenda item was prepared to 
submit the contract to the board of regents for approval. To all then concerned, the 
program appeared to be heading for a successful conclusion, much like the previous year’s 
test project.
It was not to be. First, the head buyer in the purchasing department grew 
concerned that only one bid was received. Although not technically correct as two 
additional firms responded with a No Bid, a recognized response category, and receiving 
a single bid in itself did not invalidate the bid process, the buyer nonetheless voiced her 
concern to the vice president. Since the project was over $1 million, and since the 
shared-savings approach was new to the center, how could the center be certain it was 
the best offer available? Moreover, she argued, are we certain a shared-savings contract 
does not create a debt by the state requiring approval by the state bond oversight 
commission? Acting on her own, the buyer had contacted the commission staff who
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warned her that any such project must be reviewed by the commission even though their 
Jurisdiction was uncertain. Responding to the buyer’s concerns, the vice president 
delayed forwarding the contract to the regents and its subsequent award, and decided to 
review the project.
Second, to resolve the question o f the bond oversight commission’s Jurisdiction, 
representatives of the commission’s office and the center met soon thereafter. The 
commission’s staff was very interested in the project as it had received several shared- 
savings proposals in recent years for approval, but none had been true shared-savings 
contracts. They were looking for one to use as a pattern for state-wide use. Although the 
staff raised a number of technical questions, among them how the savings would be 
calculated and verified, they observed that the center’s contract seemed to be valid. As 
to the commission’s Jurisdiction over shared-savings contracts, the commission’s staff 
was not able to provide an answer. The state legislature had passed a statute authorizing 
shared-savings contracts by state agencies, but it did not clarify the question of whether 
such contracts established a debt by the state requiring review and approval by the bond 
oversight commission. The commission’s staff agreed to refer the question to the office 
of the attorney general for an opinion.
Third, to resolve the question of whether the single bid was valid and likely to be 
the best the center could obtain, the contract was referred to the architectural and 
engineering office for an opinion. On most campuses, A&E is part of the physical plant 
office and thus part of the physical plant staff process, but at the center the office is 
independent. As a result, the retrofit project was not originally coordinated with the
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center’s A&E office because is was considered a simple ballast and bulb removal and 
replacement, a routine maintenance procedure. Upon review, however, A&E did not 
address the question o f the contract’s validity, but instead concluded it was more 
properly a construction project requiring the preparation of detailed plans and 
specifications for the light fixtures in each of the 11 buildings’ rooms. Only by such 
measures, they argued, could the center be certain it received a valid bid and could 
savings be calculated and verified. Given the contract’s cost, in excess o f $1 million, 
concluded A&E, then perhaps it would be best to engage an electrical engineer to survey 
each building’s lighting requirements, and have him prepare detailed plans and 
specifications. A&E’s cost and time estimates for a re-engineering was $35,000 to 
$40,000, and four to sbc months. Their suggestion: prepare engineering drawings and 
rebid the project.
Fourth, the Tulsa company was growing anxious about the project. Knowing they 
were the only bidder, that their bid was now a matter of public record, and having 
already invested considerable time and money in the project preparing their proposal, 
they were dismayed at the prospect o f losing the project through no fault o f theirs. The 
firm took two significant steps. It sent a letter requesting the contract be awarded to 
them since they had complied with all provisions o f the request for proposals, and 
suggesting they would resort to legal remedies if the contract were not awarded. Then, 
the company’s president contacted a member of the seven-member university board of 
regents, a business acquaintance, to intervene on the company’s behalf. The last step had 
profound significance as the project was thrust directly into the political arena.
115
In an effort to resolve the questions and conclude if  the project should proceed, 
and to get out o f the growing quagmire, the vice president convened a meeting in late 
June of representatives from physical plant, A&E, legal counsel, purchasing, and finance. 
The meeting was to focus on three questions; should the contract be awarded, should it 
be rebid, or should it be canceled and completed in-house? Several additional questions 
surfaced during discussion, however. Does the project require the lengthy and expensive 
process o f re-engineering campus lighting? If so, then why not contract directly with an 
engineer to identify lighting changes, and then perform the work in-house rather than 
share savings with an outside contractor? How can the savings be calculated and 
verified? Can the single bid be awarded, or were there irregularities in the bid process 
that limited the number o f potential bidders, thus requiring a re-bid? Could the center get 
a better price with a re-bid? Finally, can the center award a contract based on payment 
through shared-savings, or must the oversight commission approve it?
Ensuing discussion concluded it would still be in the best interest of the center to 
outsource the project. Whether the project should be re-engineered and re-bid was 
partially reconciled with the conclusion that the offer appeared to be good; the contract 
price was slightly less than last year’s project for which three proposals were submitted. 
A&E’s technical concerns with the proposal, in particular a methodology to calculate and 
verify the savings, could likely be reconciled through negotiations with the company. 
Whether the project fell within the oversight commission’s jurisdiction would have to 
await the opinion of the attorney general’s office. The remaining question appeared to be
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whether the center had inadvertently or otherwise limited the number o f bid responses in 
its RFP and should therefore re-bid the project. Legal counsel promised an opinion.
In early July, the regent to whom the company had appealed, called the vice 
president to inquire about the contract’s status. The vice president explained his and his 
staffs concerns, indicating legal counsel was considering what action the center should 
take. The regent was nonetheless insistent: irrespective of the vice president’s concerns, 
had the company complied with all legal provisions; that is, was it a valid offer? If so, 
were there any legal Justifications for not awarding the contract to the company? The 
vice president replied that the contract could probably be awarded, but that he wanted to 
work through the other questions before making a decision. As a consequence, however, 
the president’s office, located on the main campus, began to take a close interest in the 
project.
In early august, the center’s legal counsel affirmed the bid was probably a good 
offer and would likely benefit the center. It seemed to meet all legal provisions and 
could therefore be awarded. A case could be made, however, that because the company 
had been working on campus and had access to all buildings for an extended period of 
time, the firm may have had an undue advantage in preparing its proposal. It had access 
to information the other bidders’ were unlikely to be able to develop in time to respond 
to the RFP. Consequently, legal counsel concluded, the project should be re-bid. In 
response, the vice president instructed the director o f operations and A&E to begin 
preparing plans and specifications for a re-bid. In early September, the attorney 
general’s office issued its opinion that even though bond oversight commission
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jurisdiction was ambiguous in the legislation providing for shared-savings contracts, the 
commission ought to review and approve the contract.
At this point, because the company appealed to a member o f the university’s 
board o f regents, the president’s office effectively took control o f the project from the 
center. The main campus legal counsel, to whom the center’s legal counsel was 
responsible, and who worked directly for the president, instructed the center’s vice 
president to stop further action. He would determine if the Tulsa company’s bid should 
be awarded, and if the contract required submission to the bond oversight commission. 
As the university is a state constitutional entity, there was also a broader question of 
whether the bond oversight commission had jurisdiction over the university. Award of 
the contract thus became a political issue.
No further action on the project was undertaken at the center until late October 
when the president’s office instructed the vice president for administrative affairs at the 
center to proceed with negotiations with the company over the technical concerns 
surfaced earlier by the center’s architect. The contract was to be submitted to the board 
of regents at its meeting in early December for approval. Negotiations ensued, the 
technical questions were resolved, including agreement on the methodology to calculate 
and verify savings, and the company accepted the modified contract by the first week of 
December. At the president’s review meeting shortly before the board met, the president 
and the board chairman complimented the center in its efforts to reduce energy costs, and 
on the decision to seek the regents’ approval to award the contract to the Tulsa company. 
The president also concluded the contract should be presented to the bond oversight
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commission for approval even though it was probably not required, observing it would be 
“good politics” to do so. He assured the staff that approval would be forthcoming. The 
board approved award of the contract to the company at its meeting shortly thereafter.
The contract’s award awaited only approval by the bond oversight commission. 
The commission met at the end of January and approved the contract subject to two 
conditions; the company could not sell the contract as a means to finance it; the company 
could not use the university’s name as security to obtain financing. The company agreed 
to both conditions. Thinking all that remained was the contract signing, the director of 
operations scheduled a meeting to complete the process. Not so fast, argued the campus 
architect. Yet to be agreed upon was the methodology and formula for calculating the 
savings. Although the contract specified the formula, agreed in principle by both parties, 
and required that an independent third party calculate the savings, the architect insisted 
on clarification. An ensuing meeting resulted in satisfactory clarification, and the 
director again tried to arrange a signing. Not so fast, argued the architect again. The 
estimated hours of operation identified in the contract, one of the important elements in 
calculating energy savings, appeared to be in error. They should be recalculated. 
Subsequent recalculation confirmed their accuracy. Another contract signing was 
scheduled. Not so fast, argued the architect yet again. How do we know that the 
company is in compliance with the bond oversight commission’s restrictions? Although 
the director argued that it is not the university’s responsibility to enforce the oversight 
commissions’ rulings, by now the overly-cautious vice president grew even more 
cautious given the contract’s visibility, and agreed with the requirement that the
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company must present a letter from the commission acknowledging that the company 
was in compliance with its restrictions. After a delay o f three weeks, required 
documentation was provided and the contract, at last, was scheduled for signing in late 
April, almost a year later. By the first o f  May, however, the contract was still not signed. 
In the meantime the center had forgone an estimated $335,000 in utility savings.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study postulates that an economically-based, financially-driven decision 
model, when used to outsource higher education in-house functions, may be an 
incomplete explanation of the process. Focusing on how and why higher education 
institutions outsource, it seeks a more complete decision model by asking two questions: 
(I) what non-financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role in 
outsourcing decisions, and (2) how does their presence affect the decision? Two 
corollary questions are implied: (a) are costs the major criterion upon which the decision 
to outsource was made; if not, then (b) what decision model is more appropriate or 
complete? A review of the literature suggests three hypotheses and associated models. 
First, outsource decisions are economic-based and financially-driven. Second, outsource 
decisions are management-based, and driven by possible efficiencies and the benefits of 
divestiture. Third, outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics 
inherent in higher education: bureaucratic decision processes, collegial decision 
processes, or political dynamics decision processes.
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This third study further clarifies how and why higher education institutions 
outsource. Analysis o f  the decision to outsource a campus-wide lighting retrofit at the 
health sciences center confirms that the decision was not based solely on economic or 
financial considerations, even though they were significant. At each major step the 
decision to outsource the project rather than complete it in-house was reaffirmed by cost- 
benefit analysis. The one-building test project came close to a solely economic-based, 
financially-driven decision. The case therefore confirms that financial considerations are 
important and play a major role as a base-line in outsource decisions. As the project 
grew, however, decision process dynamics expanded beyond financial considerations 
alone.
The decision process at times illustrated all three decision models. The 
bureaucratic and collegial decision process models adequately explain the decision 
process leading to the test project, evaluation of the test, and the decision to proceed with 
the campus-wide project. The participating members o f this group included the director 
of operations and three o f  his four assistants, one of whom was an engineer. Each was 
acting in his organizational and bureaucratic capacity. In addition, they enjoy a collegial 
relationship, making decisions after eliciting and accommodating the views and concerns 
of each member. Expanding the group to include the vice president was an easy 
evolution as he is an insistent primary participant in all physical plant decisions.
When the follow-on decision process to retrofit the remaining 11 buildings 
expanded beyond this group, the bureaucratic model continued predominate. The chief
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buyer’s response reflected the department o f purchasing’s routines and procedures. An 
RFP should have more than one bid to maintain the integrity o f the bid process and to be 
in the best interest of the center. Because the contract potentially created a debt by the 
state, it should be referred to the bond oversight commission’s staff. That staff, in turn, 
reflected its own routines and procedures by reviewing and commenting upon the 
contract even though its jurisdiction was not certain. Finally, A&E’s response was most 
typically bureaucratic. Their purpose as an organization is to prepare drawings and 
specifications for renovation and construction projects in campus buildings, and to 
oversee contract completion and compliance. Their response was therefore 
predictable, even though the bulb and ballast retrofit was a maintenance-related project 
in which they would not have routinely become involved.
The decision, finally, reflected the political decision dynamics model. Defined as 
a diffused process in which individuals and groups vie for influence, it describes 
purchasing, the campus architect, and the operations director arguing and maneuvering 
for their respective positions. In particular, the architect’s insistence on three occasions 
before the contract signing that his concerns be accommodated, although they had minor 
influence on the contract itself, is classic political dynamics. The contractor also entered 
the political arena when he appealed to the regent. The regent, in turn, vied for 
influence in the process by going to the president’s office. The president’s office 
illustrated both the bureaucratic and political models; it “won” by exerting its influence 
in making the decision to award the contract, but its influence stems from its 
organizational position and prerogatives. The vice president’s eager acquiescence to the
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president’s office, even though this was clearly a local campus issue, reaffirms the 
political model’s efficacy.
The study also identified a pattern that, on review, was also present in the motor 
pool case and may be significant. A major factor in this cases’ decision process 
escalation was the project’s cost. The test project’s cost was $254,000, and, although 
significant, appeared to entail minimal risk. It would be funded from the utility budget 
where the savings would likewise accrue. At this stage, the decision process was limited 
to the physical plant staff and the vice president Cost o f the campus-wide project, 
however, increased by four times, to just over $1 million. At that level, the project’s 
visibility and risk seemed to become more significant. Hence, the chief buyer was 
uncomfortable with only one bid in response to the RFP even though receiving one 
response to an RFP was not unusual. In addition, concern over potential risk was 
illustrated by questions being raised several times over a methodology to calculate and 
verify energy savings. It thus appears that the higher the potential cost in an outsource 
decision, the greater the visibility and the further the decision moves from solely 
economic and financial considerations, and the greater the number of decision 
participants. This is a pattern to look for in subsequent cases.
This case reaffirms a pattern suggested by the first two cases. Restructuring or 
reengineering an in-house enterprise appears to be a significant consideration in the 
decisions to outsource. Re-engineering in this case refers to the more traditional 
definition of recalculating technical specifications and, with the project thus being re­
defined, to completing it in-house to reduce the project’s cost. In addition, its intent
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parallels the concept o f “process reengineering” illustrated in the first two cases; let’s 
restructure the organization and its processes to become more efficient and competitive 
and thereby keep the enterprise in-house. More explicitly, reengineering was addressed 
in both the test building and the campus-wide project by estimating the costs o f 
completing the projects, to include hiring additional staff if necessary. This study thus 
seems to reaffirm the efficacy o f reengineering as an alternative to outsourcing, although 
in the end outsourcing was the more cost-effective approach.
In summary, the case adds to a more complete and satisfactory understanding of 
how and why higher education institutions outsource by confirming that economic-based 
financial considerations, while important, are an incomplete explanation of why the 
decision was made to outsource. More important to the process, indeed at times even 
bringing into question award o f the contract, were the decision process dynamics: the 
influence of the bureaucratic and political dynamics. The management-based model 
does not appear to have influenced the decision. The case also confirms the role of 
reengineering, and, finally, suggests what appears to be an important phenomenon, a link 
between project cost, visibility, and decision dynamics.
124
STUDY FOUR
OUTSOURCING AT A RURAL UNIVERSITY:
SETTING THE STANDARD
THE CASE
The university is a public four-year liberal arts university located in the central 
rural area of Oklahoma. Sited on gently rolling hills in farm country, its closest 
significantly-sized town is eleven miles to the west south-west (population 10,000), and 
its closest urban area is Oklahoma City, well to the south. Student population on campus 
is about 2500, with enrollments at its two urban centers bringing the total student 
population to just over 4,000. Organized into the five schools of Arts and Sciences, 
Business, Education and Behavioral Sciences, Environmental Sciences, and Nursing and 
Health Professions, the university offers 30 undergraduate majors and a Master of 
Education program.
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Established in 1897 as a land-grand college, its growth and development were 
marked by the struggles typical of many colleges and universities: under-funding, 
accreditation, faculty recruitment, and consensus over its mission. During World War II, 
the university participated in national defense programs, and following the war, reaped 
the benefits of greatly-increased enrollments stimulated by veterans programs. Like 
almost all american colleges and universities, it experienced its greatest growth during 
the post-war period of the late 1940s and 1950s. And, also like most american colleges 
and universities in the early 1970s, the university experienced the problems o f declining 
enrollments following the “baby boom” peak: surplus capacity, and declining revenues.
The Civil Rights movement and Affirmative Action programs o f the late 1960s 
and 1970s were both a blessing and a bane to the university. While the programs opened 
additional sources o f revenue, they also led to crippling competition for students from 
major universities trying to comply with the civil rights acts. Whereas the university 
enjoyed stable, if not growing enrollments, aggressive recruiting and enticements by the 
major universities all but dried up its traditional student pool. As a consequence, 
enrollments plummeted to less than 600 students, and administration was in turmoil. The 
mid-1970s saw a series of interim and short-term presidents come and go, two dismissed 
for alleged financial mismanagement. By 1976, the university was bankrupt.
At this point, the board of regents for Oklahoma State University and the A&M 
colleges stepped in by appointing an experienced, determined vice president for fiscal 
affairs, and somewhat later, a well-qualified, strong president. The new vice president
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faced a daunting task. Revenue bonds were in default. University-wide revenue 
collections had been sporadic; accounts receivable and cash were just not making it to 
the bank. Food services and the bookstore were hemorrhaging through mismanagement 
or theft. The physical plant had seriously deteriorated, with even routine operations, 
maintenance, and repair tasks being neglected. Students, faculty, and staff were 
dismayed at its poor condition and sub-standard services. The new vice president was 
not able produce a competent or reliable financial statement because financial records 
were in disarray; his first one began with a gross operating loss. It was largely because 
the core of dedicated, loyal, and conscientious faculty were determined to persevere that 
the doors stayed open.
After spending most o f his first year getting financial controls and records in 
order, the vice president turned to food services and the bookstore, auxiliary enterprises 
whose buildings were financed with revenue bonds. Defaults on these bonds were 
putting at risk the personal assets of the members of the board of regents. He had tried to 
put together a management and staff team from among university employees during his 
first year that could operate the cafeteria at a break-even level, but he was unsuccessful. 
The employees seemed unresponsive to the critical need for improvement, and the vice 
president suspected a stream of food was going out the back door. Moreover, the 
university’s relatively isolated location made it difficult to attract a pool o f candidates 
from which qualified employees could be selected. The cafeteria continued to operate at 
a loss. As he entered his second year at the university, he therefore turned to the only 
other apparent alternative, offering a contract to run food services to an off-campus
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provider. With the president’s support he quickly outsourced food services. The regents 
enthusiastically supported the action. Although growing pains included changing the 
contractor’s manager several times, food services’ tum-around was quick and dramatic. 
Students, faculty, and staff were uniformly pleased and impressed with the results.
As it became clear that the food services contract was going to be successful, the 
vice president began considering the bookstore as an outsource candidate. Though he 
had made improvements in the bookstore operations during the preceding two years, 
particularly in its financial management, he still could not make the operation profitable. 
He estimated at one point that every book the bookstore sold cost the university 25 cents. 
He tried recruiting new management in an effort to turn things around, but the 
university’s location again worked against finding qualified candidates willing to travel 
the distance or relocate. Outsourcing once more appeared the only solution. This time, 
however, several faculty members and a senior administrator expressed concern about 
outsourcing. Would contracting the bookstore to a private firm increase the price of 
books and reduce their variety?
With financial concerns his driving motivation, the vice president, again with the 
president’s support, nonetheless moved quickly and outsourced the bookstore. The 
regents once more approved the contract with little discussion and no expressed concern. 
Indeed, they had witnessed the dramatic tum-around in food services and were 
enthusiastic supporters of the concept at the university, particularly as profitable 
operations removed the threat o f bond forfeiture. By the vice president’s fourth year at 
the university, both food services and the bookstore were profitable operations. In
128
addition to improving services and paying revenues to the university, the contractors had 
renovated and upgraded the facilities.
Improvements in the physical plant operations and maintenance did not seem as 
difficult. Soon after his arrival, the vice president was able to hire an experienced 
engineer to direct improvement efforts in the physical plant, and facilities improvement 
became one of the president’s primary concerns. Demonstrating his interest and 
commitment, the president met weekly with the vice president for fiscal affairs, the 
director o f physical plant and his managers, including from time-to-time his vice 
presidents for student services and academic affairs. Participants openly and frankly 
discussed physical plant problems, and the improvements they thought were required, 
together with how and when to make them. With re-established revenue streams, 
improved university-wide financial management, and the president’s support, campus 
facilities began to show improvement. Maintenance was being performed, building 
systems were operating smoothly, campus-wide clean-up and redecorating significantly 
improved dormitories and common-use facilities, and improvements were made in 
landscaping. Students, faculty, and staff once again began to take pride in the campus’ 
appearance.
By 1979, the university had made a significant tum-around. The two auxiliary 
enterprises were operating profitably, and the physical plant was much improved. 
Outsourcing had proven to be a success at the university, even though its success had 
been mixed at the few other institutions in Oklahoma where it had been tried. Could 
outsourcing bring similar improvements to other campus enterprises? While outsourcing
129
had enabled two failing enterprises to become successful, could it further improve a 
satisfactorily operating enterprise like the physical plant? This question had been 
recurring often to the vice president for fiscal affairs as he visited the campuses o f other 
universities where he observed physical plant operations and improvements he wished he 
could bring to his university. He concluded, however, that his plant’s capabilities and 
resources were too limited. Added to his wish for even greater physical plant 
improvements were his growing concerns that complying with the many developing 
environmental, health, and safety restrictions might be too difficult for the present 
physical plant operation to handle.
Concluding that outsourcing could answer both concerns, he began contacting 
contractors providing educational facilities management whenever he planned to visit 
another campus to determine if they were operating in the area. If so, he asked the 
contractors for a tour of the facilities and observed their operations. Impressed with what 
he saw, he developed a list of services and service performance standards that would 
improve his university’s physical plant well beyond the plant’s current capabilities. 
Contractors were providing other campuses with up-front capital improvements; 
experienced and highly-qualified management; a broad range o f in-depth skills; 
economies of scale that reduced procurement and operating costs; and quick, responsive 
service.
About this same period, the university’s president was growing aware that 
outsourcing could serve a purpose becoming increasingly important to him. As a 
consequence of food services’ and the bookstore’s successful outsourcing, he soon began
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to appreciate that he no longer had to spend time and effort worrying about and 
overseeing their operations. He was able to leave that to the contractors, whose 
responsibilities were clearly defined in the contracts. Though keenly aware that both 
enterprises’ successful operations continued to be his responsibility, he was relieved at 
being able to delegate their management to the contractor. Could the same principle 
apply successfully to other management-intense campus support activities, like the 
physical plant? Outsourcing these activities might allow him more time to focus directly 
on the university’s primary missions of education, research, and public service.
Outsourcing’s potential to relieve his management burdens became more clear 
during periodic retreats he attended with other university presidents. The presidents 
invited to the retreats representatives from private industry to present programs they were 
offering to improve campus operations and finances. One presentation in particular, by a 
firm specializing in physical plant management, caught his attention. Upon his return, he 
and the vice president for fiscal affairs concluded that outsourcing the university’s 
physical plant might offer many advant%es to the institution.
This time, however, they proceeded more slowly and deliberately. No other 
college or university in Oklahoma had attempted to outsource their physical plant, so 
reactions were uncertain. Moreover, physical plant operations had already improved 
significantly, so convincing the campus community, and perhaps even the regents, that 
outsourcing the plant was appropriate and advantageous might be more difficult. And, in 
contrast to the former university employees in food services and the bookstore, physical 
plant employees were more highly skilled, higher paid, and were likely to be more
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forceful in opposing a contract if  they perceived their jobs to be at stake. To minimize 
this possibility, they decided to outsource the physical plant in two phases. First, they 
would outsource plant services employing lower-paid trades: custodians, grounds- 
keepers, painters, and the motor pool mechanics. Second, if all went well, they would 
solicit a contract providing the mechanical trades: HVAC technicians, plumbers, 
carpenters, and electricians. To ease university employee fears o f being displaced by 
contract employees, and make the contracts more acceptable by all, the contracts would 
include the requirement to hire the university’s in-place employees for at least six 
months.
As these strategies were being developed, the president regularly included his 
vice presidents and other key administrators in discussions and deliberations. He was 
very concerned that all sectors o f the campus community, particularly the academy, be 
aware of and have a voice in the decision process. He remembered well the dark days 
not long passed when everything appeared to be in decline and the university seemed to 
be fracturing. He did not want anything similar to recur.
The regents were likewise kept appraised. They were by now firm advocates o f 
outsourcing as they saw its successes in food services and the bookstore. Nevertheless, 
they expressed concern about outsourcing the physical plant, an already-improved 
enterprise, and the potential loss o f university employees who were trying hard to 
improve the plant. Convincing them required significant effort, in contrast to the first 
two outsource proposals, as the president and vice president outlined, documented, and 
presented to the regents the advantages and safe-guards to be included in the contract.
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The provisions requiring the contractor to keep in-house employees for six months, and 
with comparable pay and benefits, revolutionary concepts at the time, were the decisive 
reassurances the regents wanted. They approved the first phase outsource contract for 
the physical plant operation in 1981.
The contractor moved quickly to provide promised improvements. Custodial 
services showed dramatic improvements almost overnight. Painting crews, previously 
uncoordinated and sporadically employed, now provided uniform quality and color- 
coordinated schemes. The contractor invested heavily to improve landscaping and paved 
several parking lots. Within three months, campus facilities were so improved, even 
beyond the significant improvements of the previous five years, that the regents were 
invited to campus to view the results. Uniformly impressed, they authorized the vice 
president to proceed with the second phase.
The second phase also went smoothly and quickly. All of the mechanical-skilled 
employees stayed with the contractor, and all but a few remained after the six month 
period. Significantly, several o f these employees went on to transfers and promotions to 
other contract sites operated by the contractor. In a surprising and unusual development, 
the first-phase contractor failed to win the second-phase contract. Two service providers 
thus found themselves responsible for separate parts o f the university’s physical plant. 
Although the arrangement could have led to significant problems, they didn’t 
materialize. In fact, having two major national-level contract providers on campus
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worked to the advantage of the university; both competed to provide the better and more 
responsive service, and a capital improvement made by one was matched by the other.
Pioneers in outsourcing in Oklahoma higher education, the university 
demonstrated that outsourcing provides convincing benefits. It enabled the university to 
continue to provide successfully two important, yet failing, auxiliary services: food 
services and the bookstore. Later, it enabled the university to improve its physical plant 
well beyond its in-house capabilities by bringing in up-front capital investment, critical 
employee skills, in-depth management expertise, and more efficient and productive 
services. The vice president estimates that over the years, the contractors have brought 
to the university over $2 million in capital improvements at little or no cost to the 
university, generated savings and efficiencies o f up to 20% that have been put back into 
campus operations, increased the quality and levels of service, and generated revenues 
for the campus. When asked if they had ever considered bringing any of the operations 
back in-house, both the president and the vice president quickly answered no. Indeed, 
the university recently completed an $8 million dormitory construction project on 
campus at little cost to the institution by outsourcing. The university is leasing on- 
campus real estate to a developer on which dormitories were constructed at no cost to the 
university. The university, in turn, guarantees a minimum occupancy level. At the end 
of 20 years, the developer will recover project costs and a return on investment, and the 
dormitories will revert to the university. The project illustrates the university’s 
continuing commitment to outsourcing.
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study postulates that an economically-based, financially-driven decision 
model, when used to outsource higher education in-house functions, may be an 
incomplete explanation of the process. Focusing on how and why higher education 
institutions outsource, it seeks a more complete decision model by asking two questions: 
(I) what non-financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role in 
outsourcing decisions, and (2) how does their presence affect the decision? Two 
corollary questions are implied: (a) are costs the major criterion upon which the decision 
to outsource was made; if not, then (b) what decision model is more appropriate or 
complete? A review of the literature suggests three hypotheses and associated models. 
First, outsource decisions are economic-based and financially-driven. Second, outsource 
decisions are management-based, and driven by possible efficiencies and the benefits of 
divestiture. Third, outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics 
inherent in higher education: bureaucratic decision processes, collegial decision 
processes, or political dynamics decision processes.
The rural university case yields a trove o f information useful in analyzing 
outsourcing. The study examined three outsource decisions: food services, the 
bookstore, and in two phases, the physical plant. The decisions to outsource food 
services and the bookstore, respectively the first and second decisions, closely follow the 
economically-based, financially-driven decision model and can be considered valid 
examples. The decisions help explain why the university outsourced the enterprises. In 
both cases, the enterprises were unable to break even despite some effort in both to
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restructure or reengineer. Employee attitudes, mismanagement, and the lack of a nearby 
labor pool from which to find qualified management and employee replacements appear 
to be significant factors. After economic and financial analyses, outsourcing thus offered 
a clearly better alternative to continued efforts to improve in-house operations.
Moreover, an opinion issued by the Oklahoma stale attorney general’s office that the 
university’s regents were personally liable for default o f all bonds they had approved 
gave urgency to the need to find a financial solution to the unprofitable operations of 
both enterprises. The buildings housing each enterprise were constructed from bond 
proceeds. The regents’ encouraged and approved the decisions without questions.
While the economic-based, financially-driven decision model is clearly evident, 
the vice president’s ability to move quickly and largely imilaterally to outsource both 
functions, albeit with the president’s approval, stems from his role and responsibilities as 
the university’s chief financial officer. That is, his actions are more completely 
explained if they are considered in the context of the organizational-bureaucratic 
decision model, thus explaining how the functions were outsourced. Financial 
considerations were vitally important and impelled action, but the response was largely a 
result o f  the vice president’s organizational position and prerogatives. Thus the 
university’s first two decisions are also clear illustrations of the bureaucratic decision 
model.
The decisions to outsource the physical plant, however, moved beyond both the 
economic-based, financially-driven and the bureaucratic decision models, and provide 
useful contrasts to explain why and how it was done. The vice president was concerned
136
that despite its improvements and satisfactory current operations, the plant needed 
improvements current capabilities were unlikely to allow. Outsourcing, with its 
economies of scale and access to a wide labor pool, management-based concerns, 
provided a means to achieve them. Concurrently, the president’s realization that 
outsourcing provided him relief from managing non-educational activities likewise 
moved the decision into a management model: outsource non-core activities to allow 
greater focus on core activities.
Moving beyond outsourcing food services and the bookstore, both decision 
makers realized that the decision to outsource the plant represented an important 
evolution in outsourcing’s use at the university. Financial imperatives were not as 
significant, and outsourcing appeared more discretionary. Moreover, the value and 
magnitude of a contract to operate the physical plant meant that more members o f the 
campus community would be affected, directly and indirectly. In particular, a larger 
number o f more highly-paid, highly-skilled, and likely more vocal employees would be 
affected in contrast to the employees affected by the food services and the bookstore 
contracts. Consequently, the president adopted a collegial approach to decision making 
by ensuring representatives from all campus communities were involved in the decision 
process. Interviews with the vice presidents for fiscal affairs, academic affairs, student 
affairs, members of the faculty, and managers of the physical plant determined they all 
believed they had significant input into the decision to outsource the physical plant and 
agreed with the assessment that the process was collegial.
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Although the decisions primarily followed the collegial model, political dynamics 
played an important, though lesser role. The decision to outsource the plant in two 
phases based on trade skills was an effort to minimize potential opposition from a likely 
vocal group while the concept was tried, proven and accepted. So likewise was the 
decision to include in the contract the requirement to hire in-house plant employees for at 
least six months at comparable wage and benefit rates. Unusual for the time, these 
contract provisions successfully limited opposition from the affected employees, satisfied 
the regents' concerns, and provided satisfactory answers to two state legislators who 
inquired on behalf o f  their constituents.
Beyond confirming decision models as an appropriate explanation of how 
outsource decisions are made, the study provided additional insights into outsourcing in 
higher education. First, the physical plant decisions appear to confirm that the higher the 
value and magnitude o f a potential contract, the more significant non-economic and non- 
financial considerations become, and the more likely the decision is to reflect the 
collegial and political decision dynamics models. This possible phenomenon was 
identified in two o f the previous cases, and implicit in the first case. Food services and 
the bookstore were failing enterprises, but their operating costs were individually about 
one-third the operating costs of the physical plant, with fewer resources thus at risk. 
Second, restructuring or reengineering, though not a major effort, nonetheless occurred at 
some level. The vice president tried restructuring food services and the bookstore before 
concluding outsourcing in each case offered a better alternative. At about the same time, 
he reorganized the physical plant and hired a professional director. Significant
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improvements resulted over several years. The vice president’s subsequent conclusions 
that the university was unlikely to be able to make the improvements he viewed 
elsewhere with the plant’s current capabilities and resources was implicit reengineering; 
he made a judgement that further reengineering would not bring further improvements
Finally, the case study confirmed many outsourcing benefits often cited in higher 
education management literature. Outsourcing brings up-front capital funding at no or 
little cost to the institution. Outsourcing brings increased productivity and lower costs 
through economies of scale buying and more responsive, quicker purchasing. 
Outsourcing brings increased productivity by reducing employee absenteeism and 
providing a larger pool o f qualified employees on which to draw when non-routine 
problems arise. Outsourcing can increase revenues from auxiliary enterprises. 
Outsourcing, through its efficiencies, can reduce the cost of providing services and 
provide savings that can be reallocated or retained in the outsourced activity to improve 
services further.
In summary, the rural university’s experiences with outsourcing confirm that a 
more satisfactory explanation of how and why a higher education institution outsources 
is provided with a broader decision model. The university outsourced to reduce 
operating costs and to increase revenues, confirming the economic-based, financially- 
driven decision criteria. It also outsourced to divest enterprises in order to allow greater 
focus on its core activities, and to achieve improvements through economies of scale, 
confirming the management criteria. Both models provide more complete explanations 
of why the institution outsourced.
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Explanations of how the decisions were reached are provided by the decision 
process dynamics models. The bureaucratic model is illustrated by the largely unilateral 
decision process used by the vice president o f fiscal affairs when deciding to outsource 
food services and the bookstore. The collegial model is illustrated by the decision 
process the president and vice president used when proceeding with the first and second 
physical plant outsource phases. Elements o f the political process dynamics model, 
though not as apparent, were present as the collegial group decided to outsource the plant 
in two phases in an effort to mute potential opposition. Finally, the case confirms the 
role and significance of reengineering in deciding to outsource, and also appears to 
confirm that the higher the value and magnitude of an outsource contract, the more 
significant non-economic and non-financial considerations become.
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STUDY FIVE
A SMALL LIBERAL ARTS UNIVERSITY:
A WORK IN PROGRESS
THE CASE
The small liberal arts university enjoys a reputation as a high-quality, innovative 
institution. A state-supported university drawing 94% of its 1700 students from 
Oklahoma, it is located in a community of 16,000 to the southwest of Oklahoma City, the 
closest urban area. It is also about 25 miles from one of Oklahoma’s flagship 
universities, a proximity that allowed the university’s president, a former dean at the 
flagship university, to establish, maintain, and draw from a close academic relationship. 
Several prominent, retired flagship faculty, including a former president, have taught 
courses at the university over the past two decades. Its own faculty is also distinguished, 
with 80% holding the highest degree in their academic field and being required to
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demonstrate competence in more than one field. A student-faculty ratio o f 23:1, the 
lowest of all state universities, ensures personalized attention and instruction. Offering 
undergraduate degrees in 27 academic programs and 6 pre-professional programs, its 
general education courses are uniquely interdisciplinary, merging disciplines and cross- 
disciplinary teaching teams. The high quality of its education earned national 
recognition in 1995 when it was listed among the top liberal arts colleges in the nation by 
U.S. News and World Report. It was the only public liberal arts college to achieve this 
distinction.
The university was established by the state legislature in 1908 as a women’s 
college, remaining so until it became coeducational in 1965. In common with all 
institutions o f higher education during the early and mid 1970s, the college struggled 
with declining enrollments and increasing costs. In 1974 the college’s mission was 
redefined, and the college was renamed. Its current president was hired a year later.
With determined and deliberate but gradual efforts, and tight, careful, fiscal 
management, the president and regents brought the university to the prominence it enjoys 
today.
Outsourcing at the university is a recent phenomenon; its first contract was 
awarded in 1994. The president first became aware of and interested in outsourcing 
when he finally grew weary of his bookstore continually losing money. While attending 
an annual conference of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, he 
visited a bookstore vendor’s display booth and explored how a contract to operate the 
campus bookstore might benefit the university. He assumed the vendor would have little
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interest in operating a bookstore on a campus with only 1700 students, and at the time, 
gross sales of about $450,000. He was pleased when the vendor made a proposal 
sometime later. The offer was attractive; the contractor would employ the bookstore’s 
current staff for at least one year, and would pay the university 6% of gross sales. In 
addition, the contractor would redecorate the bookstore facility. The regents approved 
the contract with little discussion, and soon the university was receiving $30,000 to 
$40,000 a year from the bookstore when not long before it was losing almost that much 
each year. He and his vice president were pleased and impressed with the contract and 
the concept of outsourcing.
A year later, the director of food services retired. A long-term employee, she had 
built food services into a well-run, well-liked and profitable enterprise. A particularly 
successful part o f the enterprise was catering non-university social and professional 
events in campus facilities. The university’s facilities provide the town’s only attractive 
and accessible facilities for large events, and the high quality of university food catering 
made them particularly desirable. Replacing the director therefore became very 
important to the president and to the continued success of the enterprise. Upon 
reviewing university employees for a candidate, however, he concluded he would need to 
look elsewhere.
The bookstore’s success encouraged the president to consider outsourcing food 
services as an alternative to advertising for and selecting a new food services director.
By the time he went through a hiring process and selected an unknown, he reasoned, he 
could request proposals from food services vendors and select a contractor. Again at a
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conference, he became acquainted with a group of educators who had become impressed 
by the quality of the people associated with professional food management. Knowing 
several presidents who had food services contracts, he discussed their experiences with 
them. All were pleased. His vice president for fiscal affairs prepared and released a 
request for proposals and several contractors responded. Reviewing their references and 
qualifications, he and the vice president did not select the vendor who offered the 
greatest financial benefits, but rather the vendor who seemed to have the best record and 
reputation. Again the regents approved the contract with little discussion.
The new contract had an inauspicious beginning, however. The new manager had 
worked as an assistant manager for food services at another Oklahoma college, earned a 
degree in hotel management at an Oklahoma state university, and seemed to please the 
cafeteria patrons, particularly students. Appearing to be well qualified to run food 
services, one of his first catering events did not go well, and served as a harbinger of 
continuing problems. A chamber o f commerce banquet held annually at the university 
was scheduled to occur soon after he arrived. Although he had adequate time to prepare, 
the event was described as a disaster. Tables were not adequately set up, the food was 
not prepared as ordered, and service was poor. Although the manager reduced the charge 
by 50%, recognizing the problems, the poor impression remained. Several large 
subsequent banquets showed improvement, but they were still unsatisfactory enough to 
cause townspeople to look for alternative locations. Indeed, a recent luncheon in honor 
of the governor went particularly poorly.
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The contracting firm, a national corporation, promised to correct the catering 
problem, and asked for time to improve. A year later, the firm was acquired by another 
corporation, an event that appeared to delay corrections. After two years, the manager 
still runs food services, and while he is popular among students, improvements in 
catering have been insufficient to win back lost customers. The president is growing 
concerned that the new company, with contracts at campuses with over 25,000 students, 
may just not care much about a campus with 1,700 students. The vice president 
continues to work with the contractor to improve catering, determined that it must 
improve in order to continue the contract.
After a year into the food services contract, however, its problems did not seem 
so intractable as to discourage the vice president for fiscal affairs, by now an advocate of 
outsourcing, from considering additional outsourcing opportunities. Knowing of the 
great success the rural university described in the previous study had experienced with 
outsourcing its physical plant operations, he began to look at how his university might be 
able to benefit similarly. Like the rural university, the small university’s physical plant 
operations ~  its maintenance, repair, and custodial services -  were adequate. But also 
like the rural university, he concluded, improvements would be unlikely if tried in-house 
with its current staff. Worker productivity, institutionalized overhead costs like 
employee benefits, and purchasing procedures would probably limit the potential for 
improvement.
Using the rural university as a model, and working with his director o f physical 
plant, the vice president analyzed physical plant operations. They concluded several
145
benefits could accrue to the university with a contract to operate the physical plant.
First, the university’s campus is small, less than 500,000 square feet, so the limited range 
of skills inherent in a correspondingly small staff allowed only routine maintenance. 
Innovative approaches would be unlikely, and compliance with new federal 
environmental and occupational mandates would be difficult. A contractor, however, 
would have available a wide range of expert staff skills that could be called upon as 
necessary to provide advice on what and how to improve. Second, a contractor would 
not be constrained by the often-unwieldy and time-consuming state purchasing and bid 
procedures. Things could get done quicker. Third, contractor employees would likely be 
more productive with fewer days off and a wider labor pool available for special 
requirements or during holidays and vacation times.
Encouraged by the possibility of improvements likely under a contract to operate 
the physical plant, and using the rural university’s experience as a model, the vice 
president and the director of physical plant concluded they should prepare and release a 
request for proposals. Anticipating a contract, the director had already begun to reduce 
the number of physical plant employees through attrition. By the time the contract was 
likely to be awarded, just over half the physical plant employees would be gone. This 
time around, however, the president appeared to have a few concerns, perhaps stimulated 
by the catering problems under the food services contract. What about costs? The vice 
president concluded total costs would be a little higher, but the improvements to facilities 
and the quality of services would more than Justify them. What about responsiveness? 
Would the contract limit flexibility to fix physical plant problems we may not anticipate
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now? Will we give up too much control? The vice president assured the president that 
the contract would allow both flexibility and control.
Whatever concerns the president may have had about outsourcing physical plant 
operations, he had explicit faith and confidence in his vice president for fiscal affairs. 
With broad experience in higher education finance and management, he had been 
recruited by the president explicitly to help him improve the university. Indeed, he 
describes his vice president as “one o f the best financial vice president presidents in the 
state, not solely because o f his abilities in finance, but also because of his overall 
imderstanding of higher education.” With his successful efforts to outsource the 
bookstore, high expectations of improvements in food services performance and, perhaps 
most important, his confidence in his vice president for fiscal affairs, the president was 
prepared to let the vice president move forward with a contract. He instructed the vice 
president to present the plan to the vice presidents for academic affairs and 
administrative affairs during a scheduled staff meeting, and then to two additional 
campus groups. Finally, the vice president presented the proposal to the regents, who 
subsequently approved it. The RFP was released, bids were received, and a highly- 
experienced, national-level contractor was selected.
About three months after the contract for physical plant management was signed, 
and just as the contractor was beginning to demonstrate improvements, the vice president 
suddenly and unexpectedly passed away. The passing of this highly skilled, respected 
and much liked individual directly and indirectly resulted in a number of lingering
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problems that have adversely affected the physical plant contract performance. First, the 
contract allowed current university physical plant employees to chose either to remain 
university employees working in the physical plant or to transfer to the contractor.
About half the employees chose to remain with the university. This arrangement created 
two parallel, dissimilar personnel structures: two separate pay structures; two separate 
vacation and holiday schedules; and limited control o f personnel by the contract 
manager. Difficulties soon surfaced. With more generous holiday and vacation benefits, 
the university employees scheduled or took time off when they didn’t like work 
assignments, disagreed with the contract manager’s decisions, or when they pleased. If 
they didn’t take unscheduled time off when they disagreed with the manager’s decisions, 
they claimed to be university employees and therefore not subject to his orders.
A highly unusual provision, it was designed to engender employee support for the 
contract, to protect long-term employees from losing generous retirement benefits, and to 
reassure regents and other decision makers that university employees would be treated 
well. When participants in the decision process were asked if both the contractor and the 
university had anticipated these problems, the responses generally acknowledged that 
they had, but that the vice president for fiscal affairs either had a plan or would know 
how to “make things work.” A delay of about six months in hiring a new vice president 
for fiscal affairs no doubt exacerbated the problems which, though difficult, were not 
intractable. Current and ongoing discussions between the contractor and the new vice 
president will likely resolve the issue, but the contract has been in effect for over a year 
and these problems have not endeared it to many participants.
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A second and related continuing problem concerns the former director of physical 
plant. Also retained as a university employee, his role was envisioned to provide 
contract oversight, and to liaison and coordinate between the contractor and the 
university. In practice, however, he continued to try to direct maintenance and repair 
priorities, frequently at odds with the contract manager. His efforts appear to stem from 
an attempt to fill the void left by the vice president’s death. The new vice president has 
moved to limit the former director’s influence in physical plant operations by assigning 
him as a purchasing agent for supplies available at lower cost through the state system, 
and for special projects for which the contractor would charge the university additional 
management fees. The former director’s enthusiasm for and support of the contract 
continues lukewarm at best.
A third unresolved issue concerns the status o f the motor pool, shipping and 
receiving, and campus security. Originally part of the physical plant, their status was not 
addressed in the contract, and downsizing in anticipation of outsourcing limits available 
resources to continue the functions under the university. It appears the motor pool and 
shipping and receiving were originally envisioned to fall under the contract, and all agree 
it is likely a problem the former vice president intended to work out. The contractor has 
nonetheless agreed to operate the motor pool, and the arrangement, likely to require an 
adjustment in the contract’s fees, continues under discussion with the university.
Although the university’s administration is generally pleased with the results of 
the physical plant contract, its future appears somewhat uncertain. The president and 
vice presidents acknowledge that maintenance and repairs are timely and of good quality,
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grounds keeping and landscaping have improved, and the contractor has repaired, 
replaced, upgraded, and generally improved the campus infrastructure, important 
improvements not generally visible. The contractor has also provided technical 
specialists from within its corporation when needed to assist with improvements. The 
administration is also pleased with the contract manager’s responsiveness and dedication. 
His proactive efforts have done much to offset the lingering problems in the 
administration’s view of the contract, as has the contractor’s willingness to negotiate 
changes to the contract.
Successful resolution o f the personnel issues, and renegotiating several o f the 
contract’s management fees, appear to be central to the contract’s continuation. In the 
president’s mind, no doubt reinforced by the former director o f physical plant, bringing 
physical plant operations back under the university remains an option. With half the 
physical plant employees still remaining under the university, including the former 
director, he believes he still has a core staff that can take the physical plant over and then 
hire additional staff. The president nonetheless appears committed to efforts to resolve 
the outstanding problems. If agreement can be reached on personnel, he states, he would 
be satisfied with some increase in the contract’s cost and would support its continuation. 
The new vice president for fiscal affairs continues vigorous efforts toward that end.
Outsourcing at this small liberal arts university thus remains a work in progress. 
The bookstore contract is considered highly successful. It generates significant revenues 
for the university and set a standard. The food services contract is less successful, 
particularly in catering, but the contractor has promised improvements and the president
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seems willing to allow them to try. The physical plant contract is still being negotiated, 
over a year after it was originally signed, with none o f the problems appearing to be 
intractable. Despite the absence of more than one proven success in outsourcing, the 
president and vice presidents still remain favorably disposed toward outsourcing as a 
concept and its benefits to the university.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study postulates that an economically-based, financially-driven decision 
model, when used to outsource higher education in-house functions, may be an 
incomplete explanation o f the process. Focusing on how and why higher education 
institutions outsource, it seeks a more complete decision model by asking two questions; 
(1) what non-financial, non-economic considerations play a significant role in 
outsourcing decisions, and (2) how does their presence affect the decision? Two 
corollary questions are implied: (a) are costs the major criterion upon which the decision 
to outsource was made; if not, then (b) what decision model is more appropriate or 
complete? A review of the literature suggests three hypotheses and associated models. 
First, outsource decisions are economic-based and financially-driven. Second, outsource 
decisions are management-based, and driven by possible efficiencies and the benefits of 
divestiture. Third, outsource decisions are driven by the decision process dynamics 
inherent in higher education: bureaucratic decision processes, collegial decision 
processes, or political dynamics decision processes.
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Outsource sequencing at the university is similar to outsourcing at the previous 
case’s rural university and demonstrates similar patterns even though the cases are 
separated by over 20 years. The same campus enterprises are involved: the bookstore, 
food services, and the campus physical plant. Both outsource efforts began with smaller 
enterprises, and initial success led to additional outsourcing efforts. Unlike the rural 
university’s experience with outsourcing its food services and bookstore, however, the 
small university’s interest in outsourcing these enterprises was not based on compelling 
financial concerns. Although the bookstore was not profitable, it was not in danger o f 
default. Food services a had been highly successful enterprise, and the decision to 
outsource was influenced by the bookstore’s successful contract and the president’s 
concern that he would be unable to find a qualified manager to replace the retiring 
manager. Economic-based, financially-driven concerns were important to the bookstore, 
but marginal to food services.
The university’s justification for outsourcing physical plant management likewise 
follows the rural university’s pattern. Both physical plants were operating adequately, 
and the decisions to outsource reflect the desire to improve operations and the 
expectations that outsourcing would offer management-based benefits deriving from 
economies of scale purchasing and greater productivity. Indeed, the university’s vice 
president for fiscal affairs and director o f physical plant drew explicitly and heavily on 
the rural university’s experience.
The decision processes were also similar. In both cases, participation in the 
decisions to outsource the bookstores and food services was limited to the presidents and
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the vice presidents for fiscal affairs. At the rural university, however, financial 
considerations required quick action, thereby limiting deliberation, whereas at the liberal 
arts university it appears the president’s determination to outsource and both enterprises’ 
limited impact on the campus community could explain the narrow decision processes. 
On both campuses and with both enterprises, the actions and decisions o f the respective 
presidents and vice presidents nevertheless fall within their organizational and 
bureaucratic roles and reflect that decision model.
When the decisions were made on both campuses to proceed with outsourcing the 
physical plants, the decision processes were expanded to include a broader decision 
group, reflecting in both cases recognition of the wider impact outsourcing physical plant 
operations would have on the respective campus communities. O f particular importance 
is the significantly greater cost o f the physical plant contracts, and the number o f higher 
skilled and higher paid long-term physical plant employees. Further, in both cases the 
decisions to outsource the physical plants reflect the collegial decision model. At the 
small university, however, political dynamics played a marginal role in the bookstore and 
food services decisions, and a secondary role in the physical plant. This does not imply 
political dynamics had no impact on outsourcing. To the contrary, concern for the 
welfare o f physical plant employees and the need for their support led directly to the 
decision to allow employees to chose to go with the contractor or remain with the 
university. That decision, in turn, is now causing contract and operating difficulties.
To summarize, the economic-based, financially-driven decision model at the 
university appears to play a less significant role than the management-driven model, and
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is an incomplete explanation o f the decisions. In all three, there were no compelling 
needs to outsource for financial reasons or to divest campus operations. Like the first 
case, these considerations were important but not decisive, and help explain why the 
decisions were made. The management-based model, postulating that outsourcing can 
provide efficiencies, increased productivity, and economies of scale, was a primary 
explanation of why the physical plant was outsourced. More important were the decision 
process dynamics explaining how the decisions were made; the bureaucratic model in 
the decisions to outsource the bookstore and food services, and the collegial model in the 
decision to outsource the physical plant.
Beyond confirming that the decision models provide a more complete explanation 
of outsource decisions, the university’s experience appears to reaffirm the pattern 
identified in the earlier cases: the higher the value and magnitude of a potential outsource 
contract, the more significant non-economic and non-financial considerations become. 
The bookstore’s gross sales are now about $500,000 per year. Food services’ sales are 
running about $350,000 per year. The physical plant budget, however, is over twice 
those amounts at $1.2 million, and represents about 20% of the university’s total annual 
budget.
In addition, together with the rural university’s experience, the small university’s 
experience seems to suggest another pattern; on small campuses, bureaucratic and 
collegial decision models are more likely, and political process decision dynamics are 
less important. Finally, although the university is experiencing difficulties with two of 
its three contracts, it nonetheless reaffirms again many benefits associated with
154
outsourcing. In particular, outsourcing can increase revenues and decrease costs. It can 
bring up-front resources either unavailable to, or difficult to obtain by campuses. And, it 
can increase productivity and reduce costs through economies o f scale and with a larger 
labor pool.
Somewhat a surprise, the university’s experience with outsourcing did not appear 
to include explicit or implicit reengineering efforts. With the bookstore, reengineering 
did not appear to be considered at all. With food services, the enterprise was already 
successful and reengineering seemed unnecessary. With the physical plant, 
reengineering was considered unlikely to result in any improvements given the limited 
skill pool and long-tenures o f in-house employees. Likewise a surprise, the 
management-divestiture model was little in evidence. The president and vice president 
continue to be actively engage in managing Food Services and the Physical Plant. An 
explanation may be that both conclude the food services and physical plant contracts 
have not proven as successful as anticipated.
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I. IMTROPÜCTION (William D. Middleton)
Throughout higher education, and the public sector 
generally, there has been a growing interest in the idea 
of privatisation as a means of reducing costs and 
improving quality of support services. The perception - 
and sometimes the reality - is that a public sector or 
institutional work force is inefficient and non- 
responsive. We should let the private sector, and 
coBq>etition, work to assure that services are provided at 
the lowest possible cost and in the most responsive 
possible memner.
The Federal government has had privatization programs 
for years, and many state and local governments have 
followed suit. In Virginia, our former Governor, Gerald 
Baliles, several years ago mandated a "make/buy" 
competitive procurement program. This required that we 
compare the cost of services provided in the public sector 
with the cost of contracted services.
Even if it isn't required, shouldn't we as prudent 
managers be doing this as a matter of course?
At the University of Virginia we have given much 
thought to just how we could best carry out such 
comparisons, and have developed a program based upon the 
framework provided by Governor Baliles's "make/buy" 
executive memorandum.
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In developing our program we reached one essential 
conclusion: The issue is not privatization versus in-
house performance; the issue is competition.
David Osborne, who has done a great deal of study and 
writing on improving efficiency in government, has 
established as one of his basic guidelines: "Whenever 
possible, inject competition into public service."
Osborne quotes the city auditor at Phoenix, Arizona, 
Jim Flanagem, who has discovered there is no truth to the 
old saw that outside business is always more efficient 
than government. The important distinction, says 
Flanagan, is not public versus private, it is monopoly 
versus competition.
"Where there is competition," says Flanagan, "you get 
better results, more cost-consciousness and superior 
service delivery."
In developing our program in Virginia, we didn't want 
to just trade an in-house monopoly for a contractor 
monopoly.
Think about it:., Isn't this what we often do when we 
contract out a service ?
In principle, our "make/buy" competitive procurement 
program is one under which our internal work force 
competes for facilities projects or service contracts 
against private sector contractors. In establishing the 
program we had three principal goals:
1. We wanted to assure ourselves, and our 
customers, that facilities projects and services 
are being provided at a satisfactory level, of 
quality and in the most economical manner 
available.
2. We wanted f j a c t  as a force to 
enhance the cost-consciousness/ efficiency, and 
productivity of our internal work force.
3. R i y , wanted the force of greater 
C^ o m ^ t i t jia^to enhance the competitiveness of
ours ide^“cont ract or s.
We have established as basic policy that we will 
make the broadest possible use of competitive "make/buy" 
solicitations for all forms of facility services, whenever
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feasible. To do this effectively, we recognized that some h 
fundeuaental restructuring of our organization and revision// 
of responsibilities would be necessary. The principal 
changes have been:
1. Our work management department has become our 
"program manager" for most of the University's 
facilities maintenance and services budgets 
allocated directly to facilities management, and 
acts in a similar capacity for all of our 
reimbursable customers. Their charge is simply 
to get the work done for the lowest possible 
cost at an acceptable level of performance.
2. Our operations department has been recast as an 
"entrepreneurial" unit which is expected to 
compete for work much like any private sector 
business. They are now responsible for 
establishing pricing and schedules for work 
performance, and are fully accountable for the 
finemcial results.
3. Our business operations unit has established a 
comprehensive.; system of financial responsibility 
centers throughout the facilities management 
organization. Each such center is held
accountable for the profit or loss of their
"mzüce/buy" activities.
We initiated this "make/buy" approach at the 
University of Virginia not quite two years ago, and have 
now completed more than $2 million in procurements under
this program. Today we'll give you an overview of how we
have modified the organization and established procedures 
to effectively conduct a competitive procurement program, 
we'll summarize the principal results to date, and will 
offer some advice based upon this experience for anyone 
who might.be contemplating a similar venture.
Jay Klingel, director of work management, will first 
discuss the procedures through which his office functions 
as program manager for facilities pfojects and services, 
the several different procedures we've established for our 
"make/buy" contracts, and our procedures for evaluating 
bids or proposals and administering "make/buy" contracts.
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Next, Dick Fowler, director of facilities operations, 
will discuss how we've reorganized our principal operating 
department to make it a more businesslike entrepreneurial 
unit, how we are using fineuicial responsibility centers as 
a way of providing management incentives, and how we have 
begun to change the culture of the organization to provide 
a greater emphasis on productivity and competitiveness.
Third, Bill stauff, our director of business 
operations, will talk about the formulation of the 
responsibility center concept; our approach to planning, 
budgeting, repoirting, emd controlling under this concept; 
and our cost accounting system.
Finally, we'll talk a bit about the effects of 
"make/buy" procurement, both as perceived by our 
customers, and as we have seen it inside the organization, 
and we'll summarize the results to date and offer advice 
from our experience for others interested in this 
competitive procurement approach.
II. "MAKE/BOY" PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (Jay Klingel)
The program has required some fundamental changes in 
our facilities management organization._ As mentîbhëd, the~ 
'work management orflee has become more of a program 
management groi^.
Our job is to get the maintenance and improvement 
work completed at the lowest possible cost at an 
acceptable level of quality. We manage maintenance 
programs and budgets by controlling the flew of 
•through a series of comparisons. The work
management group no longer has the responsibility to "keep 
the shops busy", but to do as much maintenance for the 
money as possible through competitive comparisons.
As we began to implement our ideas on the "make/buy" 
program, we realized that contract development, or 
preparing the procurement specifications, would be the 
first key to a successful program.
The position of service contracts manager was 
established as part of our work management office. The 
duties of this position include specification development, 
procurement coordination, contract administration, and 
reporting. We were fortionate to attract a candidate with 
procurement experience in the public sector, bringing the 
skills and knowledge necessary to establish a consistent 
and accurate program of writing specifications. By
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combining the technical expertise of operations personnel 
and procurement experience we feel we have been able to 
develop solid and equitable specifications.
The types of contracts we have established vary from 
long term (multi-year) service contracts, to yearly unit 
rate agreements, to spot or lump sum purchases for 
specific projects. These different types of procurements 
allow us to compare prices of in house and outside 
contractors in three distinct ways:
. 1. Long Term Service Contracts. These contracts
are based on providing a basic service on an 
annual or multi-year basis. Examples of this 
type of contract for which we have completed 
"make/buy" comparisons based on direct 
competition include custodial services, elevator 
maintenance, grass mowing, and fire detection 
and inspection.
2. Unit Rate Standing Contracts. These contracts
are awzurded to outside contractors for yet-to-be 
determined services based on a unit rate. Once
contracts are in place we are able to make an
indirect comparison of in-house versus 
contracted costs for a specific job. Examples 
of this type of contract include interior paint, 
suspended ceilings, tile floor, and concrete 
sidewalks. If our Operations crews are able to 
provide services at a lower cost than the 
contract unit rate, the work is assigned to them 
through that method of indirect comparison.
3. Snot Procurement. These contracts are awarded 
through a direct competitive bids for a specific 
project. Examples would be a renovation 
project, painting the exterior of a building, or 
moving a department from one facility to 
another.
Through these three basic procurement methods we feel 
we have built a foundation to eventually compare costs for 
virtually the full range of services provided by our 
Facilities Management organization.
We are obviously unable to develop comprehensive 
specifications for all services at one time. We have 
tried to identify those items that would result in the 
most savings from a competitive comparison. Services that 
had been traditionally contracted that we felt our own
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forces may be able to accomplish and, as well, those 
services we normally provided with in-house forces that 
were not competitively priced, were targeted first.
As a state institution, all of our procurements must 
be in accordance with the Virginia Public Procurement Act. 
For all our directly competitive comparisons we ask that 
our Operations Depeutment abide by the same rules as their 
competition.
The level of quality must be emphasized in the 
specification. While the cost of services is foremost in 
many of our minds, especially in our current financial 
climate, an acceptable level of quality must be 
maintained. Describing that acceptable level-of quality, 
especially for a service, is perhaps the specifier's most 
difficult task.
Evaluation of Bids/Proposals
After the need is developed for a particular 
contract, a solicitation must be issued to both outside 
contractor zuid in-house forces. The bid or proposal from 
our in-house forces is treated almost identically as bids 
from the private sector. Facilities Operations must 
develop a bid price based on solicitation requirements and 
submit it to the same office which issued the solicitation 
to - the private sector. Once bids are received, the in- 
house bid is compared to the lowest responsible/responsive 
bid from outside contractors. A "make/buy" analysis is 
completed based on these two bids. The solicitation 
requirements may need to be clarified to assure that all 
parties involved in the procurement have a full and 
complete understanding.
‘ • When evaluating bids/proposals within the "make/buy"
program, researching the capabilities of both in-house and 
the outside contractors is an essential element when 
making an award. One should take the time to do the 
necessary research to determine if the apparent low bidder 
has the capabilities to complete the contracted work. 
Contractor or in-house capabilities to be researched might 
include:
- Financial Data/Fund Availability
- Availeüsle Technical Equipment/Personnel
- Production/Delivezry Capacity
- Quality Assurance Program
After researching the capabilities of Facilities 
Operations as well as the outside contractor, an award is
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made. Various types of information about the award should 
be provided to both end user departments as well as 
Facilities Management personnel. Such information would 
include; what type of contract was awarded, for how long, 
to whom, and any "make/buy" cost analysis data for key 
management personnel.
Contract Administration
The Work Management Depaxrkment has been delegated the 
responsibility to handle contract administration. This 
includes the determination of what types of services are 
to be analyzed under the "make/buy" program, developing 
specifications, reviewing bids when received, completing a 
"make/buy" analysis, recommending award, and performing 
inspections on contracted work.
Work Management is also responsible for coordinating 
contract work and performing a final inspection on 
contracted work. This includes the establishment of a 
tracking system on all contractual work, showing work 
schedules for each particular contract, establishing 
project performance dates, and performing final inspection 
of projects when completed. Whether work is completed by 
in-house forces or by outside contractors,- a quality 
assurance program should be established to monitor 
performance and to offer solutions to problems. Work 
Management monitors and assesses contractual solutions to 
assure that they are appropriate to the problems and 
competently implemented.
III. COMPETING UNDER ««MAKE/BÜY» (Richard Fowler)
Facilities Operations reorganized the maintenance and 
renovation shops into individual responsibility centers 
(cost centers). We used zero based methods to establish 
our budgeting and spread appropriate divisional, 
departmental and overall assignable Facilities Management 
overhead to the individual cost centers. We then fine- 
tuned the billing rates of selected cost centers as 
required to enhance their competitiveness.
In "make/buy" comparisons we compete head-to-head 
with successful local contractors. An examination of 
examining fourteen recent "make/buy" comparisons for our 
renovations shops during the 1991-92 time frame reveals 
that Facilities Operations was low bidder on nine projects 
at an average of 15% below the next low bidder. However, 
in this tight economy we have found that some contractors 
were providing loss leaders just to make payroll. Our
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renovations superintendents have been actively courting 
project managers amd customer facilities representatives to 
learn of additional work opportunities.
Some of the problems associated with the "make/buy" 
approach include a diminished control of our work load. 
Our backlog of work has been reduced significantly because 
the decision point in determining when we are awarded 
projects has been delayed until very late in the life of a 
project.
Additionally, the recessive economy contributed to a 
paucity of projects of any sort to be accomplished. Due 
to our competitive environment, we have been forced to 
reduce the amount of advice, pricing and other "free" 
services we previously provided to others.
We have increased our productivity awareness and have 
actively marketed our services to the University 
community. We have additionally solicited work from 
other state agencies and local governments. This has 
provided opportunities for us to perform sign making, 
asbestos removal consulting, furniture renewal and 
establishing recycling programs for local school systems. 
We have started putting on "dog-and-pony" shows to 
demonstrate our capabilities and to foster the thought 
that work could be cost-effectively accomplished by us 
during this period of diminished activity.
We have additionally begun a series of discussions 
with customers concerning performing design-build projects 
using our own staff and teaming up with Facilities 
Planning & Construction Department to buy their 
professional design services for either a piece of the 
action or on an hourly rate basis. We feel that we can 
best serve our customers by striking a deal based on a 
guaranteed maximum price with a negotiated shared savings 
based on perceived risk to both parties. This procedure 
not only makes us an advocate for the customer since we 
both have a strong interest in bringing in a project as 
cheaply as possible but it takes much of the guesswork out 
of the composition and timing of our backlog of work, as 
well as puts a project on an expedited track.
The "make/buy" approach has been a little scary due 
mainly to the overall economy rather than due to the 
competitiveness of the system. It has caused the 
adrenalin to pump a little faster during our work days.
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IV. RESPONSIBTI.ITY CENTER ACCODMTING (William StaUff)
Cost center restructuring is necessary when a company 
reorganizes. An APPA evaluation team and an independent 
facilities consultant organization made recommendations 
resulting in changes to our organization. Cost center 
restructuring followed based on a three-fold harmony of 
establishing the cost system with budgets in sync with the 
organizational structure (Figure 1).
We reviewed our organization and established 
responsibility units for each service that we provide. 
We designed the system to assess the achievement of each 
profit center including that of the manager in control of 
its operation. Plumbing supervisors now take on an 
additional task as fiscal manager, as well as a service 
oriented memager. Up to this time, foxrty million dollars 
($40,000,000) was controlled by few euid spent by many.
Planning, budgeting, reporting, and controlling is 
now by profit center. The general theory is to delegate 
responsibility for memaging expenditures to the supervisor 
at the point where the costs are generated. 
Decentralization of accountability is now in place. The 
first (quarter review of fiscal year 1991-1992 was an 
interesting phenomenon. Many of the cost center memagers* 
profit centers were in the "black. " In many cases their 
revenues were down, but the new reporting eneüaled them to 
see their bottom line and thus hold back discretionary 
expenses. So far it's working!
Zero-based budgeting is now in place. Ronald 
Blickhahn, who applied zero based budgeting at Duke, 
emphasized: "This system requires each function,
activity or program to be justified on the basis of its 
own merit to the organization. Zero-based budgeting calls 
for resource allocations to be committed only after each 
activity or program is analyzed and justified from scratch 
or 'based' zero."
»
Thirty-three cost center managers prepare budgets 
which are reviewed and approved in accordance with 
established organizational goals autd objectives.
The cost accounting system is part of the Facilities 
Management system (FMS). David J. Gojdies from Emory 
University, talks about the need for a university's 
facilities management system to be "the primary planning 
and control tool of the physical plant department." The 
system that the University of Virginia is putting in place
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allows the facilities memagement budget structure to be 
arranged in cost centers that match the various functions 
or shops. The system has the capeüaility to summarize cost 
and budget data in the NACUBO/APPA reporting formats 
(Figtire 2 ). The accounting system integrates with the 
facilities management system and interfaces with the 
administrative mainframe for uploading and downloading. 
The system allows users on-line access and query 
capeüsility.
V. The Results of "Malce/Buv” (Jay Klingel)
We felt it was important to track the progress of the 
"make/buy" program both in terms of the nmnber and types 
of procurements as well as the financial impact. We are 
tracking the cost, differential between Facilities 
Management's proposals and the low private sector 
proposals. The difference is not necessarily a savings. 
For instance, we have traditionally contracted pest 
control services. In a "make/buy" procurement, if our in- 
house bid was $10,000 higher- than the low contractor, we 
haven't saved $10,000. But, on the other hand, if the in- 
house bid was $10,000 lower, we have, in effect, "saved" 
that amount due to injecting competition. Thus the actual 
savings realized by the program represents the 
differential of proposals for those services for which the 
traditional provider chemged as a result of competition.
We have been tracking the financial results of 
"make/buy" procurements since January 1991. Through March 
of 1992 a total dollar volume of $1.99 million had been 
awarded as a result of "make/buy" comparisons. Of that 
total, 75% has been awarded to in-house forces. The 
cumulative differential of in-house bids and the low 
private contractor bid is- $.59 million. Attached is the 
reporting format we've developed, indicating financial 
information through the third quarter of fiscal year 1991- 
92 (Figure 3) .
Effects on the Organization
We've mentioned the move in our organization toward a 
more entrepreneurial attitude and approach by our 
operations area. The "make/buy" program forces this 
approach due to the fact that as more and more basic 
services are competitively procured, the operations group 
must become more innovative, more business-like in order 
to acquire the work to recover their expenses.
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We found early in the program that some of our shops, 
because of rate structures, were unable to compete with 
the private sector. ' This resulted, positively, in a lower 
price for those services.
Negatively, employees in these shops were unable to 
obtain work. Ultimately some positions were terminated 
and these employees were either transferred or, in some 
cases, laid-off. So, there are admittedly morale 
implications due to the "make/buy" program.
Many employees feel threatened by the possibilities 
that "make/buy” comparisons present. There are 
constraints in the Virginia State personnel and 
procurement systems that limit flexibility in many cases. 
However, we are finding that those individuals that are 
confident in themselves emd their work are welcoming the 
challenges that the program offers. Those of us who have 
heard that "Facilities Management teüces too lon^ amd costs 
too much" welcome the opportunity to compete with private 
contractors, and demonstrate the cost effectiveness of 
public sector work.
The assumption that private business is always more 
efficient than government or public work is not accepted 
in our organization.
We feel that appropriate levels of competitive 
comparisons will not only reveal where efficiencies 
currently lie, but will enhance efficiency in both the 
public and private sector service providers.
One of the key differences between public and private 
sector business is, of course, profit motivation. Through 
competition, the private sector earns profit. The public 
sector, traditionally, has no profit motivation. By 
combining the concepts of competitive comparisons for 
services and facilities endowments, the public sector can 
make a case for earning not a personal profit, but a 
public profit. By confronting the bureaucratic tendencies 
of complacency and centralization, we hope to become less 
of a bureaucratic public organization and more of a 
competitive entrepreneurial public organization.
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